Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Andrew Delaney, a lawyer acting pro se, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the Eastern District of New York, listing $1,110 in assets and $44,434 in liabilities. He later sought to dismiss his petition, arguing that he was not a debtor as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) and that venue was improper. The bankruptcy court denied his motion, stating that dismissal would not be in the interest of all parties, particularly his creditors, and that the trustee had made progress in achieving a modest settlement.Delaney appealed the bankruptcy court's denial to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The district court dismissed his appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the denial of a motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is not a final order that can be appealed as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The district court also treated Delaney's notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and denied it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it too lacked jurisdiction over Delaney’s appeal. The court held that the bankruptcy court's order denying Delaney's motion to dismiss was nonfinal because it did not finally dispose of any discrete disputes within the larger bankruptcy case. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of the appeal left significant further proceedings in the bankruptcy court. As a result, the Second Circuit dismissed Delaney’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Delaney v. Messer" on Justia Law

The case involves a court-appointed receiver tasked with distributing funds recovered from a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Kevin Merrill, Jay Ledford, and Cameron Jezierski. The scheme defrauded over 230 investors of more than $345 million. The appellants, comprising institutional and individual investors, were among the victims. The institutional investors, known as the Dean Investors, frequently withdrew and reinvested their funds, while the individual investors, known as the Connaughton Investors, invested through a third-party fund and later received settlements from that fund.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland approved the receiver's distribution plan, which used the "Rising Tide" method to allocate funds. This method ensures that no investor recovers less than a certain percentage of their principal investment, but it deducts pre-receivership withdrawals from the recovery amount. The Dean Investors objected to this method, arguing that their reinvested withdrawals should not be counted against them. The Connaughton Investors objected to the plan's "Collateral Offset Provision," which counted third-party settlements as withdrawals, reducing their distribution from the receiver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's approval of the distribution plan. It held that the Rising Tide method without the Maximum Balance approach was appropriate, as it ensured a fair distribution to more claimants. The court also upheld the Collateral Offset Provision, reasoning that it prevented the Connaughton Investors from receiving a disproportionately higher recovery compared to other victims. The court emphasized the need for equitable distribution and the administrative feasibility of the receiver's plan. View "CCWB Asset Investments, LLC v. Milligan" on Justia Law

An affiliate of Cambrian Holding Company held a lease to mine coal on land owned by Hazard Coal Corporation. During Cambrian's bankruptcy, it proposed selling its lease interest to American Resources Corporation, which falsely warranted it could obtain a mining permit. The bankruptcy court approved the lease assignment based on this false understanding. Hazard Coal later discovered American Resources could not lawfully mine coal and repeatedly tried to unwind the assignment, but the bankruptcy court rejected these attempts.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially approved the sale of Cambrian's lease interest to American Resources. Hazard Coal did not object before the sale but later moved to reconsider the sale order, citing American Resources' permit-blocked status. The bankruptcy court denied this motion, stating Hazard Coal could have raised its objections earlier. Hazard Coal did not appeal this decision. Subsequently, Hazard Coal moved to compel American Resources to restore power to the mine or rescind the assignment, but the court again denied the motion, reiterating that Hazard Coal had forfeited its objections by not acting timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Hazard Coal appealed the bankruptcy court's declaration that Cambrian had validly assigned the lease to American Resources. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The court held that the bankruptcy court reasonably interpreted its prior orders as barring Hazard Coal's challenge to the lease assignment due to its failure to timely assert its rights. The court emphasized that Hazard Coal's objections were forfeited because they were not raised in a timely manner. View "In re Cambrian Holding Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Edgar Reyes-Colón, who was subjected to an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by Banco Popular de Puerto Rico in 2006. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition in 2016, finding that Banco Popular failed to join the requisite number of creditors. Reyes-Colón subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) and initiated an adversary proceeding alleging bad faith under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2).The bankruptcy court denied Reyes-Colón's motion for attorney's fees, ruling it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction as the motion was filed after the case was closed. Reyes-Colón appealed to the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, adding that the motion was untimely under local rules requiring such motions to be filed within fourteen days after the issuance of the mandate. Reyes-Colón then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over post-dismissal § 303(i) motions, as such motions necessarily require post-dismissal jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed the denial of the attorney's fees motion on the grounds that it was untimely, as it was filed 365 days after the mandate issued, far exceeding the fourteen-day limit set by local rules.Regarding the adversary proceeding, Reyes-Colón filed a motion for withdrawal of reference to have the district court adjudicate the case. The district court denied the motion as untimely, conflating the timeliness of the motion for withdrawal with the timeliness of the § 303(i) motion. The First Circuit vacated this decision, clarifying that the timeliness of the motion for withdrawal should be measured from the filing of the adversary proceeding, not the dismissal of the involuntary petition. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether there is cause to withdraw the reference. View "Reyes-Colon v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Patrick and Patricia McConathy filed for bankruptcy in Louisiana in 1990 but failed to disclose their interests in over 3,000 acres of land in Kansas. In 2019, the McConathys and other plaintiffs sued American Warrior, Inc. (AWI) in Kansas state court over these interests. During discovery, AWI learned of the McConathys' undisclosed bankruptcy and moved to reopen the bankruptcy case in 2021. The bankruptcy court reopened the case and imposed an automatic stay on the Kansas litigation.The bankruptcy court found that the McConathys and their attorneys violated the automatic stay by continuing the Kansas litigation but did not find that the non-debtor plaintiffs violated the stay. The court later approved a settlement between AWI and the bankruptcy trustee, transferring the estate's interests to AWI. Subsequently, the bankruptcy court terminated the automatic stay concerning the non-debtor plaintiffs and decided to permissively abstain from the Kansas litigation, allowing it to proceed in state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not err in its decisions. It affirmed that the Kansas litigation was not void ab initio and that the non-debtor plaintiffs did not violate the automatic stay. The court also upheld the bankruptcy court's decision to terminate the stay and abstain from the Kansas litigation, emphasizing that the bankruptcy court had broad discretion to modify or lift the stay as circumstances changed. The Fifth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court's permissive abstention decision, affirming the lower courts' rulings. View "American Warrior v. Foundation Energy" on Justia Law

Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, a Nashville-based auto-parts corporation, entered bankruptcy proceedings in 2014. In February 2015, Vista-Pro initiated an adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., a New York corporation, to recover approximately $50,000 in unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro mailed a summons and complaint to Coney Island's Brooklyn address, but without addressing it to any specific individual. Coney Island did not respond, leading the bankruptcy court to enter a default judgment against it in May 2015. In April 2016, the trustee appointed for Vista-Pro sent a demand letter to Coney Island's CEO, Daniel Beyda, to satisfy the default judgment. Coney Island acknowledged receipt of this letter.Coney Island later moved to vacate the default judgment in October 2021, arguing that the judgment was void due to improper service, as the summons and complaint were not addressed to an individual as required by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(3). The Southern District of New York bankruptcy court denied the motion, instructing Coney Island to seek relief from the Middle District of Tennessee court. In July 2022, Coney Island filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) to vacate the default judgment, claiming it was void. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court denied the motion as untimely, noting Coney Island's unreasonable delay in filing the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Rule 60(b)(4) motions, which seek to vacate void judgments, must be filed within a "reasonable time" as stipulated by Rule 60(c)(1). The court found that Coney Island's delay in filing the motion was unreasonable, given that it had actual notice of the default judgment by April 2016 but did not move to vacate it until July 2022. The court emphasized that its precedent requires adherence to the reasonable-time limitation for Rule 60(b)(4) motions, even if the judgment is alleged to be void. View "In re Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC" on Justia Law

Byron David filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in July 2018, and Donald King was appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee. King applied to retain a law firm, which was approved by the bankruptcy court. The case was converted to Chapter 11 in April 2019, and King became the Chapter 11 Trustee but did not reapply to retain the law firm. The case was later converted to Chapter 13 in May 2020, terminating King’s role as trustee. King then applied for retroactive approval to retain the law firm for work done during the Chapter 11 phase, which the bankruptcy court initially denied but later approved.The bankruptcy court approved the law firm’s fees for the Chapter 7 phase but denied fees for the Chapter 11 phase due to the lack of a proper retention application. King was granted leave to file a nunc pro tunc application, which he did in October 2020. The bankruptcy court approved this retroactive application, but David objected, arguing that King, as a former trustee, could not employ professionals. The district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s denial of David’s motion to amend but left open the issue of retroactive employment for the Chapter 11 phase.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a former trustee to file a post-hoc application to retroactively employ professionals. The court emphasized that the statute’s language refers to the current trustee, and upon conversion, the trustee’s services are terminated. Therefore, King, as a former trustee, could not apply for retroactive approval to employ the law firm. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "David v. King" on Justia Law

The case involves debtors who filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, claiming a homestead exemption for their residence. They listed the exemption as "100% of FMV" (fair market value) on their bankruptcy schedule. No party in interest objected to this exemption within the 30-day period following the creditors' meeting. Later, the case was converted to Chapter 7 after one of the debtors passed away and the remaining debtor failed to meet Chapter 11 obligations. The Chapter 7 trustee sought to sell the residence, arguing that the exemption should be limited to the statutory cap.The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington ruled that the homestead exemption was limited to the statutory cap of $45,950, with the remaining value of the home belonging to the bankruptcy estate. The debtor appealed, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) reversed the bankruptcy court's decision. The BAP held that because no objection was made within the 30-day period, the debtor was entitled to the full fair market value of the home, not limited by the statutory cap.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court distinguished this case from Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz and Schwab v. Reilly, noting that the case began as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, where the debtors owed fiduciary duties to their creditors. The court emphasized that within the 30-day objection period, the debtors made specific representations in their Chapter 11 documents indicating that they were not claiming an above-limit exemption and that creditors would be paid in full before any above-limit exemptions were allowed.The Ninth Circuit held that the initial failure to object did not mean the debtor could exempt more than the statutory limit. The court concluded that the homestead exemption was limited to the statutory cap, and the remaining proceeds from the sale of the home were part of the bankruptcy estate. The decision of the BAP was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "IN RE: MASINGALE" on Justia Law

The case involves Puerto Rico's attempt to enact Law 29, which aimed to relieve municipalities from contributing to the Commonwealth's reformed public pension funding scheme. The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the Board) challenged the law, and the Title III court overseeing Puerto Rico's debt restructuring declared Law 29 a nullity and of no effect. This decision was not appealed. La Liga de Ciudades de Puerto Rico (La Liga) argued that the Title III court's order did not authorize the Board to recover funds retained by municipalities under Law 29 before the order took effect.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, interpreting its own prior order, granted motions to dismiss filed by the Board and other defendants. The court dismissed some claims on the merits and others for lack of standing. The court held that the Title III court's order applied retroactively, nullifying Law 29 from its inception and allowing the Board to recover the funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of La Liga's complaint. It held that the Title III court's order declaring Law 29 a nullity and of no effect applied retroactively, covering the period from the law's enactment. The court found that the Title III court had the authority under PROMESA to nullify Law 29 from its inception and that the Board's actions to recover the funds were justified. The court also addressed standing issues, affirming that La Liga had standing to sue the Board and CRIM but not the executive branch defendants. View "La Liga de Ciudades de P.R. v. Financial Oversight and Management Board" on Justia Law

Joseph Boswell, Sr. was convicted by a jury of bankruptcy fraud and tax evasion. Boswell operated a business servicing pizza ovens and stopped reporting income and paying taxes around 1995. He filed for bankruptcy in 2011, claiming significant back taxes owed. The government alleged that Boswell used various corporate entities, nominally owned by family members, to conceal assets from the IRS and creditors. During his bankruptcy, Boswell reported minimal assets and income, despite evidence suggesting he controlled significant funds through these entities.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana oversaw the initial trial. Boswell moved to dismiss the bankruptcy fraud charge, arguing it was untimely and that the indictment was improperly sealed. The district court denied this motion, finding the government had a legitimate reason for sealing the indictment. Boswell also requested a bill of particulars, which the court denied, and he was ultimately convicted on both counts. The district court sentenced him to sixty months in prison and ordered restitution to the IRS.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government failed to demonstrate a legitimate prosecutorial purpose for sealing the indictment, which meant the statute of limitations was not tolled, rendering the bankruptcy fraud charge untimely. Consequently, the court reversed Boswell's conviction on the bankruptcy fraud charge. However, the court affirmed the tax evasion conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court also upheld the district court's jurisdiction to impose restitution while the appeal was pending and found no cumulative errors warranting a new trial for the tax evasion charge. View "USA v. Boswell" on Justia Law