Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Santander appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order overruling Santander's objection to the confirmation of debtor's plan under Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court proposed that petitioner surrender his vehicle under 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(C) to satisfy Santander's claim. The bankruptcy court held that 11 U.S.C. 506(a)(1) and (a)(2) determined the vehicle's value and hence the amount of Santander's secured claim, which would be satisfied by debtor's surrender of the vehicle. The court held that section 506(a)(2)'s valuation standard applied when a Chapter 13 debtor surrendered his vehicle under section 1325(a)(5)(C). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's judgment. View "Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Heatherwood and FCB appealed the district court's affirmance of a final amended judgment entered by the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that there was an implied restrictive covenant limiting the use of real property at issue to a golf course. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, because FCB satisfied the person-aggrieved doctrine, FCB also met Article III standing requirements. On the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it held that FCB and Heatherwood had actual, constructive and inquiry notice of the implied restrictive covenant; the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that most, if not all, of the homeowners within the Heatherwood subdivision bought their home with the expectation that the golf course property would remain a golf course; the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that the doctrine of estoppel by deed precluded the enforcement of the covenant; with respect to FCB and Heatherwood's argument that the doctrine of integration in the Agreement between HGC and Heatherwood served to destroy an implied covenant, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding integration did not apply under the facts of the case; in considering the doctrine of changed circumstances, the bankruptcy court relied on various factual findings in determining that the homeowners' benefit from the continued existence of the covenant outweighed the detriment borne by FCB and Heatherwood; and the court rejected FCB and Heatherwood's argument that HGC had no standing to enforce the implied restrictive covenant because HGC owned no property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Heatherwood Holdings, LLC v. HGC, Inc." on Justia Law

United appealed the district court's order denying United's motion to dismiss an antitrust complaint brought against it by DHL. At issue was whether DHL had sufficient notice of the availability of the claim against a Chapter 11 debtor to satisfy due process requirements and render the claim discharged. The court concluded that the district court applied an incorrect standard in accepting as true DHL's allegation that it was not aware of, or with due diligence could not have become aware of, sufficient facts to plead an antitrust claim that would survive a motion to dismiss in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, the court remanded for further development of the facts concerning (a) what DHL knew or reasonably should have known in time to present an antitrust claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, or to file a late proof of claim or move to amend the reorganization plan and (b) what United knew or reasonably should have known concerning DHL's claim. View "DPWN Holdings (USA), Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, trustee for the estate of debtor, attempted to avoid eight transfers made by debtor to the IRS as payment for the income tax liability of debtor's principal. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the United States as to the first seven transfers. The bankruptcy court concluded that plaintiff succeeded in proving constructive fraud and ruled that the IRS was an initial transferee from whom plaintiff could seek recovery. The district court affirmed with regard to the first seven transfers but reversed as to the eighth. The district court concluded that the IRS could not be held liable as an initial transferee because it qualified for the mere conduit exception. The court affirmed, viewing the transaction as sufficiently similar to the deposit of funds into a bank account to conclude that the IRS acted as a mere conduit. View "Menotte v. United States" on Justia Law

Debtor and his wife sought relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtor owns Bradley Machinery, which sells and rents construction equipment. Bradley did not file a bankruptcy petition. Some of Bradley’s equipment was subject to security interests in favor of Lender; Debtor had personally guaranteed payment of the loans. Lender filed an adversary proceeding asserting that Debtor caused Bradley to sell equipment “out of trust,” without remitting the proceeds of the sale of collateral to Lender, constituting embezzlement under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) and willful and malicious injury under section 523(a)(6). Pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A). Lender asserted that Debtor obtained an extension of credit through false representations to Lender regarding the status of certain pieces of collateral. The Bankruptcy Court held that Lender had failed to show that the debt was nondischargeable. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed on alternate grounds and remanded for determination of damages. Lender suffered a loss due to Debtor’s misrepresentations regarding the status of the collateral. Debtor’s subjective intent to repay is not a factor under section 523(a)(2)(A) when there is a separate specific false material misrepresentation. Debtor knew that Lender would rely on these misrepresentations when determining whether to continue to extend credit. View "In re: Bradley" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order denying the parties' joint request to seal the entire record of bankruptcy proceedings before the district court. The parties sought to seal the record of proceedings on an interlocutory appeal taken from the bankruptcy court, which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The district court rejected the parties' argument that the "good cause" standard applied and held that the "compelling reasons" standard governed the decision to seal the record of the proceedings. The court agreed, concluding that the rationale for the "good cause" standard did not apply in this case and that the district court properly invoked the "compelling reasons" standard in considering the sealing request. In this case, the only reasons provided for sealing the records - to avoid embarrassment or annoyance to defendant and to prevent an undue burden on his professional endeavors - were not "compelling," particularly because the proceedings had been a matter of public record since at least 2004. Defendant has not pointed to any compelling reasons that overcome the strong presumption in favor of maintaining public access to court records. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Oliner v. Kontrabecki" on Justia Law

LGI's bankruptcy trustee filed suit to recover payments to SDGE and SCE that LGI made for its clients, Buffets and Wendy's restaurants, as avoidable preferences under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 547(b). SDGE and SCE asserted the subsequent new value exception to preference liability pursuant to section 547(c)(4). The court held that, in three-party relationships where the debtor's preferential transfer to a third party benefits the debtor's primary creditor, new value could come from the primary creditor, even if the third party was a creditor in its own right and was the only defendant against whom the debtor had asserted a claim of preference liability. As section 547(b) makes voidable a transfer "for the benefit of a creditor," it both served the purposes of section 547 and honored the statute's text to construe "such creditor" in the section 547(c)(4) exception as including a creditor who benefited from the preferential transfer and subsequently replenished the bankruptcy estate with new value. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel correctly concluded that SDGE and SCE could each offset subsequent new value that Buffets or Wendy's paid to LGI for that utility's services, regardless of when those services were provided. The court directed the BAP to enter a modified judgment reducing SCE's preference liability based on the double-counting of two payments. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Stoebner v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., et al." on Justia Law

Sentinel specialized in short-term cash management, promising to invest customers’ cash in safe securities for good returns with high liquidity. Customers did not acquire rights to specific securities, but received a pro rata share of the value of securities in an investment pool (Segment) based on the type of customer and regulations that applied to that customer. Segment 1 was protected by the Commodity Exchange Act; Segment 3 customers by the Investment Advisors Act and SEC regulations. Despite those laws, Sentinel lumped cash together, used it to purchase risky securities, and issued misleading statements. Some securities were collateral for a loan (BONY). In 2007 customers began demanding cash and BONY pressured Sentinel for payment. Sentinel moved $166 million in corporate securities out of a Segment 1 trust to a lienable account as collateral for BONY and sold Segment 1 and 3 securities to pay BONY. Sentinel filed for bankruptcy after returning $264 million to Segment 1 from a lienable account and moving $290 million from the Segment 3 trust to the lienable account. After informing customers that it would not honor redemption requests, Sentinel distributed the full cash value of their accounts to some Segment 1 groups. After filing for bankruptcy Sentinel obtained bankruptcy court permission to have BONY distribute $300 million from Sentinel accounts to favored customers. The trustee obtained district court approval to avoid the transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547; 11 U.S.C. 549. The Seventh Circuit, noting the unique conflict between the rights of two groups of wronged customers, reversed. Sentinel’s pre-petition transfer fell within the securities exception in 11 U.S.C. 546(e); the post-petition transfer was authorized by the bankruptcy court, 11 U.S.C. 549. Neither can be avoided.View "Grede v. FCStone LLC" on Justia Law

Before Paul filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Paul and Candace were in divorce proceedings in New Jersey. No final judgment existed nor was there a division of marital assets. Based on an estimate of her expected share of marital assets, Candace filed a timely proof of claim for $577,935 against Paul’s bankruptcy estate, apparently premised on her stake in a partnership that was legally titled in Paul’s name and, therefore, passed to his bankruptcy estate. It would likely be distributed as shared marital property in a divorce decree. The trustee sought to expunge the claim, arguing that Candace’s interest in equitably dividing marital property in Paul’s bankruptcy estate was not a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. 101(5), because the state court had not entered a final divorce decree before Paul’s filing. The bankruptcy judge found that the claim for equitable distribution arose prepetition and must be allowed. On direct appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Although Candace did not have an equitable distribution decree in hand at the time Paul filed for bankruptcy, the focus should not be on when the claim accrues, but whether a claim exists. Given the Bankruptcy Code’s expansive definition of “claim,” a non-debtor spouse has an allowable pre-petition claim against the bankruptcy estate for equitable distribution of marital property when the parties are in divorce proceedings before the bankruptcy petition is filed. View "In re: Paul Ruitenberg, III" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, Mississippi Valley agreed to sell cattle to Swift, planning to fulfill that agreement in part with cattle it had received from J&R. Mississippi Valley was merely the holder of J&R’s cattle, not the purchaser or owner. Because the relationship between Swift and J&R had soured, Mississippi Valley did not inform Swift that some of the cattle were actually J&R’s. Swift paid for the purchases with checks made out to Mississippi Valley, which deposited the checks in its general operating account and periodically sent J&R checks for sales of J&R cattle. Mississippi Valley stopped making timely payments. As the debt mounted, J&R sent increasingly frantic demands for payment. Mississippi Valley sent seven checks to J&R totaling $862,747.31. Less than 90 days later, creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Mississippi Valley. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the seven payments as preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547(b), but J&R argued that Mississippi Valley never had a property interest in the funds but only held the sale proceeds for J&R’s benefit. The bankruptcy court granted J&R summary judgment. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that it is unclear how much money could properly be traced to a constructive trust in favor of J&R.View "In re: MS Livestock, Inc." on Justia Law