Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of appellees' motion to dismiss Rosanna Mac Turner's and David Turner's Adversary Complaint without leave to amend. The panel held that the Turners' claims for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law were correctly dismissed without leave to amend because the Turners' lack of standing could not be cured by amendment. The panel also held that the district court correctly dismissed the Turners' claims for breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the Deed of Trust (DOT) and violation of Cal. Civ. Code 2923.5 without leave to amend because any amendment would be futile. The panel explained that the DOT permitted the substitution of the Trustee, the Turners cannot allege that they suffered damages for the alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the DOT, and appellees have complied with Section 2923.5, leaving the Turners no remedy. View "Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank NA" on Justia Law

Mello appealed the bankruptcy court's order confirming debtors' second amended plan without a hearing. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the bankruptcy court was in the best position to determine when an evidentiary hearing on the issue of good faith was necessary. The panel also held that the bankruptcy court did not err in overruling Mello's objections and confirming debtors' second amended plan. View "Mello v. Wojciechowski" on Justia Law

Agriprocessors wired funds covering overdrafts at Luana Savings Bank in the 90 days before the company filed for bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy court found that the bankruptcy trustee could recover some deposits, the trustee and the bank cross-appealed. The Eighth Circuit held that the true overdrafts were debt because the bank made an unsecured loan and/or extension of credit to Agriprocessors and thus Agriprocessors was legally obligated to the bank for the amount of the overdrafts. Therefore, the district court correctly found that the trustee could recover Agriprocessors' true-overdraft-covering deposits from the bank. Furthermore, the payments did not qualify as contemporaneous exchanges for new value, debts and transfers in the ordinary course of business, nor transfers creating security interests. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to base the bank's liability on the uncorrected balances; the bankruptcy court did not err in finding a netting agreement; and the transfer was not for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made, and thus not voidable; View "Sarachek v. Luana Savings Bank" on Justia Law

The one-year filing deadline imposed by 11 U.S.C. 727(e)(1) was a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. Debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition that fraudulently omitted his home, a key asset. Because no one notice, debtor subsequently received a discharge of his debts under 11 U.S.C. 727(a). The panel held that a non-jurisdictional time bar was an affirmative defense that may be forfeited if not timely raised, and debtor forfeited the defense by failing to raise it in the bankruptcy court. On the merits, the bankruptcy court's determination that debtor fraudulently concealed his ownership interest in the home was plainly correct. Therefore, the panel reversed the bankruptcy court's judgment dismissing the trustee's request for relief under section 727(d)(1) and remanded with instructions. View "Weil v. Elliott" on Justia Law

General Mills filed an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Applying Minnesota law to its preclusion analysis, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's rejection of debtor's claim preclusion defense. In this case, because all claims between codefendants were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation, there was no final adjudication on the merits. Furthermore, because General Mills' adversary claim arose from its rights and remedies with respect to debtor's execution of a promissory note secured by the property at issue, there was no final adjudication of that issue. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court as to issue preclusion as well. The court rejected debtor's claim of judicial estoppel where General Mills did not take inconsistent positions. The court also held that General Mills' fraud claims were not barred by the statute of limitations; rejected debtor's challenges to the bankruptcy court's evidentiary rulings; and affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that debtor's debt was not dischargeable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hernandez v. General Mills Federal Credit Union" on Justia Law

A group of hotel-related businesses, as well as investors and guarantors, filed suit alleging claims of fraud against the Royal Bank and two of its subsidiaries. The district court dismissed the claims because plaintiffs had failed to list their cause of action in a schedule of assets in their now-concluded bankruptcy proceeding, they lacked standing to bring the claim, and were barred by judicial estoppel. The claims of the investor and guarantors were dismissed as untimely and barred by the law of the case. The Second Circuit affirmed on the grounds of judicial estoppel and timeliness. The court held that, under Fifth Circuit law, the kind of LIBOR-fraud claim that BPP wanted to assert was "a known cause of action" at the time of confirmation, so that BPP's failure to list it in the schedule of assets was equivalent to a representation that none existed; the bankruptcy court "adopted" BPP's position; and BPP's assertion of the claims now would allow it to enjoy an unfair advantage at the expense of its former creditors. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not shown good cause for an untimely amendment, and the district court properly denied leave to amend. View "BPP Illinois v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy trustee filed suit against Pennie Glasser, seeking to recover from her, as a preference, a payment made by debtor to her. Glass is the former wife of an insider of debtor, as well as a minor investor and employee of debtor at the time of payment. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that Glasser was not an insider of debtor and the payment was not an avoidable preference under 11 U.S.C. 547(b) and Minnesota Statute 513.45(b). In this case, Glasser did not have sufficient closeness to be treated as an insider. View "Seaver v. Glasser" on Justia Law

Raymond and Sandra have lived in their Ambler, Pennsylvania home since 1993. They took on a mortgage from AmeriChoice. They fell behind on their payments. In 2012, AmeriChoice filed a foreclosure action; AmeriChoice obtained a default judgment. AmeriChoice scheduled a sheriff’s sale. The day before that sale, Raymond, acting alone, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, triggering the automatic stay and preventing the sale. The case was dismissed six months later after Raymond failed to make payments. AmeriChoice rescheduled the sale. On the rescheduled date, Raymond filed a second Chapter 13 petition. The Bankruptcy Court granted relief from the stay. On the second rescheduled date, Sandra filed her Chapter 13 petition. Days later the court dismissed Sandra’s petition for failure to obtain prepetition credit counseling. In Raymond’s second case, AmeriChoice moved (11 U.S.C. 1307(c)) to either convert Raymond’s case to Chapter 7 or dismiss, arguing bad faith use of bankruptcy. Raymond unsuccessfully moved to postpone a hearing and the day before the hearing sought dismissal under section 1307(b). Raymond did not appear at the hearing. The court dismissed Raymond’s case, stating that he was “not permitted to file another bankruptcy case without express permission.” Sandra was subsequently enjoined from filing bankruptcy for 180 days. The Third Circuit vacated. While a bankruptcy court may issue a filing injunction while approving a section 1307(b) voluntary dismissal, the injunction against Raymond, beyond what had been requested, was not supported by reasoning. View "In re: Ross" on Justia Law

Debtors filed voluntary petitions under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and a motion seeking bankruptcy court approval of an asset purchase agreement (APA), whereby they agreed to seek substantially all of their assets to Buyer. The bankruptcy court approved the APA through a sale order and confirmed Debtors’ proposed plan of reorganization. Appellants, senior executives of Debtor, were then informed that their employment was terminated the day the sale closed. The bankruptcy court found Buyer liable to Appellants under the APA for their severance pay. The district court vacated the judgment against Buyer, finding that Appellants’ claims against Buyer fell outside the bankruptcy court’s statutorily granted jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims for severance pay from Buyer because the claims were not proceedings which “arise in” the chapter 11 bankruptcy such that they fell within the grant of jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. 1334. View "Quincy Medical Center v. Gupta" on Justia Law

ASARCO filed suit against MRI, challenging MRI's refusal to bring ASARCO back into a partnership in a Montana copper mine. MRI argued that ASARCO's decisions during its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing prevent it from suing for reinstatement. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of MRI's motion for summary judgment on preclusion and estoppel grounds. The court held that the district court correctly determined that ASARCO was not precluded from bringing its breach of contract claim and the claim was not barred by res judicata. The court explained that the claim was contingent on future events and thus ASARCO could not have brought it during the adversary proceeding. The court also held that ASARCO's disclosure of the right to reinstate, though scant, was sufficient. Finally, the court left it to the district court to decide in the first instance the nature of the provision and whether, if it is executory, the ride-through doctrine applies. View "ASARCO v. Montana Resources" on Justia Law