Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The debtor worked Saylor’s nightclub and for another entity owned by Saylor, scouting for commercial properties. Debtor obtained loans ($1,018,350) to purchase four Michigan car washes. The loan closings were conducted by another company controlled by Saylor, acting as agent for the title company, which never released loan proceeds to complete the purchases. After the debtor defaulted, Bayview, assignee of the notes, discovered that he did not hold title to the properties securing the notes. Bayview filed claims under the title commitments. The title company claimed that the loan applications contained false statements and denied the claim for failure to exercise due diligence in approving the loans. Bayview sued and the parties settled; Bayview assigned an interest in the notes to the title company, which obtained a default judgment of $10,172,840 against Saylor. The debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The title company filed an adversary complaint claiming that the Bayview notes were undischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B). The bankruptcy court rejected the argument, holding that under Michigan law, claims for fraud cannot be assigned and that the title company had the right to pursue Saylor, but not the debtor. The district court reversed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the title company can seek nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2) View "Pazdzierz v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's finding of fraud and entry of a nondischargeable judgment for SG Homes. The court concluded that SG Homes justifiably relied on defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations and thereby suffered proven damages. Therefore, the bankruptcy court's finding of fraud on the basis of justifiable reliance was not clearly erroneous. Further, the award of damages for SG Homes was not clearly erroneous and the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the judgment debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SG Homes Associates, LP v. Marinucci" on Justia Law

Debtor appealed from the bankruptcy court's order finding that her prepetition claim against her former spouse for alimony was property of her bankruptcy estate, and ordering her to turn that claim over to the trustee. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) concluded that debtor had not shown that the right to alimony payments was different from any other stream of payments someone could have been ordered to pay to her under South Dakota law. Therefore, the BAP concluded that it fit within the broad definition under 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1), and was not expressly excluded by section 541(b) or (c)(2). Thus, it was property of the estate, subject to any exemptions debtor could have under South Dakota law. Accordingly, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's order. View "Mehlhaff v. Allred" on Justia Law

Debtor's Chapter 13 case was converted to Chapter 11 after a creditor filed a claim that caused his scheduled debts to exceed the debt ceiling for Chapter 13 cases. The denial of confirmation of debtor's organization plan was certified for appeal from the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). At issue on appeal was whether Chapter 11's absolute priority rule, 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(B), as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, applied in such individual debtor cases. Using standard tools of statutory interpretation, and in accord with two other circuits, the court held that it did and affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying confirmation. View "In the Matter of Philip Lively" on Justia Law

In 2009, Epling purchased a manufactured home, borrowing funds from Vanderbilt secured by a security interest in her manufactured home. Epling resided in Magoffin County, Kentucky. Vanderbilt filed an application for first title and an application for a title lien statement in Bell County, Kentucky and later filed the Certificate of Title for the manufactured home, which listed Vanderbilt’s lien, in Bell County. In 2010, Epling filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The trustee initiated a strong-arm proceeding to avoid Vanderbilt’s lien on the manufactured home, under 11 U.S.C. 544, because the lien was not properly perfected under the Kentucky law. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee summary judgment, concluding that Vanderbilt had failed to perfect its lien because it had filed the required title lien statement in its county of residence, rather than in Epling’s county of residence. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Westenhoefer" on Justia Law

This is an adversary proceeding arising out of the bankruptcy of debtor (Derivium). Plaintiff (Grayson), assignee of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, appealed from a district court judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to grant summary judgment for defendants (Wachovia). The court concluded that the district court did not err in affirming the grant of summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Customer Transfers claim; summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Cash Transfers claim; the bankruptcy court's determinations that the stockbroker defense applied to commissions; and the bankruptcy court's ruling that in pari delicto barred Grayson's tort claims against Wachovia. View "Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC" on Justia Law

The Trustee for McKenzie’s bankruptcy estate filed an adversary proceeding against GKH, McKenzie’s law firm (and a creditor), seeking records pertaining to entities in which McKenzie allegedly had an interest (11 U.S.C. 542). The parties entered into an agreed order. The Trustee then filed other actions, arising from the same post-petition transfer of 50 acres from the Cleveland Auto Mall, an entity in which McKenzie had a 50% interest, to a newly formed entity in which McKenzie had no interest. The Trustee alleged violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(k) and preferential or fraudulent transfer, 11 U.S.C. 547(b) and 544(g)). The Bankruptcy Court dismissed, finding that under Tennessee law and notwithstanding prior dissolution, CAM existed as a separate legal entity such that the land remained its separate property. The Trustee then filed a state court action, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy to commit fraud; GKH allegedly represented McKenzie under a conflict of interest in drafting the transfer documents. Several claims were dismissed as untimely. GKH then sued the Trustee alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed GKH’s adversary proceeding alleging claims, citing quasi-judicial immunity and failure to state a claim, and denied GKH’s motion for leave to file a complaint in state court. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "In re McKenzie" on Justia Law

After filing for bankruptcy, plaintiff sought a discharge of his law student loans under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The bankruptcy court granted a partial discharge, but, on appeal, the district court reinstated the student loan debt in full as non-dischargeable. The district court ruled that plaintiff had not acted in good faith, which was one of the prerequisites for relief under section 523(a)(8). The court concluded that a good faith finding should be reviewed for clear error. The court also concluded that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous where it relied on substantial evidence in the record and its factual inferences were permissible. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with directions. View "Hedlund v. The Educational Resources Inst." on Justia Law

BDI elected under I.R.C. 1362(a) to be treated as an S-corporation, not subject to federal taxation because its profits and losses passed through to Barden, its sole shareholder. MSC owns the Majestic Star Casino and Hotel. BDI acquired MSC in 2005. BDI elected to treat MSC as a QSub (I.R.C. 1361(b)(3)(B), not as a separate tax entity. MSC, therefore, paid no federal taxes. In 2009, MSC and its affiliates filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions. Barden and BDI were not debtors. After the petition, Barden caused revocation of BDI’s status as an S-corporation; MSC’s QSub status automatically terminated because it was no longer wholly owned by an S-corp. Neither BDI nor Barden sought authorization from the debtors or from the Bankruptcy Court. MSC allegedly was unaware that it had a new obligation to pay income taxes. As of first date federal taxes would have been due, the debtors had paid no federal income taxes. The Bankruptcy Court permitted conversion of MSC to a limited liability company, so that MSC would no longer qualify for QSub status, even if the Revocation had not occurred. The debtors sought to avoid the Revocation, which, they alleged, caused an unlawful post-petition transfer of property. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the debtors. The Third Circuit vacated and directed that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "In Re:Majestic Star Casino LLC" on Justia Law

Peoples Bank loaned Debtors $214,044, secured by a mortgage recorded in 2004. In 2008, Debtors obtained a $296,000 construction loan from Banterra, secured with a second mortgage on the same property. Banterra was aware of the first mortgage, but did not know was that in 2007, Debtors obtained a second loan from Peoples, for $400,000, secured by another mortgage on a different piece of property. The 2004 Peoples mortgage contained a cross-collateralization provision, stating that “In addition to the Note, this Mortgage secures all obligations … of Grantor to Lender … now existing or hereafter arising,” and a provision that “At no time shall the principal amount of the Indebtedness secured by the Mortgage … exceed $214,044.26 … “Indebtedness” … includes all amounts that may be indirectly secured by the Cross-Collateralization provision.” In 2010 Debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The balance due on Peoples 2004 loan was then $115,044.26. Debtors received permission and sold the property for $388,500.00. Out of these proceeds, Peoples claimed the balance due on the 2004 loan plus partial payment of the 2007, up to the cap. The Bankruptcy Court found in favor of Peoples. The district court reversed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, upholding the “plain language” of the cross-collateralization agreement. View "Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Banterra Bank" on Justia Law