Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The Debtors’ chapter 13 plan provided for cure of any defaults and maintenance of regular monthly mortgage payments on real property, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(5). The Bank failed to file a proof of claim and did not receive any disbursements for the mortgage debts. After their chapter 13 discharge, the Debtors sought a determination that the Bank’s liens had been discharged. The bankruptcy court determined that the liens had passed through the bankruptcy, but that the amount of debt secured by each should be reduced by the amount that the Bank would have been paid if it had filed proofs of claim. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the reduction of the debt amount. Although a secured creditor is not required to file a proof of claim to preserve its lien, its failure to do so affects its right to payment under a chapter 13 plan. The Debtors or the Trustee could have filed a proof of claim on the Bank’s behalf, so that the Debtors would not have exited bankruptcy in default on the debt. Excess cash of more than $9,000 was returned to the Debtors after the plan was consummated. If the decision to reduce the debt were affirmed, the Debtors would gain a windfall. View "In re: Matteson" on Justia Law

The City filed timely proofs of claim for property taxes owed by a Chapter 11 debtor with respect to quarters of the 2009 tax year that had been billed pre‐petition, but did not file proofs of claim with respect to property tax bills for later quarters that were billed during the bankruptcy proceedings.  A single lien secured payment of the entire tax burden - both taxes that were the subject of claims and those that were not. The bankruptcy court ruled that the now-confirmed plan extinguished the lien and the district court affirmed. The court held that a lien is extinguished by a Chapter 11 plan if: (1) the text of the plan does not preserve the lien; (2) the plan is confirmed; (3) the property subject to the lien is “dealt with” by the terms of the plan; and (4) the lienholder participated in the bankruptcy proceedings. The court concluded that all four requirements are satisfied when applied to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "City of Concord, N.H. v. Northern New England Telephone Operations" on Justia Law

Falco sold insurance for Farmers, under a 1990 Agent Agreement, which provided that Falco would be paid Contract Value upon termination of the Agreement. As a Farmers agent, Falco was entitled to borrow money from the Credit Union. In 2006, Falco obtained a $28,578.00 business loan and assigned his interest in his Agreement receivables—including Contract Value—as security. The loan document gave the Credit Union authority to demand payments that Farmers owed Falco; it could tender Falco’s resignation to levy on Falco’s Contract Value. Falco failed to make payments and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing the loan on his schedules. Falco received a discharge in February 2011, covering his liability under his Credit Union loan. In April 2011, the Credit Union notified Farmers that Falco had defaulted and exercised the power of attorney to terminate his Agent Agreement. Farmers notified Falco that the resignation had been accepted, calculated Contract Value as $104,323.30, paid the Credit Union $29,180.92, and paid the balance to Falco. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Credit Union’s secured interest survived bankruptcy; it did not tortuously interfere with Falco’s Agreement because it had a legal right to terminate the Agreement; and Falco failed to show an underlying wrongful act or intentional tort as required under civil conspiracy. View "Falco v. Farmers Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Falco sold insurance for Farmers, under a 1990 Agent Agreement, which provided that Falco would be paid Contract Value upon termination of the Agreement. As a Farmers agent, Falco was entitled to borrow money from the Credit Union. In 2006, Falco obtained a $28,578.00 business loan and assigned his interest in his Agreement receivables—including Contract Value—as security. The loan document gave the Credit Union authority to demand payments that Farmers owed Falco; it could tender Falco’s resignation to levy on Falco’s Contract Value. Falco failed to make payments and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing the loan on his schedules. Falco received a discharge in February 2011, covering his liability under his Credit Union loan. In April 2011, the Credit Union notified Farmers that Falco had defaulted and exercised the power of attorney to terminate his Agent Agreement. Farmers notified Falco that the resignation had been accepted, calculated Contract Value as $104,323.30, paid the Credit Union $29,180.92, and paid the balance to Falco. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Credit Union’s secured interest survived bankruptcy; it did not tortuously interfere with Falco’s Agreement because it had a legal right to terminate the Agreement; and Falco failed to show an underlying wrongful act or intentional tort as required under civil conspiracy. View "Falco v. Farmers Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Henry filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition, without counsel. The Trustee objected to confirmation of his plan, arguing that the repayment period exceeded five years and was too speculative; there was no evidence Henry would be able to meet the required payments. Henry agreed to have his original plan denied and was allowed to remedy errors by filing an amended plan by January 22, 2015. Henry maintains that an amended plan was mailed to the Bankruptcy Court on January 22, 2015. The Court never received an amended plan, nor did the Trustee. The Trustee submitted an order for dismissal, which was entered on February 4. Henry received the order on February 9, and immediately went to the Bankruptcy Court and filed amended schedules and an appeal. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Trustee was extremely thorough in explaining what was expected and what to file; Henry was receiving communications from the Bankruptcy Court through traditional mail. If there was any doubt that the documents would arrive through the mail, he should have made arrangements to present the documents physically to the Court. Filing requirements and deadlines are necessary to an orderly bankruptcy process. View "In re: Henry" on Justia Law

Henry filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition, without counsel. The Trustee objected to confirmation of his plan, arguing that the repayment period exceeded five years and was too speculative; there was no evidence Henry would be able to meet the required payments. Henry agreed to have his original plan denied and was allowed to remedy errors by filing an amended plan by January 22, 2015. Henry maintains that an amended plan was mailed to the Bankruptcy Court on January 22, 2015. The Court never received an amended plan, nor did the Trustee. The Trustee submitted an order for dismissal, which was entered on February 4. Henry received the order on February 9, and immediately went to the Bankruptcy Court and filed amended schedules and an appeal. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Trustee was extremely thorough in explaining what was expected and what to file; Henry was receiving communications from the Bankruptcy Court through traditional mail. If there was any doubt that the documents would arrive through the mail, he should have made arrangements to present the documents physically to the Court. Filing requirements and deadlines are necessary to an orderly bankruptcy process. View "In re: Henry" on Justia Law

In this Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, Appellants filed a complaint in a Puerto Rico superior court against the Trustee in bankruptcy and other defendants. The Trustee removed the state case to the bankruptcy court. Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for a jury trial and a motion requesting remand to state court. The bankruptcy denied both motions. Appellants appealed. The district court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the bankruptcy court’s orders were not final. The First Circuit dismissed Appellants’ subsequent appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ appeal of the bankruptcy court orders because the bankruptcy court’s orders were not final. View "Sitka Enters., Inc. v. Segarra Miranda" on Justia Law

Bulk, a gasoline distributor with gas stations in Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee, leases stations and equipment to tenant-operators. Bulk receives monthly rent plus payment for gasoline. The Kentucky Department of Revenue (KDOR) revoked Bulk’s license as a gasoline and special fuels dealer after it asked Bulk to post additional security and Bulk failed to do so. The change affected only the way in which Kentucky collected its fuel tax. Bulk kept track of the separate line-item for the tax in the invoices it received from its suppliers (Marathon and BP) and sought refunds from KDOR for those payments. A KDOR employee emailed Bulk that “only a licensed dealer is allowed to purchase product without the Kentucky tax for export. If your license is reinstated and all outstanding tax liabilities are satisfied, consideration will be given to your refund request.” Bulk regained its license, then sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Bulk filed an adversary proceeding, seeking refund of the taxes. Kentucky filed a proof of claim. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Bulk, finding that Bulk had paid the taxes, which were not appropriately collected for gasoline that was consigned to destinations outside Kentucky. The district court disagreed, concluding that Bulk just paid a higher price to its suppliers. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the decision in favor of Bulk. View "Bulk Petroleum Corp. v. Ky. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust on their property. At the time that Appellants defaulted, Respondent was the holder of the note and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was the beneficiary of the deed of trust securing the note. After Appellants filed for bankruptcy, MERS assigned its interest in the deed of trust to Respondent. Before the assignment was recorded, Respondent filed a proof of claim in Appellants’ bankruptcy claiming that it was a secured creditor. Respondent then filed a motion for relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay so that it could foreclose on Appellants’ property. Appellants argued that Respondent was not a secured creditor because it did not have a unified note and deed of trust when the bankruptcy petition was filed. The United States Bankruptcy Court certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court concerning the legal effect on a foreclosure when the promissory note and deed of trust are split at the time of foreclosure. The Supreme Court concluded (1) when the promissory note is held by a principal and the beneficiary under the deed of trust is the principal’s agent at the time of foreclosure, reunification of the note and the deed of trust is not required to foreclose; and (2) as a matter of law, the recording of an assignment of a deed of trust is a ministerial act. View "In re Montierth" on Justia Law

After Gregory Bos and his spouse filed a joint petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the Board filed a complaint against Bos and his spouse contesting the dischargeability of a $504,282.59 debt. An arbitrator had awarded the Board the $504,282.59 against Bos, individually and as doing business as BEI, and BEI to recover the outstanding amounts owed to trust funds governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The bankruptcy court entered judgment, concluding that Bos had committed defalcation while acting as a fiduciary of the Funds and that the $504,282.59 debt to the Funds was therefore nondischargeable. The district court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether an employer’s contractual requirement to contribute to an employee benefits trust fund makes it a fiduciary of unpaid contributions. The court joined the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, holding that Bos was not a fiduciary under section 523(a)(4). Consistent with the court's general rule that unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds are not plan assets, Bos did not engage in defalcation for purposes of section 523(a)(4). Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment because Bos did not act as a fiduciary under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4), and because the bankruptcy court and district court expressly found that Bos’s debt did not fall under any of the other nondischargeability exceptions put forth by the Board. The court remanded to the bankruptcy court with instructions to discharge the debt. View "Bos v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law