Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose after a rare vehicle, originally owned by a Wisconsin man, was stolen and shipped to Europe. Richard Mueller inherited the vehicle and sold part of his interest to Joseph Ford. Years later, TL90108 LLC (“TL”) purchased the vehicle overseas and, upon attempting to register it in the United States, was notified that Ford and Mueller were the owners of record. Ford and Mueller sued TL in Wisconsin state court for a declaratory judgment and replevin. The trial court dismissed the case on statute-of-repose grounds, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review. While the appeal was pending, Ford filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy but did not list TL as a creditor or provide it with formal notice of the bankruptcy proceedings or relevant deadlines.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida set a deadline under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) for creditors to file complaints objecting to the discharge of debts. TL did not file a complaint before this deadline, as it was unaware of the relevant facts supporting a fraud claim until later discovery in the Wisconsin litigation. After learning of Ford’s alleged fraud, TL moved to extend the deadline and file a complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), arguing for equitable tolling and asserting a due process violation due to inadequate notice. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent in In re Alton, which held that equitable tolling does not apply to Rule 4007(c) deadlines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in In re Alton remains binding and precludes equitable tolling of Rule 4007(c)’s deadline, even in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The court also held that TL’s actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding satisfied due process, and thus, the deadline could not be extended on that basis. View "TL90108 LLC v. Ford" on Justia Law

A medical device distributor sued a former employee, alleging that he breached a non-compete agreement, his duty of loyalty, and misappropriated trade secrets after joining a competitor. The employee responded with counterclaims and third-party claims. During the litigation, the employee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which stayed the district court proceedings. In the bankruptcy case, the distributor filed a proof of claim for damages, which the employee did not contest. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim, and the distributor received a partial distribution from the bankruptcy estate. The employee also waived his right to discharge, leaving him potentially liable for the remaining balance.After the bankruptcy case closed, the United States District Court for the District of Vermont lifted the stay. The distributor sought summary judgment for the balance of its allowed claim, arguing that the bankruptcy court’s allowance of its claim should have preclusive effect. Initially, the district court denied this request, finding that using claim preclusion offensively would be unfair. Upon reconsideration, however, the district court reversed itself and granted summary judgment to the distributor for the remaining balance, holding that claim preclusion applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Second Circuit held that, even if claim preclusion could sometimes be used offensively, it could not be applied in this case because it would be unfair to the employee, who had less incentive to contest the claim in bankruptcy. The court vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the distributor and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that claim preclusion cannot be used offensively to secure a judgment for the balance of an allowed bankruptcy claim under these circumstances. View "Thermal Surgical, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law

Several investment funds based in the British Virgin Islands invested heavily in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities and were forced into liquidation after the Madoff Ponzi scheme was exposed in 2008. Liquidators were appointed in the BVI insolvency proceedings. Before the collapse, certain investors redeemed their shares in the funds for cash, receiving over $6 billion in payments. The liquidators, seeking to recover these redemption payments for equitable distribution among all investors, initiated approximately 300 actions in the United States, alleging that the payments were inflated due to fictitious Net Asset Value (NAV) calculations based on Madoff’s fraudulent statements.The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the actions after recognizing the BVI proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court dismissed most claims, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over some defendants, that the liquidators were bound by the NAV calculations, and that the safe harbor for securities transactions under § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code barred the claims. However, it allowed constructive trust claims to proceed against certain defendants alleged to have known the NAVs were inflated. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, leaving only the constructive trust claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that all of the liquidators’ claims, including the constructive trust claims, should have been dismissed under the safe harbor provision of § 546(e), which applies extraterritorially via § 561(d) in Chapter 15 cases. The court concluded that the safe harbor bars both statutory and common-law claims seeking to avoid covered securities transactions, regardless of the legal theory or proof required. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment allowing the constructive trust claims and otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims. View "In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd." on Justia Law

Stanley Watson, a former county commissioner, accused Sheneeka Bradsher and Zarinah Ali of stealing his wallet at a bar. Despite no evidence, he repeatedly demanded their arrest and threatened police officers who did not comply. Bradsher was arrested for disorderly conduct, but later released when Watson's wallet was found in his car. Bradsher and Ali sued Watson for slander, battery, and false imprisonment, winning a $150,500 judgment.Watson filed for bankruptcy, and Bradsher and Ali sought to except their judgment from discharge. The bankruptcy court found Watson genuinely believed the women stole his wallet, discharging the slander and battery debts but ruling the false imprisonment debts nondischargeable. The district court affirmed the nondischargeability of the false imprisonment debts but remanded for further clarification on the slander claim. On remand, the bankruptcy court found the slander debt dischargeable, attributing two-thirds of the damages to false imprisonment and one-third to slander.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding Watson willfully and maliciously caused the women’s confinement, making the false imprisonment debts nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The court also upheld the bankruptcy court’s allocation of damages, finding it supported by the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgments in favor of Bradsher and Ali. View "Watson v. Bradsher" on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific LLC, a large corporation in the pulp and paper industry, acquired Bestwall Gypsum Co. in 1965, inheriting significant asbestos-related liabilities. By 2017, Bestwall faced around 64,000 pending asbestos claims, prompting Georgia-Pacific to implement a divisional merger known as the Texas two-step. This maneuver split Georgia-Pacific into two entities: Georgia-Pacific retained most assets, while Bestwall assumed the asbestos liabilities and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to manage these claims through a § 524(g) trust.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted Bestwall's motion for an injunction to prevent asbestos claimants from pursuing claims outside the bankruptcy process. The Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants opposed this and moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case, arguing it was filed in bad faith since Bestwall was solvent. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, stating that filing for Chapter 11 to resolve asbestos claims is a valid purpose, even for solvent debtors.The Committee later moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Constitution does not grant jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases involving solvent debtors. The bankruptcy court rejected this argument, holding that Congress has the authority to define bankruptcy jurisdiction, which includes cases filed by solvent debtors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases involving solvent debtors because the Bankruptcy Code is a federal law, and petitions for relief under it arise under the laws of the United States. The court clarified that challenges to a debtor's eligibility for bankruptcy protection are not jurisdictional issues. View "Bestwall LLC v. Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants" on Justia Law

Absolute Pediatric Therapy, owned by Anthony Christopher, hired LaDonna Humphrey in May 2018 but terminated her four months later. In October 2018, Absolute and Christopher sued Humphrey in Arkansas state court, alleging various tort claims and accusing her of stealing information and making false accusations. Humphrey counterclaimed under the False Claims Act, alleging her termination was for reporting illegal activities. The litigation was contentious, and in August 2019, the state court found Humphrey in contempt and liable on all counts, awarding $3.57 million in damages to the plaintiffs.Following the state court's decision, Humphrey filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in September 2019. The Trustee of her bankruptcy estate proposed selling her claims, including her counterclaim and defensive appellate rights, to Absolute for $12,500. Humphrey objected to the sale of her defensive appellate rights. The bankruptcy court approved the sale, finding it reasonable and negotiated at arm's length. Humphrey did not obtain a stay of the sale but did secure a stay of the state court appeal.Humphrey appealed the bankruptcy court's order to the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, which reversed the bankruptcy court's decision. The district court held that defensive appellate rights are not property of the estate under Arkansas law and found the sale not in the best interest of the estate. The district court also rejected the argument that the appeal was moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) because Humphrey had obtained a stay of the state court proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the absence of a stay of the sale itself rendered the appeal statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). The court vacated the district court's order and dismissed Humphrey's appeal from the bankruptcy court. View "Humphrey v. Christopher" on Justia Law

The Debtor-Appellant filed a chapter 13 voluntary petition on August 16, 2024, and was allowed to pay the filing fee in installments. The Debtor claimed to have received credit counseling within 180 days before filing, but failed to submit the required credit counseling certificate within the statutory deadline. The bankruptcy court issued an order compelling the Debtor to file the certificate by October 11, 2024, but the Debtor did not comply. Additionally, the Debtor failed to make the required installment payments on September 27 and October 11, 2024.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the Debtor’s case on October 15, 2024, due to the failure to pay the installment payments and the failure to submit the credit counseling certificate. The Debtor appealed the dismissal, arguing that the failure to pay the filing fee installment was due to unintentional delay and that the payment for the September 27 installment was sent but not received. The Debtor also attempted to submit two payments on October 14, which were delivered late.The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Debtor’s appeal did not comply with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8014, as the brief lacked necessary components such as citations and a proper argument. Additionally, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for failure to file a credit counseling certificate and for failure to make required installment payments. The court emphasized that compliance with the credit counseling requirement is mandatory and that the bankruptcy court had no choice but to dismiss the case. The order of the bankruptcy court was affirmed. View "Rivett v. Carlson" on Justia Law

In December 2021, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts partially recognized a multi-million-dollar foreign judgment obtained by PCC Rokita, S.A. against HH Technology Corp. (HHT). Shortly thereafter, HHT executed a trust agreement and an assignment for the benefit of creditors to wind itself down. About two months later, PCC Rokita petitioned the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts to involuntarily place HHT into Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Assignee moved to dismiss the involuntary petition, submitting a list of fifteen creditors of HHT that were allegedly qualified under section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.The bankruptcy court issued an order setting a deadline for additional creditors to join the involuntary petition. Only one additional creditor, Shanghai Morimatsu Chemical Equipment Co., joined before the deadline. The court denied PCC Rokita's motion for an extension and subsequently denied DFT Properties, LLC's motion to join the petition after the deadline. The bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the Petitioning Creditors failed to prove that any of the twelve challenged creditors were unqualified, leading to the dismissal of the involuntary petition.The Petitioning Creditors appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. They then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court may set a deadline for creditors to join a pending involuntary petition and that a putative debtor need not plead defenses to the avoidability of a pre-petition preferential transfer in its answer to the involuntary petition. The court also found that any error in requiring the creditors to disprove defenses to avoidability was harmless. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the involuntary petition. View "PCC Rokita, S.A. v. HH Technology Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding for debtors Theodore William White, Jr., and Porscha Shiroma. White and Lynn E. Wardley had previously started a business that failed. The Chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against Wardley, alleging a constructively fraudulent obligation and transfer under federal bankruptcy statutes and the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). The Trustee sought to avoid a $750,000 obligation and transfer made by White to Wardley.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment in favor of Wardley, rejecting the Trustee’s claims. The court found that White received reasonably equivalent value for both the guaranty obligation and the $750,000 transfer. The Trustee appealed to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment orders, agreeing that White received reasonably equivalent value for the guaranty obligation and the $750,000 transfer. The court found that White’s benefits, including employment, a 15% equity stake in the business, cash and equity incentives, and a business opportunity, were approximately equivalent to the value of the debt he took on. The court also held that the guaranty obligation was unconditional, making the $750,000 transfer a dollar-for-dollar exchange that constituted reasonably equivalent value. View "White v. Wardley" on Justia Law

A group of former managers of Ruby Tuesday, Inc. participated in two top-hat retirement plans administered by Regions Bank. These plans were unfunded and designed for high-level employees, meaning they were exempt from certain ERISA fiduciary duties. When Ruby Tuesday filed for bankruptcy, the managers lost their benefits and sued Regions Bank, alleging breaches of state-law fiduciary, trust, contract, and tort duties. They also sought equitable relief under ERISA to recover their lost benefits.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed the state-law claims, ruling that ERISA preempted them. The court also granted summary judgment to Regions Bank on the ERISA claim, concluding that the requested monetary relief did not qualify as equitable relief under ERISA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that ERISA preempted the state-law claims because they related to an ERISA-covered plan. The court emphasized that allowing state-law claims would undermine ERISA's uniform regulatory scheme. Additionally, the court held that the monetary relief sought by the plaintiffs did not qualify as equitable relief under ERISA. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' request for an "equitable surcharge" was essentially a request for legal damages, which ERISA does not permit under its equitable relief provision.Thus, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Regions Bank, concluding that the plaintiffs could not pursue their state-law claims or obtain the requested monetary relief under ERISA. View "Aldridge v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law