Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The Trustee of the Vallecito bankruptcy estate appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of various owners of overriding royalty interests (appellees) to a lease that the trustee seeks to sell on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a letter submitted by an attorney in the Navajo Nation Department of Justice, stating that any "purported overriding royalty interest is invalid under the applicable provisions of the Navajo Nation Code and is completely void." The court agreed with the district court that the letter was untrustworthy, in large part because it was drafted by the trustee's counsel and was prepared after the trustee's counsel provided the Navajo Nation official with only one side of the story; the court concluded that the bankruptcy court properly held that the trustee could not raise the lack of approval by the Navajo Nation to void the contracts between Appellees and Briggs-Cockerham; and the court found no error in the district court's disposition of the trustee's additional arguments in a lis pendens filing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morton v. Yonkers, et al." on Justia Law

Katsman, represented by an attorney, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After she filed Schedule F, on which the debtor is required to list all entities holding unsecured claims, the trustee reported that no assets were available for distribution. Before discharge was ordered, Skavysh, the son of Katsman’s ex-husband, filed an adversary proceeding invoking 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(4)(A). The bankruptcy judge conducted a trial of Skavysh’s objection to discharge and concluded that although there were omissions in Katsman’s schedules, they were not fraudulent. The only witness was Katsman; the judge decided that her testimony was truthful. The district judge reversed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Katsman admitted that she had deliberately omitted creditors from her Schedule F: friends and family members who had lent her money during her acrimonious divorce from Skavysh’s father. She also failed to list property that she owned jointly with her ex-husband, including her home in Indiana and a time share in Las Vegas and alimony payments. The court found that “her many false statements bespeak a pattern of reckless indifference to the truth, implying fraudulent intent,” noting that despite her claims of ignorance of the law, she knows English and had competent counsel. View "Skavysh v. Katsman" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Aviva Life & Annuity challenged identical orders of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sitting in its capacity as a bankruptcy appellate court. The district court entered the orders in two directly related cases brought by Aviva in the nature of interpleader pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22. Aviva argued the court erred by limiting the scope of the interpleader relief granted. This case stemmed from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of the Millennium Multiple Employer Welfare Benefit Plan. Prior to seeking the protection of the bankruptcy court, the Millennium Plan was an employee welfare benefit plan providing medical, disability, long term care, severance, and death benefits. Participants made contributions to the Millennium Plan, which then purchased life insurance policies (Policies) on the lives of the participants from Aviva and other insurance companies. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Aviva Life & Annuity v. Millennium Multiple Employer" on Justia Law

Mortgages Ltd. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ML Manager subsequently managed and operated the loans left in Mortgages Ltd.'s portfolio. After confirmation of the plan, Rev Op Group, a group of pass-through investors, moved for an order in the bankruptcy court ruling that ML Manager could not act as agent for their interests, and that objecting investors like Rev Op Group should not be obligated to pay any share of the exit financing loan. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments in its Clarification Order and Rev Op Group appealed. ML Manager subsequently filed a notice of its intent to distribute proceeds according to an allocation model and a motion to approve distributions. Rev Op Group objected, but the bankruptcy court issued a Distribution Order overruling the objections and granting ML Manager's motion to approve the distributions. The district court affirmed both orders and Rev Op Group appealed. The court concluded, pursuant to In re Roberts Farms, that Rev Op Group's appeals are moot because it never moved to stay the appealed orders before the bankruptcy court or district courts. Even if the court were to extend its analysis beyond Roberts Farms, Rev Op Group would still not prevail. Any relief the court granted to Rev Op Group would require overturning previous distributions and allocations to third parties not before this court. Further, Rev Op Group's appeals must be dismissed under the four considerations from In re Thorpe Insulation Co. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeals. View "In the Matter of: Mortgages Ltd." on Justia Law

Mortgages Ltd. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ML Manager subsequently managed and operated the loans left in Mortgages Ltd.'s portfolio. After the bankruptcy court confirmed the bankruptcy plan, ML Manager sought to sell some of the loans in Mortgages Ltd.'s portfolio. Rev Op Group, pass-through investors, objected to the sales. The bankruptcy court ruled that Rev Op Group's denials of allegations in ML Manager's complaint were implausible and held that Rev Op Group investors had executed the agency agreement at issue with ML Manager. The bankruptcy court denied Rev Op Group's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that ML Manager had an agency coupled with an interest and that ML Manager was properly assigned the agency agreements at issue. ML Manager subsequently moved to sell two other properties and the bankruptcy court overruled Rev Op Group's objections, approving the property sales. Rev Op Group appealed and the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the Declaratory Judgment is not equitably moot where Rev Op Group diligently pursued its rights by seeking a stay of the Declaratory Judgment Order, even though it was unable to obtain the stay. Modification of the order would not inequitably affect innocent third parties although substantial consummation of the bankruptcy plan has occurred. The court also concluded that both the bankruptcy and district court erred by effectively resolving factual allegations in Rev Op Group's denials on the merits, instead of reviewing them for legal sufficiency. Accordingly, absent bad faith, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's determination in its Declaratory Judgment that each member of the Rev Op Group had executed the agency agreements, and was to be bound to those agreements. View "In the Matter of: Mortgages Ltd." on Justia Law

Joanne Anderson sued Jackson Hospital and Clinic, Inc., Dr. Stephen K. Kwan, and Dr. Kwan's practice group, Capital Cardio-Thoracic, P.C. asserting medical-malpractice claims against them. The trial court granted a motion to substitute bankruptcy trustee Daniel Hamm for Anderson as the real party in interest because Anderson had filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy after her medical malpractice claim had accrued. The Jackson Hospital defendants subsequently petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, arguing that Hamm's attempt to be substituted as the real party in interest was untimely. Anderson filed a separate Rule 5 petition for permission to appeal challenging the trial court's decision to remove her as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court granted both petitions; however, treated the parties' petitions for permissive appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus, found that neither were entitle to mandamus relief, and denied the petitions. View "Anderson v. Jackson Hospital & Clinic" on Justia Law

Doe settled his sexual abuse claims against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee for $80,000 after participating in a voluntary mediation program. He later filed a claim against the Archdiocese in its bankruptcy proceedings for the same sexual abuse. Doe responded to the Archdiocese’s motion for summary judgment by contending that his settlement was fraudulently induced. The argument depends upon statements made during the mediation, but Wisconsin law prohibits the admission in judicial proceedings of nearly all communications made during mediation. Doe argued that an exception applies here because the later action is “distinct from the dispute whose settlement is attempted through mediation,” Wis. Stat. 904.085(4)(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Archdiocese. Doe’s bankruptcy claim is not distinct from the dispute settled in mediation. The issue in both proceedings, which involved the same parties, is the Archdiocese’s responsibility for the sexual abuse Doe suffered. Doe sought damages in both the mediation and bankruptcy for the same sexual abuse; he did not seek separate or additional damages for the alleged fraudulent inducement. View "Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Holt and TAUG, subcontractors of the bankrupt Seiber, appealed the district court's affirmance of a prior bankruptcy court order, holding that the funds of an interpleader action, filed by EnCana, were property of the bankruptcy estate of Seiber, not EnCana, because the interpleader action extinguished the earlier construction liens of Holt and TAUG. The court upheld the validity of TAUG's chapter 56 lien where TAUG had a valid mineral lien against EnCana's property at the time EnCana was discharged from further liability to Seiber; as to Holt, the district court did not err in holding EnCana's interpleader and its deposited funds automatically satisfied its liability to Seiber, thus transferring legal possession of the funds to Seiber and the bankruptcy estate; the district court and bankruptcy courts erred in failing to draw the distinction between the act of depositing funds into the district court registry and the judicial act of discharging the depositor of any further liability; simply depositing interpleader funds does not automatically mean that the funds have been legally accepted, ownership thereof transferred, and the interpleader relieved of further duty to the court or further obligation to the parties of the dispute; the court need not address whether chapter 56 allows the liens to extend to the funds because the bankruptcy court entered an order, separate from this appeal, ruling on the interpleader and discharging EnCana; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Holt Texas, Ltd., et al. v. Zayler" on Justia Law

Dynegy filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Charles Silsby then filed a securities class action complaint against Dynegy and others alleging dissemination of false and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts about Dynegy's financial performance and prospects, in violation of securities laws. Stephen Lucas was appointed lead plaintiff in Silsby v. Icahn, the securities class action litigation. In this appeal, Lucas challenged the district court's conclusion that he lacked standing to opt out of or object to the joint reorganization plan on behalf of the putative class in the securities litigation. The court concluded that Lucas' status as lead plaintiff of the putative class in the district court securities litigation did not automatically extend to the bankruptcy proceedings; because Lucas did not seek application of Rule 23 in bankruptcy court, he represented no one but himself; and since he opted out of the release in his individual capacity, Lucas lacks standing to appeal the order confirming the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Dynegy, Inc.," on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, holders of unredeemed consumer gift cards issued by the former book retailer (Borders or Debtors) seek to vacate the district court's dismissal as equitably moot appellants' challenges to three Bankruptcy Court orders. The court held that the analysis outlined in Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co., which governs the Circuit's equitable mootness analysis in Chapter 11 reorganizations - also governs the court's mootness analysis in Chapter 11 liquidations; appellants are subject to the presumption of mootness created by the liquidation Plan's substantial consummation, and have failed to satisfy the five Chateaugay factors, as would be necessary to rebut that presumption; and the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing the appeals as equitably moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: BGI, Inc." on Justia Law