Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries
SDVF, LLC V. COZZIA USA LLC
SDVF, LLC registered a default judgment against Cozzia USA LLC in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to enforce and collect the judgment. This judgment was originally entered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. However, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court later vacated the default judgment.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed SDVF's action to enforce the judgment, reasoning that the registered judgment was no longer valid after the underlying judgment had been set aside.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that a registered judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is not valid if the underlying judgment has been vacated. The court explained that the registered judgment relies on the existence of the original final judgment, and once the original judgment is vacated, the registered judgment cannot be enforced. The court also noted that neither Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the court's inherent equitable power allows SDVF to challenge the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's ruling in the Central District of California. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the case was affirmed. View "SDVF, LLC V. COZZIA USA LLC" on Justia Law
United States v. Miller
A Utah-based transportation business, All Resort Group, became insolvent in 2013 due to poor management and financial malfeasance. Two shareholders misappropriated $145,000 in company funds to pay their personal federal tax liabilities. In 2017, the company filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee sought to recover the misappropriated funds under §544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, invoking Utah’s fraudulent-transfer statute as the applicable law.The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of the trustee, holding that §106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code waived the Government’s sovereign immunity for the state-law cause of action nested within the §544(b) claim. The District Court adopted this decision, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that §106(a) abolished the Government’s sovereign immunity in an avoidance proceeding under §544(b)(1).The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision. The Court held that §106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to the §544(b) claim itself and not to the state-law claims nested within that federal claim. The Court emphasized that waivers of sovereign immunity are jurisdictional and do not create new substantive rights or alter pre-existing ones. The Court concluded that §106(a) does not modify the substantive requirements of §544(b) and that the trustee must still identify an actual creditor who could have voided the transaction under applicable law outside of bankruptcy proceedings. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law
COOPER V. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
The Social Security Administration (SSA) overpaid a debtor, Cooper, before his Chapter 7 no-asset discharge in bankruptcy. Two years after his discharge, SSA recouped the overpayment by reducing his monthly benefits. Cooper moved to hold SSA in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge injunction.The bankruptcy court denied Cooper's motion, finding that equitable recoupment allowed SSA to recover the overpayment. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed, concluding that the overpayment and ongoing benefits were logically related as they arose from the same disability period and statutory scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the logical relationship test for equitable recoupment requires consideration of the equities, including the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. The court found that recoupment was impermissible where SSA sought to recoup overpayments from a bankrupt beneficiary who engaged in no malfeasance. The court emphasized that recoupment should only apply when it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of a transaction without meeting its obligations.The Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BAP to remand to the bankruptcy court. The court clarified that the logical relationship test demands consideration of the equities and the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code in each individual case. View "COOPER V. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION" on Justia Law
Highland Capital Fund Advisors v. Highland Capital Management
Highland Capital Management, L.P., a Dallas-based investment firm, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2019 due to numerous unpaid judgments and liabilities. During the bankruptcy proceedings, James Dondero, a co-founder, stepped down as a director and officer but continued as an unpaid portfolio manager. The unsecured creditors' committee and independent directors opposed Dondero's reorganization plans, leading to his resignation in October 2020. The bankruptcy court held Dondero in civil contempt and sanctioned him for obstructing the proceedings. The proposed reorganization plan included provisions to shield Highland Capital and associated entities from liability, including an Exculpation Provision and an Injunction Provision with a Gatekeeper Clause.The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, but on direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the plan in part, striking certain non-debtors from the Exculpation Provision. The investment fund parties requested clarification on whether the same entities should be removed from the Gatekeeper Clause. The bankruptcy court conformed the plan by narrowing the definition of "Exculpated Parties" but did not change the definition of "Protected Parties" in the Gatekeeper Clause, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the bankruptcy court failed to implement its instructions properly. The court held that the definition of "Protected Parties" in the Gatekeeper Clause must be narrowed to include only the Debtor, the Independent Directors for conduct within their duties, the Committee, and the members of the Committee in their official capacities. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision in part and remanded the case for the plan to be revised accordingly. View "Highland Capital Fund Advisors v. Highland Capital Management" on Justia Law
Sugar v. Burnett
Christine Sugar filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the Eastern District of North Carolina in September 2019. Her confirmed bankruptcy plan required her to make monthly payments and prohibited the sale of non-exempt property valued over $10,000 without court approval. Despite this, Sugar sold her residence without obtaining prior court authorization, believing it was fully exempt based on her attorney's advice. The sale resulted in proceeds of approximately $94,000.The bankruptcy court found that Sugar's sale of her residence violated the confirmed plan and the local bankruptcy rule. The court dismissed her Chapter 13 case and barred her from filing another bankruptcy application for five years. Additionally, the court imposed monetary sanctions on her attorney, Travis P. Sasser, for advising her incorrectly and for his conduct during the proceedings.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings and sanctions. Sugar and Sasser appealed the decision, arguing that the local rule was invalid, the property was exempt, and that paying off the plan balance entitled Sugar to immediate discharge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination that Sugar violated the local rule by selling her residence without prior court approval. However, it vacated the judgment dismissing Sugar's Chapter 13 case and the five-year filing bar, remanding the case for the bankruptcy court to consider the effect of Sugar's reliance on her attorney's advice. The court affirmed the monetary sanctions against Sasser, finding that his advice and conduct warranted the penalties imposed. View "Sugar v. Burnett" on Justia Law
In re 305 East 61st Street Group LLC
Little Hearts Marks Family II L.P. ("Little Hearts") was a member of 305 East 61st Street Group LLC, a company formed to purchase and convert a building into a condominium. 61 Prime LLC ("Prime") was the majority member and manager, and Jason D. Carter was the manager and sole member of Prime. In 2021, the company filed for bankruptcy and sold the building to another company created by Carter. The liquidation plan established a creditor trust with exclusive rights to pursue the debtor’s estate's causes of action. Little Hearts sued Prime and Carter for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, seeking damages for lost capital investment and rights under the Operating Agreement.The bankruptcy court dismissed all claims, ruling that they were derivative and belonged to the debtor’s estate, thus could only be asserted by the creditor trustee. The district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims, agreeing that these were derivative and could only be pursued by the creditor trustee. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, determining that these were direct claims belonging to Little Hearts and could proceed. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed as duplicative of the contract claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re 305 East 61st Street Group LLC" on Justia Law
In re: Promise Healthcare Group LLC
Promise Healthcare Group, LLC and its affiliates operated various hospital and nursing facilities. During their Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Patrick Wassmann filed a $10 million medical malpractice claim based on treatment he received at one of the facilities between March 15 and June 9, 2017. Robert Michaelson, the liquidating trustee, objected to Wassmann’s claim, arguing it was time-barred because it became untimely by the time the Trustee objected to it and it was evaluated. The Trustee also argued that Wassmann’s claim should be barred because he failed to file a timely state court complaint in addition to his Chapter 11 proof of claim.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware set a bar date of May 31, 2019, for filing proof of claims. Wassmann filed his proof of claim on January 4, 2019. The court confirmed the Debtors’ reorganization plan on September 17, 2020, which went into effect on October 1, 2020. Wassmann had until November 1, 2020, to proceed against the Debtors in state court but chose to seek recovery in the Bankruptcy Court alone. The Bankruptcy Court denied the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the claims allowance process under 11 U.S.C. § 502 evaluates claims as of the petition date and that a timely proof of claim does not require a separate timely non-bankruptcy complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the enforceability of a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) is determined as of the petition date, not the date of the court’s evaluation. The court also held that a creditor who has filed a timely proof of claim is not required to file a separate, timely non-bankruptcy action to preserve the claim. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court correctly allowed Wassmann’s claim as it was timely as of the petition date. View "In re: Promise Healthcare Group LLC" on Justia Law
Kerns v. First State Bank
Matthew Kerns, the sole member and manager of Glade Creek Livestock, LLC, personally guaranteed a loan from First State Bank of Ben Wheeler (FSBBW) using equipment and cattle as collateral. When Glade Creek faced financial difficulties, Kerns sold some of the cattle, leading FSBBW to demand full repayment. Kerns filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and during the automatic stay, FSBBW reported the sale of the collateral to a special ranger with the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association (TSCRA). This led to Kerns' indictment and arrest for hindering a secured creditor.The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of FSBBW, holding that FSBBW's actions fell within the safe harbor provision of the Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act, which protects financial institutions from liability for reporting possible violations of law. Kerns appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Kerns then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that FSBBW's report to the special ranger was protected under the safe harbor provision of the Annunzio-Wylie Act, as the special ranger qualified as law enforcement under Texas law. The court also found that Kerns had forfeited his argument for the recusal of the bankruptcy judge by not raising it earlier, despite knowing the basis for recusal since 2021. The court concluded that FSBBW's conduct was shielded from liability, and the summary judgment in favor of FSBBW was affirmed. View "Kerns v. First State Bank" on Justia Law
Fluharty v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co.
David Levine, former CEO of Geostellar Inc., was accused of defrauding and bankrupting the company. Geostellar had a directors and officers insurance policy from Philadelphia Indemnity Company, which began providing Levine's defense. The policy had a $3 million coverage limit. Levine and his wife later filed for personal bankruptcy, which stayed the Geostellar adversary action. The Geostellar Trustee moved to lift the stay to proceed against Levine to the extent of the insurance coverage, admitting that Levine's debt to Geostellar was uncollectable beyond the insurance coverage.The bankruptcy court granted the motion to lift the stay. The Trustees then filed an adversary action for declaratory judgment, seeking to establish that the right to settlement under the policy was an asset of the Levine Bankruptcy Estate, for which the Levine Trustee was the exclusive representative. The bankruptcy court dismissed the action, and the district court affirmed, finding that neither Trustee had standing to sue the insurer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Geostellar Trustee had no standing because West Virginia law did not permit a direct action against the insurer under the circumstances, and the policy only provided coverage to Levine, not Geostellar. The Levine Trustee also lacked standing because any judgment in the Geostellar adversary action would not impact the Levine Bankruptcy Estate, as Levine's debt to Geostellar was discharged and uncollectable beyond the insurance coverage. The court concluded that the right to consent to settlement under the policy was not the property of either Trustee. View "Fluharty v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Chapman v. Dunn
Michael Chapman, an Alabama inmate, sued prison officials and staff for deliberate indifference to his medical needs, violating the Eighth Amendment. Chapman alleged that an untreated ear infection led to severe injuries, including mastoiditis, a ruptured eardrum, and a brain abscess. He also claimed that the prison's refusal to perform cataract surgery on his right eye constituted deliberate indifference. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants except the prison’s medical contractor, which had filed for bankruptcy.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found Chapman’s claim against nurse Charlie Waugh time-barred and ruled against Chapman on other claims, including his request for injunctive relief against Commissioner John Hamm, citing sovereign immunity. The court also concluded that Chapman’s claims against other defendants failed on the merits and dismissed his state-law claims without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s determination that Chapman’s claim against Waugh was time-barred, finding that Chapman’s cause of action accrued within the limitations period. The court vacated the district court’s judgment for Waugh and remanded for reconsideration in light of the recent en banc decision in Wade, which clarified the standard for deliberate indifference claims. The court also vacated the judgment for Hamm on Chapman’s cataract-related claim for injunctive relief, as sovereign immunity does not bar such claims. Additionally, the court vacated the summary judgment for all other defendants due to procedural errors, including inadequate notice and time for Chapman to respond, and remanded for further consideration. View "Chapman v. Dunn" on Justia Law