Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the bankruptcy court's order imposing sanctions and judgment, and an order denying a motion to vacate or alter or amend judgment. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that defendant violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, as well as its imposition of sanctions in connection therewith, including suspension of defendant from practice for six months under Local Rule 2090-2; reversed the bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions against defendant under 11 U.S.C. 105 and its inherent authority because defendant did not receive separate prior notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding such sanctions; and remanded to the bankruptcy court the decision regarding sanctions for alleged misrepresentations by defendant at the Order to Appear and Show Cause hearing. View "Young v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Debtor challenged the district court's determination that proceeds from the post-certification sale of an exempted homestead revert to the estate if not reinvested within six months. The "snapshot rule" of bankruptcy law holds that all exemptions are determined at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, and that they do not change due to subsequent events. In re Zibman held that proceeds from the pre-petition of a sale of a Texas homestead are not permanently immune from bankruptcy creditors. Under the court's precedent, the sale of the homestead voided the homestead exemption and the failure to reinvest the proceeds within six months voided the proceeds exemption, regardless of whether the sale occurred pre- or post- petition. This interpretation of 11 U.S.C. 522(c) is in accordance with Texas law and the decisions of the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Viegelahn v. Frost" on Justia Law

Debtor moved for sanctions after Stephen Wyse, representing on of debtor's creditors, filed suit in state court seeking in part to recover a debt discharged by debtor in bankruptcy. Wyse and his client, Frank Williams, failed to appear in opposition and the bankruptcy court granted the motion. Wyse and Williams subsequently appealed the orders granting in part their first motion for relief and denying the second motion for rehearing or relief. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding a portion of the debt Williams sought to collect in the state court action was debtor's pre-conversion debt. The bankruptcy court maintained the order of sanctions against Wyse for seeking to collect the portion of the $76,200 derived from debtor's pre-conversion debt to Williams, not for seeking to collect the post-discharge debts in the state court action. The bankruptcy court was perfectly within its discretion to impose the sanction. Given William's failure to introduce any other evidence regarding the specific amount of money he provided to debtor on April 19, 2010, the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding Williams had not proven the exact amount of post-conversion debt debtor had incurred on that date. The court also concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the second motion for relief brought solely to raise neglected arguments in the first motion for relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "Williams, et al. v. King" on Justia Law

Law filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. He valued his home at $363,348, claiming that $75,000 of the value was covered by California’s homestead exemption and exempt from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(A). He claimed that the sum of two liens, including a mortgage in favor of Lin, exceeded the home’s nonexempt value, leaving no equity for other creditors. Siegel, the bankruptcy trustee, challenged the Lin lien in an adversary proceeding. Protracted litigation followed when “Lili Lin” in China claimed to be the beneficiary of Law’s deed of trust. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the loan was a fiction created to preserve equity in the house and granted Siegel’s motion to “surcharge” Law’s $75,000 homestead exemption, to defray fees incurred in challenging Law’s misrepresentations. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. A bankruptcy court may not exercise its authority to carry out the provisions of the Code, 11 U.S.C. 105(a), or its inherent power to sanction abusive litigation practices by taking action prohibited elsewhere in the Code; the “surcharge” contravened section 522, which (by reference to California law) entitled Law to exempt $75,000 of equity in his home and which made that $75,000 “not liable for payment of any administrative expense,” including attorney’s fees. An argument that equated the surcharge with denial of Law’s homestead exemption was not supported by the history of the case. No one timely objected to the exemption, so it became final before the surcharge was imposed. In addition, federal law provides no authority for denial of an exemption on a ground not specified in the Code. The Court acknowledged that its ruling may produce inequitable results, but noted that ample authority remains to address debtor misconduct, including denial of discharge, sanctions for bad-faith litigation conduct, or enforcement of monetary sanctions through the normal procedures for collecting judgments. View "Law v. Siegel" on Justia Law

Amzak appealed the district court's summary judgment on its loan loss claims against its title insurance policy provider and related entities. The court concluded that Amzak failed to show that it suffered actual loss because of a failure of title and STL could not be held responsible for any harm suffered by Amzak. The court formalized the holding in First State Bank v. American Title and likewise rejected the guarantee rationale of Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., and agreed with the district court's rejection of Amzak's argument that STL breached the title policy at the time of the loan because its mortgage was voidable at that time. The court also disposed of Amzak's negligence claim where STL's delay in making a complete filing of Amzak's mortgage was not a legal cause of Amzak's loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Amzak Capital Mgmt. v. Stewart Title" on Justia Law

Hope 7 entered into bankruptcy in 2009 and RIASO was Hope 7's largest creditor. The bankruptcy court subsequently approved the settlement of Hope 7's fraud-based claims against RIASO, approved RIASO's proof of claim against Hope 7, and directed the payment of funds from Hope 7's estate to RIASO. Hope 7 subsequently found additional evidence relevant to RIASO's alleged fraud and moved for relief of judgment under Rule 60(b) and asked the bankruptcy court to reopen its earlier orders. The court concluded that Hope 7 had not demonstrated that it had standing to challenge the bankruptcy court's settlement order or, with regard to the remaining claims, that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion for relief. The district court did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court's decision, and therefore, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "In re: Hope 7 Monroe Street Ltd." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) judgment holding that the bankruptcy estate of her former employer, Racing Services, was entitled to the liquidation proceeds of a cash-value life insurance policy the employer purchased for her. Because the trustee had presented no evidence demonstrating that appellant could have demonstrated insurability, the court rejected the argument that the purported "equities" of this case required that the court deem appellant's failure to reinstate the policy as an act of surrender. The terms of the agreement between appellant and Racing Services granted Racing Services only the limited right to receive a repayment of policy premiums from the cash value upon surrender of the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed where appellant at no time surrendered the policy and the estate did not possess a right to control the policy or receive its liquidation proceeds. View "Kaler v. Bala" on Justia Law

The claimant alleges that Father Hanser, a former pastor at a Catholic Parish in Brookfield,Wisconsin, sexually abused him in the late 1970s when he was seven years old. In 2007 the claimant participated in a voluntary mediation program conducted by the Archdiocese to address claims of sexual abuse by priests. The mediation produced a settlement. The Archdiocese paid the claimant $100,000, and he released the Archdiocese from all claims relating to abuse by Father Hanser. When the Archdiocese filed its Chapter 11 petition four years later, the claimant submitted a claim based on the same allegations of abuse by Father Hanser, claiming that an Archdiocesan representative had fraudulently induced him to settle by giving him inaccurate information about when the Archdiocese first received reports of abuse by Father Hanser. The bankruptcy judge refused to set the agreement aside because the claimant had not shown that but for the alleged misrepresentations, he would not have accepted the settlement. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claimant failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations were a substantial factor in his decision to accept the settlement and never made an offer of proof explaining what an expanded record would show. View " Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

The trustee filed an action to avoid and recover certain payments made by FMI to First Tennessee. The trustee alleged that the payments were fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. 548, and were part of a fraudulent scheme. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court and the district court correctly applied the objective good-faith standard in determining that the bank employees' testimony provided competent objective evidence that satisfied the bank's burden of proving its affirmative defense under section 548(c). The court also concluded that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in holding that the bank accepted the payments from FMI in good faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Taneja v. First Tennessee Bank NA" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals from two Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtors challenged the district court’s order reversing confirmation of their reorganization plans and remanding their cases to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these appeals, the Court dismissed them. View "Gordon, et al v. Bank of America, N.A., et al" on Justia Law