Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

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After debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court ruled that all of the income and expenses of debtor's husband should be considered in determining the ability of debtor to pay her debts. The district court affirmed. Given the nature of debtor's debt and the financial relationship between her and her husband, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in applying the totality of the circumstances test. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. View "In Re: Kulakowski" on Justia Law

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This case arose when partners of the law firm Thelen LLP, a registered limited liability partnership governed by California law, voted to dissolve the firm. At issue was whether, for purposes of administering the firm's related bankruptcy, New York law treats a dissolved law firm's pending hourly fee matters as its property. The court certified controlling questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, concluding that the court could not definitely answer the issue without the guidance of the state court. View "In Re: Thelen LLP" on Justia Law

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In Chapter 11 liquidation of KB Toys Inc. and affiliated entities, the Residual Trustee of the KBTI Trust sought to disallow certain trade claims that ASM (a company in the business of purchasing bankruptcy claims) obtained from creditors. Under 11 U.S.C. 502(d) a claim can be disallowed if a claimant receives property that is avoidable or recoverable by the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court disallowed the claims, concluding that a claims purchaser holding a trade claim is subject to the same 502(d) challenge as the original claimant. ASM was on “constructive notice” of potential preference actions, could have discovered the potential for disallowance with “very little due diligence,” and was not entitled to protection as a “good faith” purchaser. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a trade claim that is subject to disallowance under502(d) in the hands of the original claimant is similarly disallowable in the hands of a subsequent transferee. View "In re: KB Toys Inc." on Justia Law

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The bankruptcy court held that a district court judgment entered against the Debtor was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court properly gave the district court’s findings preclusive effect as to whether the judgment was the result of the Debtor’s willful and malicious injury. View "In re: Barlow" on Justia Law

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Creditor appealed from the orders of the bankruptcy court denying his requests for relief from the automatic stay and for abstention and remand. The court held that the bankruptcy court properly denied creditor's request for stay relief where there was no purpose for granting the stay since creditor's state court malpractice and negligence actions against debtor were dischargeable debts and his fraud claim was discharged when creditor failed to timely file an adversary proceeding. Further, there was no basis for an order of abstention and remand. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "Chae v. Bennett" on Justia Law

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BPRE filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief and then filed an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court alleging various state-law tort and contract claims against RML. The bankruptcy court entered a final judgment denying relief and the district court affirmed. In Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court determined that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to enter final judgment on the debtor's state-law counterclaim even thought the statute conferred such authority. Although the strict holding in Stern limited bankruptcy-court authority in one isolated respect and the question presented was a narrow one, its sweeping reasoning was broad and logically must be applied to BPRE's claims here. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded, concluding that the bankruptcy court lacked Article III standing to enter final judgment on BPRE's claims. View "BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

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In 2004, Lampe won a $25,000 judgment against Kash. Kash could not pay his debts and sought bankruptcy protection in 2012. When he submitted a list of creditors, under Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a) Kash omitted Lampe’s residential address, listing her in care of the law firm that represented her eight years earlier. The firm stopped working for Lampe in 2004, and the notice never reached Lampe, who did not participate in the bankruptcy case, which discharged the judgment debt. After the discharge, Lampe returned to the district court, seeking to revive her judgment. The district court rejected her claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A debt is a creditor’s property, and the Due Process Clause entitles her to service of notice “reasonably calculated” to reach her before she is deprived of that property. Notification to a former attorney provides little assurance that the notice will reach the creditor. Lawyers have “no general continuing obligation” to pass information along to people they no longer represent. Nothing in the record suggested that the search for Lampe’s address would have imposed an unreasonable burden on Kash; without further investigation, any belief that the firm still worked for Lampe in 2012 was unreasonable. View "Lampe v. Kash" on Justia Law

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Beginning in 2004, 1st Source Bank entered into secured transactions with the debtors for the sale or lease of tractors and trailers. The agreements granted 1st Source a security interest in the tractors and/or trailers, accounts, and in proceeds from that collateral. 1st Source filed financing statements that identified the collateral as including the specified tractors/and or trailers, and “all proceeds thereof, including rental and/or lease receipts.” The financing statements did not refer to “accounts,” “accounts receivable,” or any similar language. Later, defendant banks also entered into secured transactions with the debtors and filed financing statements that specifically referred to a security interest in “all accounts receivable now outstanding or hereafter arising.” In 2009, the debtors defaulted. 1st Source undertook repossession of the collateral securing the agreements and attempted to claim a perfected security interest and first priority in debtors’ accounts, arguing that the term “and all proceeds thereof” included accounts receivable. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that 1st Source’s financing statements were not sufficient to put defendants on notice that 1st Source claimed a security interest in accounts receivable, and holding, as a matter of Tennessee law, that “proceeds,” as used in a company’s financing statement, does not include its accounts receivable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

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After South Louisiana Ethanol filed for bankruptcy, CHS filed suit contending that South Louisiana Ethanol's option contract with Plaquemines constituted the assignment of a litigious right under Louisiana law, entitling CHS to redeem the litigious right by reimbursing Plaquemines for the cost of the option contract plus interest. The district court granted Plaquemines's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the sale fit within the statutory judicial-sale exception to redemption, as described by Bluefields S.S. Co. v. Lala Ferreras Cangelosi S.S. Co. and its predecessors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the law at issue did not apply to judicial sales. View "CHS, Inc. v. Plaquemines Holdings, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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Debtor filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed an annuity as exempt under 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(C). The court agreed with the bankruptcy court's holding that the annuity owned by debtor qualified as an "individual retirement annuity" under section 408(b) of the Internal Revenue Code and was, therefore, exempt under section 522(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code. View "Running v. Miller" on Justia Law