Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Debtor appealed from the judgment of the bankruptcy court. At issue was whether the bonuses debtor received from her employer were considered property of debtor's estate. Because the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) held that the bonus payments were not property of debtor's bankruptcy estate because she had no cognizable interest in the payments on the date the petition was filed, the court must reverse the bankruptcy court's revocation of debtor's discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 727(d)(2); avoidance of the transfer under 11 U.S.C. 549 of bonus funds she received postpetition from her employer and entering judgment for recovery of those funds by the Chapter 7 trustee, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 550; and granting the trustee's motion for costs filed by the trustee pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7054(b). View "Seaver v. Klein-Swanson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Eric Rajala, Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Generation Resources Holding Company, LLC (GRHC), appealed a district court order which granted motions by Defendants-Appellees FreeStream Capital, LLC (FreeStream) and Lookout Windpower Holding Co., LLC (LWHC) to distribute approximately $9 million held in escrow. The amount represented part of the purchase price of a wind power project allegedly developed by GRHC. The Trustee claimed that GRHC had been left with $5 million in debt while the individual Defendants-Appellees and their affiliated entities received some $13 million in proceeds from the sale of several wind power projects, unburdened by the debt. The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was what constituted property of the bankruptcy estate and whether allegedly fraudulently transferred property was subject to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay before a trustee recovers the property through an avoidance action. The district court held that allegedly fraudulently transferred property was not part of the bankruptcy estate until recovered and therefore was beyond the reach of the automatic stay. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[i]n the end, we need not pass upon the constitutionality of such a broad reading. . . . This interpretation gives Congress's chosen language its ordinary meaning, and abides by the rule against surplusage. Further, our reading does not undermine the Bankruptcy Code's goal of equitable distribution, as there exist[s] alternative means of protecting estate assets." View "Rajala v. Garnder" on Justia Law

Between 1982 and 1997, Alfes took out student loans funded by FFELP. Alfes consolidated his student-loan debt; SunTrust was the lender and obligee on the consolidated note and the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency was the guarantor. Alfes sought relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court entered a general discharge in 2005. Subsequently, Alfes sought a declaration that the debt under the consolidated note had been discharged, arguing that the consolidated note no longer constituted an “educational loan” under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(A) and had been discharged with his ordinary debt. The bankruptcy court initially entered a default judgment against the defendants. Following a series of transfers, reopening, and various motions, the bankruptcy court ultimately held that a holder of consolidated student loans is an educational lender and that the consolidated loan was, therefore, not dischargeable absent a showing of undue hardship. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Alfes v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed that her Mercedes was exempt from her bankruptcy estate under California Civil Procedure Code 703.140(b)(5) (the "wildcard" or "grubstake" exemption). The court held that a motor vehicle could fall within the wildcard exemption and that if an exempt vehicle was a tool of the debtor's trade and was secured by a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien, the debtor could avoid the lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(f)(1)(B). The court affirmed the district court's ruling and remand of the case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the Mercedes was in fact a tool of debtor's trade as a real estate agent. View "In re: Angie M. Garcia" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo appealed from a district court decision affirming confirmation of a Chapter 11 cramdown plan. Debtors had obtained a loan from Morgan Stanley to renovate hotel properties and Wells Fargo eventually acquired the loan from Morgan Stanley. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the appeal was not equitably moot. On the merits, the court held that the bankruptcy court's 5% cramdown rate calculation on the basis of a straightforward application of the prime-plus approach was not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wells Fargo Bank National Assn v. TX Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, et al" on Justia Law

In 2006 a coal-mining company borrowed $7 million from Caterpillar secured by mining equipment. The company was also indebted to Peabody, for an earlier loan, and at Peabody’s request, transferred title to the same equipment, subject to Caterpillar’s security interest, to a Peabody affiliate. In 2008, Peoples Bank lent the mining company $1.8 million secured by the same equipment and filed a financing statement. Wanting priority, the bank negotiated a subordination agreement with Peabody. After the mining company defaulted, the bank obtained possession of the assets and told Caterpillar it would try to sell them for $2.5 million. Caterpillar did not object, but claimed that its security interest was senior. The bank sold the equipment for $2.5 million but retained $1.4 million and sent a check for $1.1 million to Caterpillar. Caterpillar neither cashed nor returned the check. The district court awarded Caterpillar $2.4 million plus prejudgment interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The bank’s claim of priority derives from its dealings with Peabody. The bank did not obtain a copy of a security agreement for Peabody’s loan; a security interest is not enforceable unless the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral. View "Caterpillar Fin. Servs. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Fire Eagle appealed the district court's decision affirming a bankruptcy court's grants of summary judgment in two consolidated matters. The court held that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction extended to the underlying adversary actions and declined to reverse the district court's holding to that effect. The bankruptcy court's entering an order in the two adversary proceedings without reference to the district court was within its statutory authority. There was no constitutional bar to the bankruptcy court's exercise of its jurisdiction over the two adversary actions. Venue was proper in the Western District of Texas. The transfer of venue of the Bischoff Adversary to the Western District of Texas was proper. Finally, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment. View "Fire Eagle, L.L.C. v. Bischoff, et al" on Justia Law

Western appealed a bankruptcy court order confirming a Chapter 11 cramdown plan and denying Western's motion for relief from the automatic stay. The court expressly rejected Matter of Windsor on the River Associates, Ltd. and joined the Ninth Circuit in holding that 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(10) did not distinguish between discretionary and economically driven impairment. In light of the record in this case, the court could not conclude that the district court clearly erred in its section 1129(a)(3) analysis, particularly as the court has recognized that a single-asset debtor's desire to protect its equity could be a legitimate Chapter 11 objective. The court emphasized, however, that the court's decision did not circumscribe the factors bankruptcy courts could consider in evaluating a plan proponent's good faith. Because the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in confirming the Village's plan, Western's theory of cause necessarily also failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Western Real Estate Equities v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P." on Justia Law

The Trustee in bankruptcy of ESA appealed from the affirmance by the district court of the award of summary judgment by the bankruptcy court to Hanover. The bankruptcy court concluded that ESA's transfer of $1.375 million to Hanover within 90 days of ESA's filing a petition for bankruptcy was not an avoidable preference under 11 U.S.C. 547(b). The court held that, although the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the earmarking defense applied in this case, the court found no error in its determination that Hanover was entitled to the new value defense under section 547(c) to the Trustee's claim of a preferential transfer. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court awarding summary judgment to Hanover. View "ESA Environmental Specialists, Inc. v. The Hanover Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2000 the SEC charged violation of securities law. The court appointed a receiver to distribute assets among victims of the $31 million fraud. The receiver found that assets had been used to acquire oil and gas leases. SonCo claimed an interest in the leases. In 2010, the district court issued an “agreed order,” requiring SonCo to pay $600,000 for quitclaim assignment of the leases and release of claims in Canadian litigation. Alco operated the wells and had posted a $250,000 cash bond with the Texas Railroad Commission. Alco could get its $250,000 back if replaced by new operator that posted an equivalent bond. The $250,000 had come, in part, from defrauded investors. Alco was incurring environmental liabilities, with little prospect of offsetting revenues. SonCo was to replace Alco, but failed to so, after multiple extensions. The district judge held SonCo in civil contempt, ordered it to return the leases, and allowed the receiver to keep the $600,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the finding of civil contempt. Following remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sanction; considering additional environmental compliance costs and receivership fees, a plausible estimate of the harm would be $2 million. ”SonCo will be courting additional sanctions, of increasing severity, if it does not desist forthwith from its obstructionist tactics.” View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. First Choice Mgmt Servs., Inc." on Justia Law