Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to intervene in an adversary proceeding arising within the Commonwealth’s debt adjustment case under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2161-2177, holding that 11 U.S.C. 1109(b) provides an “unconditional right to intervene” within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).Appellant, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (UCC), intervened in an adversary proceeding initiated by Plaintiffs within a larger case brought by the Financial Oversight and Management Board on behalf of the Commonwealth. The Board had commenced quasi-bankruptcy proceedings to restructure the Commonwealth’s debt under a part of PROMESA referred to as Title III. The district court denied the UCC’s motion to intervene with respect both to intervention as of right and to permissive intervention. The First Circuit reversed, holding that section 1109(b) provided the UCC with an unconditional right to intervene in the adversary proceeding. View "Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors" on Justia Law

Telecommunications retailer OneStar paid its supplier, MCI, $1.9 million during the 90 days before OneStar was forced into bankruptcy. OneStar’s bankruptcy trustee sought to recapture those payments under 11 U.S.C. 547(b), which generally allows debtors to avoid payments made during the 90-day “preference period.” MCI asserted affirmative defenses under 11 U.S.C. 547(c): that the payments were unavoidable because MCI offset them by subsequently providing OneStar with new value--additional telecommunications services--and the payments occurred in the ordinary course of business. The trustee contended that the new value was canceled because, one week before the bankruptcy filing, OneStar assigned its contract with MCI to a newly-formed affiliate, releasing MCI from its contractual obligations to OneStar. MCI was now obligated to provide services to the affiliate, which then relayed those services to OneStar. The bankruptcy judge rejected Verizon’s ordinary-course defense but ruled that the new value MCI advanced during the preference period sufficed to make OneStar’s preferential payments unavoidable; the debt assignment to the newly-formed affiliate was irrelevant. The district judge and Seventh Circuit affirmed. A debtor’s assignment of debt and contractual rights to an affiliate does not have the effect of repaying a creditor for new value. MCI advanced subsequent new value that remained unpaid, so OneStar’s preferential transfers are unavoidable. View "Verizon Business Global, LLC v. Levin" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's order holding that CRP holds a judicial lien against the real property of debtor and avoiding that lien under Bankruptcy Code 522(f)(1). The panel held that CRP's recording of its judgment fastened an existing, but presently unenforceable lien on the property. Furthermore, the fact that an unenforceable lien exists was buttressed by CRP's belief that upon the death of debtor's wife, it will have an enforceable lien that will survive the bankruptcy. View "CRP Holdings v. O'Sullivan" on Justia Law

When a plaintiff takes inconsistent positions by pursuing in district court a civil claim that he failed to disclose as an asset in his bankruptcy proceedings, a district court may apply judicial estoppel to bar the plaintiff's civil claim if it finds that the plaintiff intended to make a mockery of the judicial system. When determining whether a plaintiff who failed to disclose a civil lawsuit in bankruptcy filings intended to make a mockery of the judicial system, a district court should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the court should look to factors such as the plaintiff's level of sophistication, his explanation for the omission, whether he subsequently corrected the disclosures, and any action taken by the bankruptcy court concerning the nondisclosure. The court overruled portions of Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003), and Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), that permit a district court to infer intent to misuse the courts without considering the individual plaintiff and the circumstances surrounding the nondisclosure. Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration of whether the district court abused its discretion in light of this new standard. View "Slater v. United Steel Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order enforcing a stipulated agreement in adversary proceedings seeking to debar an attorney from submitting claims to asbestos trusts. The trusts were created through the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of entities exposed to significant asbestos liability. In Golden v. California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 782 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2015), the panel held that assessing the validity of a settlement agreement is a question of state contract law. In this case, the district court never addressed whether federal law governed this case, and it was unclear whether the district court was even aware that the trusts contended that federal law controlled its decision. Furthermore, the district court also did not apply Golden to the settlement at issue. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court can decide whether federal or state law governs (including whether the federal law argument has been waived), and what impact, if any, Golden has on this case. View "Mandelbrot v. J.T. Thorpe Settlement Trust" on Justia Law

11 U.S.C. 502(b)(4) acts as a federal cap on a fee already determined pursuant to state law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's decision reducing a claim for pre-petition attorneys' fees under section 502(b)(4). Section 502(b)(4) limits claims for services rendered by the debtor's attorney to the extent that such claims exceed the reasonable value of such services. The panel explained that the proper mode of analysis was: (1) an acknowledgment or determination that the fee contract was breached; (2) an assessment of the damages for the breach under state law; (3) a determination under section 502(b)(4) of reasonableness of the damages claim afforded by state law; and (4) a reduction of the claim by whatever extent, if any, it is deemed excessive. The panel also held that the section 502(b)(4) cap limits fees for services already performed. The Full Faith and Credit Act requires, in the circumstances of this case, that the judgment of the state court confirming the arbitration award be given full faith and credit in the bankruptcy proceeding. View "McProud v. Siller" on Justia Law

Defendant Anice Plikaytis appealed an order awarding her attorneys' fees in a breach of contract action brought by plaintiff Debra Roth. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with Plikaytis's contention that the trial court erred when it declined to consider previously filed documents she incorporated by reference as part of her motion. In the unpublished portions of the opinion, the Court discussed Plikaytis's arguments that: (1) the court failed to apply the lodestar method; (2) erroneously denied fees for equitable and cross-claims and for obtaining relief from bankruptcy stays; and (3) substantially reduced her award without explanation. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by denying fees for obtaining bankruptcy stay relief that related to the breach claim and failing to provide an adequate justification for significantly reducing the number of hours allowed. Accordingly, the trial court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded with directions. View "Roth v. Plikaytis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that 11 U.S.C. 363(f), authorizing a trustee to sell a debtor's assets free and clear of third-party interests, applied in this case, and did not conflict with section 365(h), which protects the rights of lessees, because the trustee did not "reject" the leases. The panel affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's decision that a bankruptcy trustee's sale of a debtor's property was free and clear of unexpired leases. Therefore, section 363(f)(1) authorized the sale of SHP's property free and clear of the Pinnacle and Opticom leases. Since the trustee did not reject the leases, section 365 was not implicated. View "Pinnacle Restaurant at Big Sky LLC v. CH SP Acquisitions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment denying debtor a discharge of his debts. The panel held that the bankruptcy court's finding that debtor failed to make timely installment payments was based on his procrastination, rather than the inclement weather, was not clearly erroneous; debtor's argument under Article 2 of Iowa's uniform commercial code failed because the parties' agreement was not subject to it; even if the parties' agreement were subject to Article 2, the settlement agreement's default provision was not a liquidated damages clause; and the panel rejected debtor's remaining issues that were not raised before the bankruptcy court. View "Charles Gabus Motors, Inc. v. Tirrell" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted debtors' petition for panel rehearing and withdrew the previously filed opinion. The court denied debtors' petition for rehearing en banc.The court held that the bankruptcy court erred in ordering debtors to turn over the liquidated funds from an IRA to the trustee. In this case, the property interest was "withdrawn from the estate" when the exemptions were allowed, and there was no provision under which debtors' subsequently acquired interests in amounts distributed from the IRA could become part of the estate. Accordingly, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's order requiring debtors' to turn over the liquidated funds to the trustee and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hawk v. Engelhart" on Justia Law