Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from defendant's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding where he sought to discharge a personal injury judgment debt that he had owed plaintiff since 1985. Plaintiff filed a complaint objecting to the discharge of defendant's debt to him on the ground that defendant had fraudulently avoided satisfying that debt since the judgment underlying it was entered 22 years before. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's order overruling plaintiff's objections and discharging plaintiff's debt to him. Plaintiff also appealed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff as a sanction against defendant for filing the objections. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's order denying plaintiff's objections on the merits where plaintiff's notice of appeal was time-barred. The court held, however, that it must remand the case to the bankruptcy court so that it could either flesh out its reasons for sanctioning plaintiff or decide that he was not to be sanctioned where that court did not make specific factual findings as to what constituted bad faith on plaintiff's part. The court also held that plaintiff's appeal to the district court of the denial of his objections to the discharge was colorable, non-frivolous enough, to prevent the district court's denial of sanctions against plaintiff from being an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.

The trustee of a bankruptcy estate filed objections to the requested priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. 507 of a portion of severance compensation claims filed by the debtor's former employees (claimants). The bankruptcy court overruled the objections. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the claimants "earned" their severance compensation on the date they became participants in the debtor’s severance plan immediately after their termination from employment.

The debtor was a member of an investment LLC, engaged in construction. In state court proceedings prior to the bankruptcy filing, the debtor entered a settlement agreement that included an agreement to pay the title company $241,500. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was nondischargeable based on a finding that the debtor obtained financial benefit as the result of fraudulent representations concerning the condition of title, satisfying the elements of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (Enron) sought to avoid and recover payments it made to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity from appellees, whose notes were redeemed by Enron. On appeal, Enron challenged the district court's conclusion that 11 U.S.C. 546(e)'s safe harbor, which shielded "settlement payments" from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, protected Enron's redemption payments whether or not they were made to retire debt or were unusual. The court affirmed the district court's decision and order, holding that Enron's proposed exclusions from the reach of section 546(e) have no basis in the Bankruptcy Code where the payments at issue were made to redeem commercial paper, which the Bankruptcy Code defined as security. Therefore, the payments at issue constituted the "transfer of cash ... made to complete [a] securities transaction" and were settlement payments within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 741(8). The court declined to address Enron's arguments regarding legislative history because the court reached its conclusion based on the statute's plain language.

The borrowers, former high-level employees, participated in the company’s shared investment program by purchasing company stock. The entire purchase price was funded by personal loans from banks. The company guaranteed the loans, received loan proceeds directly from the banks, and held the shares. Some participants made a profit, but in 2001 the company filed for bankruptcy. After settling with the lenders, the bankruptcy trustee filed actions against the borrowers. The district court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The borrowers may have enough evidence to satisfy the "in the business of supplying information" element of a negligent misrepresentation defense. The borrowers may raise margin Regulations G and U as an affirmative excuse-of-nonperformance defense; it is not clear whether the borrowers, the banks, the company, or the plan violated those regulations. Summary judgment on the Securities and Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Section 17(a) illegality defenses was also in error.

The debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions and the court ordered joint administration. The court rejected the debtors' proposed procedures for auctioning property, holding that the plan did not qualify for "fair and equitable" status and could not be approved over the objections of creditors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the matter was not moot, despite the fact that the reorganization plan is no longer before the court. When a debtor’s reorganization plan has not been approved by its secured creditors and proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens, Section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides the exclusive means by which it can be confirmed. In this case, the proposed auctions would deny secured lenders the ability to credit bid, and lack a crucial check against undervaluation.

The debtor did not pay his $2,902 bill for treatment of an infection, which was turned over to a collections agency. He made payments for several years. When the balance was at $536.35 the agency sued in Michigan court for $678.27, attaching to the complaint a document titled "Combined Affidavit of Open Account and Motion for Default Judgment." An agency employee then incorrectly told the debtor that he owned $1,016. The district court rejected the debtor's suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the title to the document attached to the complaint could be misleading. The mistaken balance was not given as part of a collection effort and was not a violation of the Act.

Debtor filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in 1998 and submitted a plan of reorganization ("Plan"), continuing to operate as a debtor-in-possession. Article X of the confirmed Plan provided for the discharge of all debts pursuant to which debtor was the "primary obligor." In 2007, the IRS contacted debtor's principal officers regarding potential assessment of a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty ("TFRP") pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6672. At issue was whether the collection of a TFRP from the principal officers violated the express terms of Article X discharging such claims. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction where the relief sought by debtor would effectively preclude the IRS's collection of a section 6672 assessment and therefore, fell squarely within the reach of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), and the court's holding in American Bicycle Ass'n v. United States. The court also held that, in light of the well-established principle that section 6672 liability was a separate and distinct liability, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court's alternative holding that, although a corporation could be the primary obligor on its own underlying tax obligation, it was not the primary obligor on the separate and distinct assessment under section 6672. Rather, the corporate officers were the primary obligors on the TFRP liabilities, as these liabilities were assessed independently under section 6672 for the officers' own willful conduct. Accordingly, the judgment of the bankruptcy court was affirmed.

The Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid a mortgage with respect to wife's interest in the property because the mortgage did not name or identify her in the body of the mortgage. The wife had signed the mortgage, and a rider that contained a provision for joint and several liability, but not the note. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Relying on 11 U.S.C. 544(a) and Kentucky property law, the court concluded that the identities of both borrowers was readily ascertainable from examination of the entire mortgage, which includes the rider.

Following a remand from the First Circuit, the bankruptcy court approved the Chapter 7 trustee's decision to give priority to holders of senior unsecured debt with respect to principal and pre-petition interest. The priority did not extend to payment of post-petition interest ahead of junior unsecured debt. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed. The Code provides that a subordination agreement is enforceable to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, (11 U.S.C. 510(a)). The bankruptcy court findings as to the intent of the parties were sufficient to support the conclusion, under New York law, that the parties did not intend to subordinate the junior noteholders to post-petition interest.