Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

HSBC initiated a Wisconsin foreclosure action on the Rinaldi’s mortgage. The Rinaldis counterclaimed, alleging that the mortgage paperwork had been fraudulently altered and that HSBC lacked standing to enforce the mortgage. The Rinaldis lost at summary judgment and did not appeal. The court later vacated its foreclosure judgment after HSBC agreed to modify the loan. The Rinaldis filed a new state lawsuit reasserting their counterclaims. Before the court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Rinaldis filed for bankruptcy. In those proceedings, HSBC filed a proof of claim for the mortgage. The Rinaldis objected and filed adversary claims, alleging fraud, abuse of process, tortious interference, breach of contract, and violations of RICO and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bankruptcy court found in favor of HSBC and recommended denial of the adversarial claims. The district court agreed, noting the Rinaldis’ failure to comply with Federal Rules. The court dismissed the Rinaldis’ adversary claims as meritless and warned that the Rinaldis would face sanctions if they filed additional frivolous filings because their tactics had “vexatious and time- and resource-consuming” and their filings “nigh-unintelligible.” After additional filings of the same type, the Rinaldis voluntarily dismissed their bankruptcy. Their attorney filed additional frivolous motions. The court ordered the attorney to pay $1,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sanction. View "Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

T&N Limited (T&N), an asbestos manufacturer, chose to address the liability it faced after the deadly qualities of asbestos were discovered through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization plan (the Plan). Then Plan transferred to a Trust certain of T&N’s assets and rights, with which the Trust was to pay asbestos claims brought by persons who could have sued T&N but for T&N's bankruptcy. The Plan provided that T&N’s asbestos liability would continue after plan confirmation and that the Trust would bring asbestos suits against T&N as the agent of the actual claimants. In this lawsuit, the Trust brought an asbestos claim that had accrued a decade earlier. The district court dismissed the Trust’s suit on statute of limitations grounds, thus rejecting the Trust’s argument that it was allowed to bring asbestos claims that had not become stale prior to T&N’s filing for bankruptcy protection whenever it wished to do so. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Trust’s argument failed because the Plan unambiguously terminated the automatic stay and contained no provision that provided for any further tolling of the limitations period beyond that granted by the Bankruptcy Code. View "Barraford v. T&N Ltd." on Justia Law

Appellant and her law firm appealed the bankruptcy court's contempt order holding them in civil contempt for failing to pay sanctions imposed for prior misconduct. The misconduct stemmed from appellant's misconduct in her legal representation of debtor during bankruptcy proceedings. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to enforce the sanctions orders through any appropriate means, including a civil contempt order; the court rejected appellant's contention that she was "threatened" with imprisonment and concluded that the order does not violate the prohibition on imprisonment for a debt; and the order was not an abuse of the bankruptcy court's discretion because appellant is not protected by her alleged membership in her LLC where she was found in civil contempt for failure to pay sanctions that she owed because of her own misconduct in prior bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "Garrett v. Coventry II DDR" on Justia Law

The Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee appealed the district court's holding that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to order that he and his retained professionals be compensated for their services using the assets of a 401(k) plan pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court concluded that, in this case, no "arising under" jurisdiction exists and no "related to" jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the court concluded that bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction to award compensation to the trustee in these circumstances and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kirschenbaum v. U.S. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Claimants filed a $2,142,000 non-priority unsecured proof of claim in jointly administered Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. That claim was disallowed by the bankruptcy court; the district court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. As a result of the multitude of filings, strategies employed and positions taken over a six year period, the bankruptcy court sanctioned the attorney, Grossman, the sum of $207,004 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the court’s inherent authority under 11 U.S.C. 105, representing the attorney fees expended by counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and, post-confirmation, the Liquidation Trustee and his counsel, directly or indirectly related to the claim litigation. Grossman appealed the sanction and an order denying a motion which sought the recusal of the bankruptcy judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455. In a separate appeal, Grossman challenged the retention of special counsel to collect the judgment against him and an order requiring him to submit to a debtor’s examination and provide written discovery. Consolidating the appeals, the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Grossman vexatiously pursued arguments and filed documents throughout the litigation that were frivolous; his claims about the judge were misstatements. View "In re: Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

The Borrower defaulted on a nonrecourse Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) loan secured by property located in Detroit. CMBS loans are packaged as a trust to attract investors; in return for nonrecourse liability, CMBA borrowers promise to refrain from certain financial behavior likely to increase the risk of default and bankruptcy; the loan at issue included a solvency clause. Michigan’s 2012 Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act applies retroactively to render solvency covenants in nonrecourse loans unenforceable, declaring them “an unfair and deceptive business practice . . . against public policy [that] should not be enforced.” The lender foreclosed. Purchaser bought the property at auction with a winning bid of $756,000, and, standing in the lender’s shoes and citing the solvency clause, sued Borrower and its guarantor to collect a $6 million deficiency. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Borrower. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that that the NMLA: rendered the solvency covenant in Borrower’s CMBS loan unenforceable; violated neither the Contract nor Due Process Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions; and comported with Michigan’s constitutional provision mandating the separation of governmental powers. View "Borman, LLC v. 18718 Borman, LLC" on Justia Law

Stephens, an attorney, is controlling principal of Southwest Medical, the Debtor, and has an interest in Southeast, the debtor in a separate bankruptcy. The Chapter 7 Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Southeast and Stephens based on assets that were transferred post-petition by the Debtor to Southeast, and sought imposition of a constructive trust. By joint stipulation, Stephens was dismissed from the Adversary Proceeding. In 2013, following a trial, the Bankruptcy Court denied Stephens’ Motion to Intervene in the Adversary Proceeding; entered an order that allowed the Trustee an unsecured claim against Southeast ($1,190,000); and denied a constructive trust against Southeast’s assets. While Stephens’ appeal was pending, and on the last day of the one-year limitation period under FRCP 60(b), Stephens moved for Relief from Judgment or Order, alleging that the Trustee’s attorney had colluded with Southeast’s attorneys, amounting to a “fraud on the court.” The court denied Stephens’ Rule 60 Motion because, he was not a party in the Adversary Proceeding; held that Stephens’ allegations of fraud on the court violated Rule 9011(b)(2) and (b)(3); and ordered Stephens to pay $19,188.42 in attorney fees plus $1,659.10 as a sanction under Rule 9011(c)(2). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Stephens" on Justia Law

In 2007, Calandrillo purchased a boat manufactured by a Genmar subsidiary. Calandrillo claimed the boat was defective. In 2009, Calandrillo agreed to convey title to the boat to Genmar in exchange for payment of a lien plus $65,000. The bank received $140,000 and issued a lien waiver. Calandrillo conveyed title to Genmar, which sent Calandrillo a check for $65,000. Genmar filed for bankruptcy. The trustee sought recovery of $65,000 as a preferential transfer. The $140,000 payment was outside the 90-day preference period, 11 U.S.C. 547(b). Calandrillo argued that the payment was a contemporaneous new value exchange, exempt from avoidance. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Calandrillo presented no evidence permitting a reasonable fact-finder to find that the parties intended a contemporaneous exchange for new value. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Calandrillo’s conveyance of the boat was completed on March 4, when he sent executed title documents. He received payment of the $65,000 settlement balance on March 23. The settlement provided that the $65,000 payment would be made no sooner than 15 days after Genmar received the lien waiver and title documents, reflecting a short-term loan of $65,000 to Genmar. Repayment of a loan within 90 days of bankruptcy is an avoidable preference. View "Ries v. Calandrillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was appointed the chapter 7 trustee when Hokulani Square filed for bankruptcy. The trustee moved to auction Hokulani's principal assets and two groups of secured creditors jointly submitted the winning bid at $1.5 million. The secured creditors exercised their right to credit bid under 11 U.S.C. 363(k) and the trustee subsequently petitioned the bankruptcy court for compensation. The UST objected on the ground that including the value of the credit bid was not authorized under section 326(a). The court agreed with its sister circuits and held that section 326(a) does not permit a trustee to collect fees on a credit bid transaction in which the trustee disburses only property, not "moneys," to the creditor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy appellate panel's reversal of the bankruptcy court's award of compensation to the trustee. View "Tamm v. UST" on Justia Law

Prosser filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2006, which was converted to a Chapter 7 petition. Carroll was appointed as trustee. At a 2008 trial to adjudicate creditors’ objections to Prosser’s claim of exemptions, Stelzer, Prosser’s former “valet and personal assistant,” testified that Prosser asked him to destroy computer hard drives after Prosser filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court denied the exemptions. Carroll and others initiated an adversary proceeding, seeking denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. 727(a), Prosser deposed Stelzer in an effort to undermine his testimony; Prosser Counsel inquired into the payment of Stelzer’s legal fees by third parties and contacts Stelzer had with Carroll and Carroll’s counsel. Prosser Counsel later sought an evidentiary hearing into “a bribery scheme,” asserting that Stelzer gave unfavorable testimony during the Exemptions Trial in exchange for payment of his attorney fees in multiple litigations and that Carroll’s counsel had misrepresented Carroll’s contacts with Stelzer. Ultimately, Carroll obtained an award of legal fees and expenses against Prosser Counsel (28 U.S.C. 1927) contending that the Adversary Complaint, the Fee Objections, and the Conflicts Motion were patently meritless. The district court vacated, holding that the Adversary Complaint and Fee Objections could not have “multiplied” the adversary proceedings. The Third Circuit reversed, reinstating the sanctions. View "In re: Prosser" on Justia Law