Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Springfield, debtors in bankruptcy who applied for and were denied Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds pursuant to the CARES Act solely due to their bankruptcy status, initiated this adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against the Administrator of the SBA, in her official capacity. Springfield challenges the SBA's administration of PPP funds and asks that the bankruptcy court enjoin the SBA from denying its PPP application on the basis of its bankruptcy status.The Second Circuit held that, based upon the plain language of Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, that the PPP is a loan guaranty program and not an "other similar grant," and Section 525(a) does not apply to the PPP. Therefore, the bankruptcy court incorrectly ruled that Springfield was entitled to summary judgment and a permanent injunction. Rather, the court concluded, as a matter of law, that summary judgment in the SBA's favor is warranted on the Section 525(a) claim, reversing the judgment and vacating the permanent injunction. The court remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. View "Springfield Hospital, Inc. v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment and held that, under the particular circumstances presented here, Ultra Resources is not subject to a separate public-law obligation to continue performance of its rejected contract, and that 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(6) did not require the bankruptcy court to seek FERC's approval before it confirmed Ultra Resource's reorganization plan.Applying In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004), the court concluded that the power of the bankruptcy court to authorize rejection of a filed-rate contract does not conflict with the authority given to FERC to regulate rates; rejection is not a collateral attack upon the contract's filed rate because that rate is given full effect when determining the breach of contract damages resulting from the rejection; and in ruling on a rejection motion, bankruptcy courts must consider whether rejection harms the public interest or disrupts the supply of energy, and must weigh those effects against the contract's burden on the bankrupt estate. Because Mirant clearly holds that rejection of a contract is not a collateral attack on the filed rate, the court concluded that FERC does not have the authority to compel continued performance and continued payment of the filed rate after a valid rejection. The court rejected any further arguments to the contrary. View "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Ultra Resources" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment reversing the bankruptcy court's denial of claimants' motions seeking leave to file their respective proofs of claim. Considering the four Pioneer factors, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in determining that claimants failed to meet their burden of proving excusable neglect. Although the danger-of-prejudice factor weighs in favor of claimants, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the length-of-delay factor weighs in favor of debtors. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the reason-for-the-delay factor and the good faith factor weighs in debtors' favor. Given the exceptionally deferential standard of review applicable here, and because the prejudice factor does not outweigh the other three Pioneer factors, the court cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion. View "West Wilmington Oil Field Claimants v. Nabors Corporate Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit concluded on the merits that, under the Bankruptcy Code and the applicable state fraudulent transfer statutes, tax penalty obligations are not voidable, and relatedly, tax penalty payments are not recoverable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the trustee's claims seeking to void tax penalty obligations owed by the debtor to the IRS and to recover prior payments made by the debtor to the IRS upon such obligations.The court found the Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Southeast Waffles, LLC, 702 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 2012), persuasive and concluded that tax penalties do not fit within the obligations contemplated in the North Carolina Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. Because tax penalties are not obligations incurred as contemplated by the Act, it cannot be the "applicable law" required for the trustee to bring this action under 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). If there is no applicable law for the trustee's section 544(b)(1) claim, the court concluded that the claim must be dismissed. The court noted that its conclusion about the tax penalty payments turns on the legitimacy of the underlying tax penalty obligation; not the fact that the payments reduced the amount of the tax penalty obligations dollar for dollar. Since the underlying tax penalty obligation is not voidable, neither are Yahweh Center’s payments on that obligation. View "Cook v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of debtor's motion for leave to appeal the bankruptcy court's order denying without prejudice a creditor's request for relief from the automatic stay. In Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582 (2020), the Supreme Court addressed the finality of a bankruptcy court order denying a creditor's request for relief from the automatic stay. The panel concluded that, under the circumstances presented here and the considerations set forth in Ritzen and court precedent, the bankruptcy court's order was final and appealable because the bankruptcy court's denial of the creditor's motion conclusively resolved the request for stay relief. View "Harrington v. Mayer" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision reversing the bankruptcy court's order allowing creditor's claim in the bankruptcy proceedings of Rejuvi, a chapter 11 debtor. Creditor seeks recognition and enforcement of a default money judgment for personal injuries against Rejuvi granted by an Australian district court. The panel held that Rejuvi waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing in the South Australian district court when it sought relief from the default judgment. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The panel granted creditor's motion to take judicial notice of Rules 230 and 242 of the 2006 Civil Rules of the District Court of South Australia. View "Corso v. Rejuvi Laboratory, Inc." on Justia Law

Anne and Donald divorced in 1996 after 25 years of marriage. They later reconciled but did not re‐marry, then separated again. Because divorce laws no longer applied, Anne sued Donald in Indiana state court under equitable theories to seek redress for her contributions to the relationship during their second period together. They agreed to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Anne $435,000, half the increase in value of Donald’s retirement savings during their unmarried cohabitation. Donald declared bankruptcy and sought to discharge the arbitrator’s award as a money judgment. Anne argued that the arbitrator had awarded her an interest in specific property so that the award could not be discharged in Donald’s bankruptcy.The bankruptcy court sided with Anne. The district court reversed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in favor of Donald. Anne was awarded a money judgment, not a property interest. The award does not identify a required source of funds or manner of payment but only lists options for satisfying the obligation. The payment of cash would suffice; the award provided for post-judgment interest. The arbitrator’s award said that “this judgment should not be dischargeable in bankruptcy” but that language is not controlling. View "Harshaw v. Harshaw" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court authorized the Chapter 11 trustee to sell the debtor’s Bourbon Street, New Orleans property free and clear of all claims, liens, and interests under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(f). Two lessees of the property, together with the sole owner of the debtor, filed objections to the sale and an alternative request seeking either adequate protection under Section 363(e) or rejection of the leases, all of which the bankruptcy court denied. The lessees, insiders of the debtor company, executed and recorded leases(for below-market rates) junior to the rights of the mortgagee AMAG. Had there been no bankruptcy, AMAG could have foreclosed under state law and wiped out the junior interests.The Fifth Circuit denied the objectors’ petition for mandamus relief. Bankruptcy Code sections 363(f)(1) and 365(h)(1)(A)(ii), qualify what a debtor can do. The Code recognizes and defers to state law. The essential state law rights of the tenants, in this case, are limited by the senior mortgagee’s prior lien on the property; neither Section 363(e) nor 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) offers protection. View "In Re: Royal Street Bistro, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In an action arising from the bankruptcy of CISH, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's sanction of appellants. Appellants had filed an adversary proceeding asserting causes of action that the bankruptcy court had placed in trust for CISH's creditors, but the bankruptcy court concluded that by attempting to seize control of trust property, appellants had knowingly violated its order confirming the liquidation plan.The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the dismissal order because appellants did not file a notice of appeal on the adversary docket and the notice of appeal did not comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy rules for appealing the adversary proceeding. In regard to the punitive sanctions, appellants failed to allege an injury-in-fact and the court lacked jurisdiction. Finally, because the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the Cleveland Imaging bankruptcy case, it had jurisdiction to enter the sanctions order, too; likewise, the court has jurisdiction to consider appellants' appeal; appellants have standing to appeal the sanctions order; the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that appellants violated its confirmation order by filing their adversary proceeding and contentions to the contrary lack merit; and clear and convincing evidence supported the bankruptcy court's finding of bad faith. View "Kreit v. Quinn" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's orders in these consolidated cases arising out of the bankruptcy of PFO and a dispute over the validity and scope of the bankruptcy court's orders prohibiting one non-debtor, VSP, from asserting claims against two non-debtors, Hillair Capital Investments L.P. and Hillair Capital Management L.L.C.The court found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the Lift Stay Order and it retained jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its orders, as it did in the 2019 orders. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court would not have abused its discretion in refusing to abstain under 28 U.S.C. 1334(c)(2) as there was no timely motion for abstention. The court also concluded that the district court correctly interpreted the Lift Stay Order as prohibiting VSP's assertion of claims against Hillair in the California Action. Finally, the court affirmed the award of attorneys' fees and the earlier bankruptcy court's orders. View "VSP Labs v. Hillair Capital Investments, LP" on Justia Law