Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

After a bankruptcy sale extinguished an easement of the Port, the Port filed an adversary proceeding against debtors, seeking to invalidate the sale and regain its easement. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rejection of the Port's sovereign immunity and fraud claims.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no Eleventh Amendment violation or basis for a claim of fraud. In this case, the bankruptcy court approved a section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code sale "free and clear" of encumbrances, including the Port's easement; the bankruptcy court did not award affirmative relief nor deploy coercive judicial process against the Port and did not exercise in personam jurisdiction over the state; and any section 363(f) objection had to have been raised on direct appeal of the confirmation order and could not be raised in this collateral adversary proceeding. Furthermore, the Port failed to allege any false representation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Port leave to amend. View "Port of Corpus Christi Authority v. Sherwin Alumina Co." on Justia Law

Debtor is the sole member of REN, a Kentucky limited liability company that owns Louisville real estate. The Chapter 7 Trustee sought authority to sell that property, asserting that Debtor’s interest in REN was estate property under 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1), deemed to have been assigned to Trustee. The bankruptcy court held two hearings, both times explaining that Trustee stands in Debtor’s shoes as the sole member of REN and has whatever authority Debtor would have to sell the property, then granted Trustee’s motion. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed an appeal. There is no evidence that Debtor is a “person aggrieved” by the Sale Order. REN—not Debtor—owns the real estate. Debtor failed to explain how its sale would diminish his property, increase his burdens, or impair his rights and lacks the requisite pecuniary interest in the real estate sale contemplated in the Sale Order. Debtor did not claim an exemption in his membership interest in REN and failed to demonstrate that his success on appeal would otherwise entitle him to a distribution of surplus assets from his chapter 7 estate. View "In re Pasley" on Justia Law

In 1998, Williams hired Jaffe as her attorney. The statute of limitations expired before Jaffe filed a complaint. Williams sued for legal malpractice, obtained a default judgment, and recorded that judgment on property owned by Jaffe and his wife as tenants by the entirety. Jaffe filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2015, which identified that debt, indicating it was secured by a judgment lien on his residence. On the petition date, Jaffe and his wife owned the property as tenants by the entirety. Before bankruptcy proceedings were complete Jaffe’s wife died.When she died the tenancy by the entirety terminated; Jaffe held the property individually in fee simple. In Illinois, a creditor cannot force the sale of the tenancy by the entirety property to collect a debt against only one of the tenants but not all interests held by tenants by the entirety are immune from process. Jaffe argued that his contingent future interest in the property was exempt under 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(B), which refers to “any interest in property which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.UnThe Seventh Circuit reasoned that the statute exempts any interest held by an individual as a tenant by the entirety to the extent that state law exempts that particular interest so that the property cannot be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. View "Williams v. Jaffe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are a putative class of individuals who asserted personal injury claims against Old GM, and whose successor liability claims were extinguished during bankruptcy. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, relying on A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2014), to allege that the extinguishment of their claims without just compensation violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.In regard to the claims alleging coercion of Old GM, the Federal Circuit held that the statute of limitations had run when plaintiffs filed their complaint six years after their claims accrued. However, in regard to plaintiff's claim that the government had coerced the bankruptcy court and the district court, the court held that plaintiffs' claims were not within the claims court's jurisdiction. Finally, the court need not address the question of whether plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a loss of value of their alleged property interests. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Campbell v. United States" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of discharge on plaintiff's student loan debt under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The court held that there was no evidence that plaintiff's present circumstances -- her deteriorating diabetic conditions and the costs associated with it, and her inability to maintain employment -- are likely to persist throughout a significant portion of the loans' repayment period. Therefore, under the Brunner standard adopted by this court in In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 91, and the vast majority of other circuit courts, plaintiff was not eligible for discharge for her student loans. View "Thomas v. Department of Education" on Justia Law

After Whistler entered into a drilling contract with Nabors, Whistler entered into bankruptcy proceedings and rejected the contract. Nabors subsequently sought administrative priority in the bankruptcy proceeding for expenses incurred after the rejection of its contract, and the bankruptcy court granted the request in part and denied in part.The Fifth Circuit held that a creditor can establish that its expenses are attributable to the actions of the bankruptcy estate through evidence of either a direct request from the debtor-in-possession or other inducement via the knowing and voluntary post-petition acceptance of desired goods or services. The court clarified that when the debtor-in-possession induces availability and the bankruptcy estate derives a benefit from it, the ordinary cost of ensuring such availability qualifies as an administrative expense. The court remanded for the bankruptcy court to determine (1) whether Whistler induced Nabors to stay on the platform; (2) the length of time Nabors stayed on the platform because of Whistler's post-petition needs; and (3) the actual and necessary costs of staying on the platform during this time period. The court left it to the bankruptcy court to clarify its own findings regarding Nabors's provision of services. Finally, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of Nabors' requests for administrative priority in full. View "Nabors Offshore Corp. v. Whistler Energy II, LLC" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy trustee filed suit against parties involved in the sale of a bankruptcy estate's assets under 11 U.S.C. 363. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the trustee's claims and denial of leave to amend the second amended complaint (SAC).The court held that the trustee's claims were impermissible collateral attacks on an earlier order approving the sale in bankruptcy that was consummated under section 363. In the alternative, the trustee was not entitled to relief from the sale order, because the amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for fraud on the court. The court also held that the trustee was not entitled to relief from the sale order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, and the district court properly denied leave to amend the complaint based on futility. View "Fulmer v. Fifth Third Equipment Finance Co." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion.42 U.S.C. 405(h)—which states that no claim arising under the Social Security Act can be brought under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1346—does not bar bankruptcy courts from exercising their jurisdiction under section 1334 to hear Social Security claims. The court joined the Ninth Circuit, holding that the plain text of section 405(h)'s third sentence does not bar section 1334 jurisdiction and the district court erred by concluding otherwise. The court offered guidance on remand, clarifying what type of decision section 405(h)'s second sentence channels. The court believed that section 405(h)'s second sentence applied only where the would-be plaintiff is challenging a decision regarding his entitlement to benefits. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Benjamin v. United States" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's orders dismissing debtor's adversary proceeding and denying his post-dismissal motion. The panel held that the bankruptcy court properly dismissed debtor's adversary proceeding as a collateral attack on prior rulings. In this case, the post-dismissal motion repeated the same arguments already made by debtor. View "Raynor v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming the bankruptcy court's order requiring the law firm to remit $59,432 to the trustee of debtor's bankruptcy estate. The amount the law firm was ordered to remit was part of the proceeds of an unauthorized post-petition transfer by the debtor of the estate's property. The court held that the trustee's recovery of a portion of the Thompson Loan from the law firm did not constitute a double recovery in violation of 11 U.S.C. 550(d). View "In re: Alice Phillips Belmonte" on Justia Law