Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Creditor extended to Debtor a line of credit, and Debtor granted Creditor, pursuant to an agreement, a security interest in payments due to Debtor under an insurance policy. The agreement provided that Maine law governed all rights under the agreement. Insurer subsequently issued a commercial property insurance policy to Debtor. After a freight train owned by Debtor derailed, Creditor filed a claim under the policy, which Insurer denied. Debtor then filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Creditor instituted an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration regarding the priority of its asserted security interest in any payments due under the policy. Insurer subsequently settled with Debtor and the trustee requiring Insurer to pay $3,800,000 to Debtor in satisfaction of all claims under the policy. Creditor objected to approval of the proposed settlement, arguing that the agreement granted it a first-priority security interest in the settlement. The bankruptcy court concluded that Debtor was entitled to the settlement proceeds free and clear of Creditor’s asserted interest because Creditor had failed to perfect its interest under Maine law. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the courts below did not err in concluding that Debtor was entitled to the proposed settlement payment free and clear of Creditor’s asserted security interest. View "Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. v. Keach" on Justia Law

Zell orchestrated a leveraged buy-out (LBO) of the Tribune Company, which published the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times. In an LBO, a purchaser acquires an entity using debt secured by assets of the acquired entity. The transaction saddled the company with an additional $8 billion of debt. Tribune subsidiaries guaranteed the LBO debt. The holders of pre-LBO debt had recourse only against Tribune, not against the subsidiaries. Tribune sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2008. Aurelius, a hedge fund specializing in distressed debt, bought $2 billion of the pre-LBO debt and participated in the bankruptcy. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors obtained permission to pursue claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent conveyance against the LBO lenders, directors and officers of old Tribune, and Zell. The Bankruptcy Court discussed possible plans at length, concluding that it was uncertain that litigation would result in full avoidance of the LBO, the only result that could result in greater recovery than settlement. A plan was confirmed over Aurelius’s objection. A requested stay was conditioned on Aurelius posting a $1.5 billion bond. Aurelius was unsuccessful in obtaining expedited review. The plan was consummated. Appeals were dismissed as equitably moot. The Third Circuit agreed that Aurelius’s appeal, which sought to undo the crucial component of the consummated plan, was moot, but reversed with respect to trustees representing pre-LBO debt, who sought disgorgement from other creditors of $30 million; their requested relief would neither jeopardize the $7.5 billion plan of reorganization nor harm third parties who have justifiably relied on plan confirmation. View "In re: Tribune Media Co." on Justia Law

Angie Moffo lived rent free for eight years in a home owned by her brother-in-law, Doug Rich. After Rich filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the appointed bankruptcy trustee, Stephen Rupp, filed suit against Moffo for back rent under Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, asserting that Rich had defrauded his creditors by allowing Moffo to live in the house rent free after he became insolvent. The district court concluded that Moffo was the recipient of a fraudulent transfer and entered a $34,200 judgment against Moffo. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment entered against Moffo, holding that Rich did not transfer an asset to Moffo within the scope of the Act because the home was fully encumbered by a mortgage, and any rents were not the property of Rich. Remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Moffo. View "Rupp v. Moffo" on Justia Law

This case arose from a contractual dispute between Netsphere and Jeffrey Baron in 2009. One of Baron's companies, Ondovoa, declared bankruptcy, automatically staying the district court action. As proceedings continued, both the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy trustee became increasingly concerned over Baron’s failure to pay his current or former lawyers. Eventually, on the recommendation of the bankruptcy court, the district court appointed a receiver over Baron. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider all receivership fees and expenses. Before this mandate issued, the district court entered several orders approving interim fee applications submitted by the receiver and its counsel. After the mandate issued, and the case was remanded, the district court then entered an order reconsidering the fees it had previously awarded to the receiver, its counsel, and the Ondova bankruptcy trustee. It also authorized new payments to the receiver and to one of its counsel. Both parties appealed the various fee orders. The court dismissed the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction because 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(2) does not confer upon the court appellate jurisdiction to review these fee orders and the collateral order doctrine does not provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction. View "Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam action against GSD&M under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730, alleging that GSD&M misrepresented its profits and overhead during contract negotiations with the Air Force. At the time of filing, plaintiff was the debtor in a confirmed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan and he failed to disclose his FCA claims to the bankruptcy court. The district court dismissed the FCA claims under the doctrine of judicial estoppel and plaintiff appealed, arguing that judicial estoppel should not apply because he had no motive to conceal his FCA claims from the bankruptcy court, especially given that his repayment plan required repaying 100% of the principal of his debts. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims because the district court's findings, that plaintiff knew about his claims while his bankruptcy was still pending and had a motive to conceal, are supported by the record. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Long v. GSD&M Idea City, LLC" on Justia Law

Debtor, a Grand Island pathologist, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief in 2011. Heritage holds an allowed, unsecured claim of $270,566.00. In 2012, the Debtor acquired her residence from the Elliotts and signed a $169,900 promissory note and granted a security interest in their favor. The case was converted to a Chapter 11 proceeding in 2012. The Elliotts filed a proof of claim asserting secured status. The Bankruptcy Court overruled Heritage’s objection to timeliness and allowed the claim. Heritage did not appeal, but continued to object to the Elliotts’ voting on the plan as an impaired class, arguing that they had a post-petition claim. The court found that the Elliotts had an allowed claim, that the plan altered the treatment of their claim, and, that the Elliotts were an impaired class entitled to the vote. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Debtor's Fifth Amended Plan. The Elliotts, the sole members of their class, voted in favor of the plan. No other impaired classes voted to accept the plan. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. Although an impaired class of claims accepted the Plan, the absolute priority rule of 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)' applies to prevent Chapter 11 debtors from retaining property acquired prior to the filing of the petition when not all creditors' claims will be paid in full. View "Heritage Bank v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Needler filed a petition for Chapter 11 relief on behalf of “Miller Chrysler Dodge.” Because Needler is not admitted to practice in the Western District of Missouri, he moved to appear pro hac vice and to be employed as debtor’s attorney. The bankruptcy court agreed, stating that his fees and activities would be closely scrutinized. The Trustee discovered that the named entity did not legally exist and, when the error was not timely corrected, moved to dismiss. Needler filed an amended petition under the proper name. Needler subsequently received several orders to show cause for failure to comply with local filing requirements. Needler was unsuccessful in obtaining authority for the debtor to use cash collateral and to retain a broker to sell the business. Relief from the automatic stay was obtained by the primary creditors. Ultimately, the case was dismissed on the debtor’s motion. The court closed the file. Six months later, the Trustee moved to reopen under 11 U.S.C. 350(b), asserting that she had received a complaint from the debtor: that Needler failed to communicate accurate information, made potentially false and misleading representations, and may have filed documents and taken actions that were not authorized. Needler had filed a state court action for attorney fees of $49,000.00 and sought $63,000.00 more in fees and $3,600.00 in expenses. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed denial of the fee application and the order of disgorgement. Since Needler was a repeat offender, in many jurisdictions, the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion in imposing the sanction of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and revocation of electronic filing privileges. View "Needler v. Casamatta" on Justia Law

The Richers filed for bankruptcy. Morehead, who had invested in commercial real estate owned by a trust controlled by Richer, filed an unsecured claim for $945,000 in the proceeding. The Richers filed an adversary action claiming that Morehead’s only lawful interest in the property was to receive a share of the net proceeds of the property if and when it was sold. The bankruptcy judge, the district court, and the Seventh Circuit upheld Morehead’s claim. The 2005 “Equity Participation Agreement” provided no security for Morehead, but did give him “the sole and exclusive option to convert his Participation Interest to a Demand Note payable within one hundred eighty (180) days of conversion.” Four years later, Morehead sent Richer by certified mail, a letter purporting to convert Morehead’s participation interest to a demand note for $700,000 (plus interest), effective the day after the letter was mailed, November 25, 2009—the anniversary date. The court rejected an argument that the letter had to be mailed or otherwise communicated to them on November 25, the anniversary date, neither before nor after. The Agreement provides that “the Conversion Option is exercised on the … anniversary date,” not that communication must occur on that date. View "Richer v. Morehead" on Justia Law

C.W. Mining Company was forced into bankruptcy after creditors filed a petition for involuntary bankruptcy on January 8, 2008. Several months before the petition was filed, C.W. Mining had entered into its first contract with SMC Electrical Products, Inc., an agreement to purchase equipment with a view toward greatly increasing coal production. One payment for the equipment was a $200,000 wire transfer from C.W. Mining on October 16, 2007. Because this transfer was less than 90 days before the petition was filed, the bankruptcy trustee sought to recoup the $200,000 for the bankruptcy estate by initiating an adversary proceeding to avoid the transfer under 11 U.S.C. 547(b). Granting SMC summary judgment, the bankruptcy court rejected the Trustee’s claim on the ground that the debt was incurred and the payment made in the ordinary course of business. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed too. View "Rushton v. SMC Electrical Products" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court awarded a fee of $28,030.33 to the bankruptcy trustee, Lanser, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The district court affirmed, over a challenge by the debtors’ principal unsecured creditor, Mohns, which had a state court judgment of $142,899 against the debtors for construction of a house. The bankruptcy proceeding lasted for more than four years; the trustee collected $498,621.56 to distribute to Mohns and the debtors’ other creditors. The amount awarded the trustee was just under the maximum amount allowable; as the result of a mistake in his fee application he had asked for slightly less than the maximum allowable amount, 11 U.S.C. 330(a)(7). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although $370,996.54 went to mortgagees of the debtors’ home, which the trustee had sold to raise money for the creditors, administration of an estate with such secured claims frequently presents complex issues for the trustee. View "Mohns, Inc. v. Bruce Lanser" on Justia Law