Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the bankruptcy court's order denying BOM's motion under 11 U.S.C. 506(b) for allowance of postpetition default interest.The panel held that the bankruptcy court erred in applying a liquidated damages analysis and ruling the default interest rate was an unenforceable penalty under Missouri law; the panel made no decision as to whether and when the default interest rates under the notes at issue were triggered under the facts of this case, because such decisions are mixed questions of law and fact that are best left for the bankruptcy court to decide in the first instance; the panel endorsed the view that post-Ron Pair, the pre-confirmation interest rate to be applied under section 506(b) to an oversecured creditor whose claim is evidenced by a promissory note or similar loan agreement is the contract (both non-default and default) rate set forth in the note or loan agreement, to the extent enforceable under applicable law; the panel held that, absent state law to the contrary, a liquidated damages vs. penalty analysis is not applicable and should not be applied to a default interest rate set forth in a promissory note or similar loan agreement; and the panel followed the rule that equitable considerations should be used sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "The Bank of Missouri v. Family Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision applying the contemporaneous exchange for new value preference defense under Bankruptcy Code 547(c)(1) to except payments by debtor to Wells Fargo from avoidance as preferences.The panel held that new value was provided by the release of Wells Fargo's junior liens where a senior lienholder voluntarily released its liens for less than full payment of its debt; Wells Fargo provided new value to debtor when the IRS, a secured creditor senior to Wells Fargo, was paid from the proceeds of a sale of debtor's assets and voluntarily released its liens; a $100,000 payment made by debtor to Wells Fargo one day before a sale closing was intended to be a contemporaneous exchange; and Wells Fargo's release of claims against Phillips 66 and KCRC resulted in new value to debtor intended by the parties to be a contemporaneous exchange. View "Lauter v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

The Hazeltons sought sanctions against the University for collecting an educational debt after their debts were discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The district court reversed a bankruptcy court holding that the debt was nondischargeable and remanded. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, citing its jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases under 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(1), which is limited to orders that resolve “discrete disputes” within the bankruptcy case. The district court did not resolve the dispute regarding sanctions but decided a subsidiary legal issue. View "Hazelton v. Board of Regents for the University of Wisconsin System" on Justia Law

In this case arising out of a petition for bankruptcy filed by the Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) upholding the judgment of the bankruptcy court ruling that certain claims filed by creditor railroads should be given priority status pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1171(b) because they were "Six Months Rule" claims, holding that the claims at issue were priority claims under section 1171(b).In their claims, the creditor railroads sought to recover their share of payments that the MMA was to collect for charges that had been billed to customers that had shipped freight on routes that covered rail systems owned by the MMA and the creditor railroads. The creditor railroads argued that their claims qualified as Six Months Rule claims and so must be paid in full before other claims because the MMA incurred the debt for their share of these payments so close in time to the MMA's bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court agreed with the creditor railroads and concluded that the claims were entitled to priority under section 1171(b). The BAP affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were priority claims under the statute. View "Keach v. New Brunswick Southern Railway Co. Ltd." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the Chapter 7 Trustee's request to use his powers under the bankruptcy code to avoid Wells Fargo's security interest in debtor's real property. The court rejected the Trustee's argument that, under Georgia law, security deeds in land were required to be attested at least by two witnesses. Rather, the court stated that the deed (1) must be attested by or acknowledged before an officer and (2) must also be attested or acknowledged by one additional witness. The court explained that the use of the word "or" in "attested or acknowledged" plainly contemplates these two acts as alternative methods of authenticating a security deed.In this case, where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court stated that judicial construction was not only unnecessary but forbidden. Furthermore, this common-sense reading of the statute was reflected in Supreme Court of Georgia precedent. View "Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Veritex filed an adversary proceeding requesting that debtor's debt not be discharged because he furnished the bank with a materially false written financial statement. The bankruptcy court found that the statement was false and submitted with the intent to deceive, but discharged the debt because Veritex did not rely on the statement. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment.The Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the bankruptcy court's finding that Veritex did not reasonably rely on debtor's 2013 financial statement is clearly erroneous. In this case, Veritex looked to debtor to guarantee the loan, and it relied heavily on his financial statement; the alleged red flags were not significant enough to alert Veritex to debtor's dishonesty; and the bankruptcy court erred in focusing on the soundness of the loan rather than the truthfulness of debtor's representations. The court also held that a fraudulent statement by a debtor's partner or agent may be imputed to the debtor under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B). Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that debtor's wife was his agent. The court rendered judgment in favor of Veritex. View "Veritex Community Bank v. Osborne" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) conclusion that Lariat's claim against debtor no longer exists because her husband discharged his liabilities in an earlier bankruptcy. Rather, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's allowance of Lariat's claim based on the fraudulent-transfer judgment. The court held that the husband's discharge did not extinguish debtor's liability because it did not cover all the money owed, and that Lariat's claim against debtor is capped under 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6). View "Lariat Companies, Inc. v. Wigley" on Justia Law

In 2005, Studio entered into a commercial lease with LFLP. The debtor signed the lease as Studio's president and signed a separate personal guaranty. In 2008, the debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition, listing LFLP as a creditor; LFLP received notice of the filing and of the discharge. In 2011, the debtor, on behalf of Studio, exercised a five-year lease extension option. Studio vacated the premises before the end of the extended term. LFLP sued in Ohio state court, based on the personal guaranty. The debtor included “Discharge in Bankruptcy” as an affirmative defense. The bankruptcy court reopened the bankruptcy; the debtor filed this adversary proceeding, asserting that the personal guaranty was discharged and that LFLP willfully violated the discharge injunction by filing the state court action. The defendants argued that the lease extension resurrected the personal guaranty and that the original lease and the extension contained a survivability clause that superseded the bankruptcy.The bankruptcy court concluded that the 2008 discharge meant that the debtor was no longer liable under the Guaranty and that filing and continuing the state court action were willful violations of the discharge injunction. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed in part. A pre-petition personal guaranty is a contingent debt that is discharged in bankruptcy. The court reversed the holding that the defendants willfully violated the discharge injunction and an award of damages in light of the Supreme Court’s 2019 Taggert decision. View "In re: Orlandi" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, and substituted the following opinion in place of the prior opinion.The Port filed an adversary proceeding against debtors, seeking to invalidate the bankruptcy sale and regain its easement. The court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the bankruptcy court's decision rejecting the Port's sovereign immunity and fraud claims.In Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood, the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court’s discharge of an individual's debt to the state of Tennessee did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. For purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the court reasoned that the Port's easement was like Tennessee's debt claim against the estate: the state holds an interest burdening the bankruptcy res. Hood holds that a bankruptcy court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction over the debtor's estate can extinguish the state's interest burdening that res without implicating the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the court held that there was no Eleventh Amendment violation here. The Port's further argument to the contrary was foreclosed. The court also held that the Port failed to allege any intentional false representation under Bankruptcy Code section 1144. View "Port of Corpus Christi Authority v. Sherwin Alumina Co." on Justia Law

The IRS allows affiliated corporations to file a consolidated federal return, 26 U.S.C. 1501, and issues any refund as a single payment to the group’s designated agent. If a dispute arises, federal courts normally turn to state law to resolve the question of distribution of the refund. Some courts follow the “Bob Richards Rule,” which initially provided that, absent an agreement, a refund belongs to the group member responsible for the losses that led to it. The Rule has evolved, in some jurisdictions, into a general rule that is always followed unless an agreement unambiguously specifies a different result. Soon after the bank suffered huge losses, its parent, Bancorp, was forced into bankruptcy. When the IRS issued a $4 million tax refund, the bank’s receiver, the FDIC, and Bancorp’s bankruptcy trustee each claimed it. The Tenth Circuit examined the parties’ allocation agreement, applied the more expansive version of Bob Richards, and ruled for the FDIC.The Supreme Court vacated. The Rule is not a legitimate exercise of federal common lawmaking. Federal judges may appropriately craft the rule of decision in only limited areas; claiming a new area is subject to strict conditions. Federal common lawmaking must be necessary to protect uniquely federal interests. The federal courts applying and extending Bob Richards have not pointed to any significant federal interest sufficient to support the rule, nor have these parties. State law is well-equipped to handle disputes involving corporate property rights, even in cases involving bankruptcy and a tax dispute. Whether this case might yield a different result without Bob Richards is a matter for the court of appeals on remand. View "Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law