Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Stephanie and Kenneth Woolsey attempted to discharge a second mortgage on their home held by Citibank, N.A. through Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In their plan, they took the position that the bankruptcy code voided Citibank’s lien because it was unsupported by any current value in the home. The bank objected to the Woolseys’ plan and eventually persuaded the bankruptcy court to reject it. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, and the Woolseys appealed to the Tenth Circuit. In their argument on appeal, "[t]hey choose to pursue instead and exclusively a line of attack long foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. To be sure, the Woolseys argue[d] vigorously and with some support that the Supreme Court ha[d] it wrong. But, as Justice Jackson reminds us, whether or not the Supreme Court is infallible, it is final." The Tenth Circuit was "obliged" to apply the Supreme Court's current case law and affirmed the district and bankruptcy court's decisions. View "Woolsey, et al v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

Debtors proposed a three-year Chapter 13 plan of reorganization. The Trustee objected and argued that a five-year plan was required. At issue was whether, under 11 U.S.C. 1325(b), a debtor with no "projected disposable income" could confirm a plan that was shorter in duration than the "applicable commitment period" found in section 1325(b). The court concluded that the Trustee raised legitimate policy considerations as to why a mandated plan length might be desirable even though debtors have no projected disposable income. However, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in disregarding the controlling precedent in Maney v. Kagenveama where Ninth Circuit precedent plainly allowed debtors to confirm a shorter plan under the facts of this case. View "Flores, et al. v. Danielson" on Justia Law

Following the bankruptcy court's confirmation of Charter's proposed plan of reorganization, LDT, as indenture trustee for certain notes issued by CCI, and a CCI shareholder, appealed the confirmation order to the district court. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the appeals as moot under the doctrine of equitable mootness. View "In re: Charter Communication" on Justia Law

Barbara, an analyst at the Cleveland Clinic, and Anthony, a stay-at-home father for two-year-old triplets and ten-year-old, filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 701. On Schedule B listing assets, they included a joint interest in “Anticipated 2009 Income Tax Refund,” value “unknown.” On their joint returns for 2009, they listed: adjusted gross income: $59,402; total tax liability: $2,934; total credits: $2,934; payroll taxes withheld: $6,777; and total federal tax refund: $8,542. On line 51, “Tax and Credits,” they listed $2,903 for the Child Tax Credit (CTC). On line 65, “Payments,” they listed $1,097 for additional CTC. They amended Schedule B, changing the unknown value of their tax refund. They specified $4,000 as the portion of their refund due to the CTC and $4,542 for the portion not due to the CTC. They amended Schedule C of the bankruptcy petition, to list the $4,000 portion as exempt pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2329.66(A)(9)(g). The Trustee objected, arguing that $2,903 of the CTC, the so-called “non-refundable portion,” was not exempt. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee’s objection, reducing the exemption to $1,907. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "Zingale v. Rabin" on Justia Law

The Property Appraiser and the Tax Collector appealed from an order of the district court affirming the final order of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court held that debtor's request for the bankruptcy court to redetermine her ad valorem tax liability for the year 2009 was timely filed under 11 U.S.C. 108(a) and 505. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that debtor's request was timely under section 108(a). The bankruptcy court's interpretation of the language in section 505(a)(2)(C) failed to give full effect to Congress's intent. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's holding. View "Dubov, et al. v. Read" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action, on behalf of herself and the 181 other individuals in New York State who had received student loan collection letters from defendant. At issue was whether a debt collector's inaccurate representation to a debtor that her student loans were "ineligible" for bankruptcy discharge was a "false, misleading, or deceptive" debt collection practice, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The court held that it was because the least sophisticated consumer would interpret defendant's letter as representing, incorrectly, that bankruptcy discharge of her loans was wholly unavailable to her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Easterling v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved unanswered questions of Georgia law that are central to this appeal. Because these questions are determinative of the case and there are no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court respectfully certified the following questions for resolution: (1) Whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33, such that a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser would have constructive notice when the deed incorporates the covenants, terms, and provisions of a rider that contains the attestations required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33 and said rider was filed, recorded, and indexed with the security deed; and (2) If the answer to question one was in the negative, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. View "Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

At the behest of the Oklahoma Department of Securities, Oklahoma courts found early investors in a Ponzi scheme carried out by a third party to have been unjustly enriched and required disgorgement. Judgments were entered against those investors. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the judgments entered against Robert Mathews, Marvin Wilcox, and Pamela Wilcox qualified as a nondischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19). The bankruptcy court decided the debts were nondischargeable because they were in violation of securities laws. The district court affirmed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded: "the Department's position conveniently serves its ends (and in the abstract) a public good. But the language of the statute cannot reasonably be stretched that far." View "Oklahoma Dept. of Securites v. Wilcox, et al" on Justia Law

In 2009, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Michigan law permits debtors in bankruptcy to choose exemptions from: 11 U.S.C. 522(d); a set of general exemptions available to all Michigan residents irrespective of bankruptcy status, Mich. Comp. Laws 600.6023; or a list of exemptions available solely to debtors in bankruptcy, Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5451. The debtor chose a homestead exemption under the last option, which permits only bankruptcy debtors to exempt up to $30,000 of the value of the home, or up to $45,000 if the debtor is over the age of 65 or disabled. The figures are adjusted for inflation triennially, such that the debtor, who is disabled, claimed a total exemption of $44,695 in the value of his home; the federal exemption would be $21,625 and the Michigan general homestead exemption was $3,500. The trustee filed an objection. The Bankruptcy Court upheld the exemption. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The phrase “uniform Laws” in the Bankruptcy Clause permits states to act in the arena of bankruptcy exemptions, without violation of the Supremacy Clause, even if they do so by making certain exemptions available only to debtors in bankruptcy .View "State of MI v. Schafer" on Justia Law

Debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. After Debtor filed her petition and plan, the Trustee objected to confirmation of the plan, asserting that Debtor's petition and plan were not filed in good faith and that the amount of attorney's fees sought by Debtor was unreasonable. The bankruptcy court overruled the Trustee's objection and approved Debtor's Chapter 13 petition and plan and the requested legal fees and advanced legal costs. The district court reversed, finding that Debtor's plan was filed in bad faith. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and affirmed the bankruptcy court, holding (1) it was not clearly erroneous for the bankruptcy court to find Debtor's plan was not an attempt to abuse Chapter 13 but rather a responsible decision given her particular circumstances, and thus, the district court erred when it reversed the bankruptcy court on the ground that Debtor's plan was filed in bad faith; and (2) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded $2,800 in attorney fees to Debtor's counsel. View "Sikes v. Crager" on Justia Law