Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The Committee appealed a consolidated district court judgment affirming several bankruptcy court judgments. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in approving the Settlement Agreement - a compromise the Trustee made in discharge of his fiduciary duty. The court affirmed the Trustee’s conclusion that the estate’s best interests were better served by the Settlement Agreement than by continued litigation to determine the absolute value of Chase’s secured collateral; for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 502(b), although the bankruptcy court did not adequately determine the amount of Chase’s allowed claim, its error was harmless; the bankruptcy court did not abuse the discretion afforded it by Rule 3012 in declining the Committee’s request to undertake a “more precise determination of value;” and the bankruptcy court did not err in denying the Motion to Value simultaneously with its approval of the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s consolidated judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders approving the Settlement Agreement, denying the Claim Objection, and denying the Motion to Value. View "Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Chase Capital Corp." on Justia Law

LifeCare operated 27 long-term acute care hospitals with about 4,500 employees.Hurricane Katrina destroyed three of its facilities. It had $484 million debt; approximately $355 million was secured. Secured lenders wanted to purchase the company outright and offered to credit $320 million of the debt as LifeCare’s only alternative to liquidation under Chapter 7. The secured lender group, LLC2, put funds in escrow to pay legal and accounting fees. LifeCare filed for bankruptcy one day later, obtained permission to sell assets under 11 U.S.C. 363(b)(1), abd marketed its assets to more than 106 potential parties. LLC2 was selected as the successful bidder. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors and U.S. government—neither of which would recover anything through the sale— objected to the transfer as a “veiled foreclosure.” In exchange for the Committee dropping its objections, LLC2 deposited $3.5 million in trust for general unsecured creditors. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale. Deeming the administrative fee monies escrowed by LLC2 not to be estate property, the court held that the government had no claim to it. The Third Circuit affirmed. Payments by an 11 U.S.C. 363 purchaser (LLC2) need not be distributed according to the Code’s creditor-payment hierarchy where no cash changed hands other than that deposited in escrow for professional fees and paid directly to the unsecured creditors. The payments neither went into nor came out of the bankruptcy estate. View "In re: ICL Holding Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Sahagun filed a class action suit against Landmark, alleging that Landmark had failed to pay a variety of wages required by California law. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling that Sahagun was entitled to the prevailing wage for time spent fabricating components for public works contracts. The district court held, however, that the bankruptcy court applied an incorrect legal standard for assessing whether Landmark was required to pay prevailing wages for the time class members spent traveling to and from public worksites. The district court thus remanded for “additional fact finding.” Both parties appealed. The court weighed four factors to assess jurisdiction, concluding that the risk of piecemeal litigation in this instance is significant; judicial efficiency would not be enhanced by exercising jurisidiction; systemic interest in preserving the bankruptcy court's role as the finder of fact tips in favor of declining jurisdiction; and delaying review would not cause irreparable harm to either party. The court held that the district court's order was not a final order and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Sahagun v. Landmark Fence Co." on Justia Law

Washington orchardists Harold and Shirley Ostenson (collectively Ostenson) and California organic fruit broker Greg Holzman (d/b/a Greg Holzman, Inc. (GHI)) formed Pac Organic Fruit LLC (Pac-O) in 1998. The business operated from 1998 through 2004 but collapsed in 2005. During 2005, Pac-O defaulted on its operating line of credit and lease payments, Holzman fired Ostenson, and the bank foreclosed on the packing facility. Thereafter, Holzman, acting as Pac-O's agent, executed a demand promissory note in favor of GHI and transferred Pac-O' s assets to GHI to satisfy the note. In early 2007, Ostenson filed a voluntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Later that year, a creditor of Pac-O, Northwest Wholesale Inc., filed this action against Pac-O, Ostenson, and GHI, alleging a fraudulent conveyance from Pac-O to GHI. Ostenson filed cross claims and/or third party claims against Pac-O, Holzman, GHI, and Total Organic LLC (another Holzman company). Ostenson claimed Holzman and his companies (collectively Holzman defendants or HDs) were as a derivative action on behalf of Pac-O. The trial court dismissed Northwest Wholesale's claims following a settlement. Thereafter, the only remaining claims were Ostenson's responsive claims against Pac-O (seven counts) and his derivative claim (count VIII) against HDs. The trial court: (1) rejected Ostenson's contention that HDs had waived a CR 41 motion by putting on evidence; (2) rejected Ostenson's contention that HDs had consented to the derivative action in the stipulation in Ostenson's bankruptcy proceeding; and (3) ruled that Ostenson relinquished membership in Pac-O with his bankruptcy filing. Ostenson moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that federal bankruptcy law preempted the Washington Limited Liability Company Act (WALLCA, chapter 25.15 RCW) regarding dissociation of LLC members upon filing bankruptcy. The trial court denied Ostenson's motion. Ostenson appealed, and Division Three affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the dissociation provision found in RCW 25.15. 13 0(1)(d) was not preempted by federal bankruptcy law and affirmed the dismissal of the former LLC member's derivative claim under the facts of this case. View "Nw. Wholesale, Inc. v. Pac Organic Fruit, LLC" on Justia Law

Investors in Central Sleep filed suit against the company, Dachman, its promoter, and others, claiming fraud, RICO violations, conversion, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, and securities fraud. Dachman was also convicted for his fraudulent conduct. He spent the funds he stole from investors on a tattoo parlor, vacations and cruises, a new Land Rover, rare booksm and to fund personal stock trading and gambling. Goodman represented the defendants. A judge ordered Central Sleep into receivership and issued a stay against “all civil legal proceedings” involving the defendants. The receivership closed; victims received pennies on the dollar. Goodman obtained a judgment for unpaid legal fees and submitted a claim, but also filed a lien against the proceeds of the Dachmans' state court medical-malpractice lawsuit. Neither Goodman nor the Dachmans informed the receiver or the judge of those proceedings. The receiver learned of the malpractice suit and recovered the settlement proceeds. When the receiver proposed a distribution plan, Goodman argued that his lien entitled him to be paid in full from the malpractice suit proceeds, rather than pro rata from the receivership estate like other creditors. The judge offered Goodman the opportunity to post a bond to delay distribution, pending appeal. Goodman did not post a bond. The judge approved the plan and the funds were distributed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted the receiver’s motion for sanctions against Goodman. View "Duff v. Central Sleep Diagnostics, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, Laura Sheedy refinanced property she owned. For the transaction, Sheedy executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Washington Mutual Bank (WAMU). The mortgage was eventually assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. JPMorgan Chase National Association (Chase) serviced the loan. Deutsche Bank subsequently commenced foreclosure proceedings. Thereafter, in 2010, Sheedy filed for protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. As part of her plan, Sheedy raised a series of allegations of lender liability. In 2011, Sheedy filed this adversary proceeding to have the bankruptcy court resolve her lender liability claims, adding that Deutsche Bank and Chase (together, the Secured Creditors) were liable for fraud deceit, and misrepresentation on the basis that WAMU provided her with inaccurate or false information concerning the terms of the note and the mortgage. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secured Creditors. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that all of Sheedy’s claims were either time-barred or without merit. View "Sheedy v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co." on Justia Law

Knight is a licensed attorney, and the charges against him stem from his representation of a Barber in a bankruptcy proceeding, in 2008-2010. Knight was convicted of conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 157; aiding and abetting bankruptcy fraud; aiding and abetting the making of a false statement in relation to a bankruptcy case; and five counts of aiding and abetting money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957 and 2. The district court granted Knight a new trial on the conspiracy, bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering counts, granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on the false statement count, and conditionally granted him a new trial on the false statement count in the event of reversal on appeal. The Eighth Circuit reversed the acquittal on the false statement charge, but affirmed the decision to grant Knight a new trial on all counts of conviction, noting evidence that Knight and Barber used the IOLTA to keep Barber's creditors from learning that he had money available and evidence concerning a sham entity that was used to divert money to Barber's own pocket. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law

The Hospital had to pay a Hospital Assessment Fee (HAF) as part of an Indiana program designed to increase Medicaid reimbursements to eligible hospitals. After it failed to pay its HAF, the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) began withholding Medicaid reimbursements. On June 19, 2012, the Hospital filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FSSA continued to withhold reimbursements in satisfaction of its HAF debt. The Hospital filed an adversary complaint against FSSA claiming that the HAF was a pre-petition claim subject to the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court agreed, ruling the HAF was an “act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case,” 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(6), and was subject to the stay. FSSA was ordered to repay the full amount it had withheld. The district court reversed as to the HAF for fiscal year 2013. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the 2013 HAF, like the 2012 HAF, is a pre-petition claim subject to the automatic stay. FSSA was aware of its claims against the Hospital—for both fiscal years 2012 and 2013—well before it filed for bankruptcy View "Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Ind. Family & Soc.Servs. Admin." on Justia Law

The Lapideses renewed a loan from Venture Bank secured by a third mortgage on their home. Howard subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After Howard’s personal debts were discharged, the Lapideses executed two “Change in Terms Agreements,” each of which extended the maturity date of the loan for six months. When Howard ceased making payments under these agreements, Venture Bank sought a declaratory judgment that the agreements were valid and enforceable. Howard counterclaimed that Venture Bank’s efforts to obtain payments after his discharge violated the discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. 524(a)(2). The bankruptcy court denied Venture Bank’s claim for a declaratory judgment and awarded Howard damages and attorney’s fees. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Howard’s payments were not voluntary within the meaning of section 524(f) and did not comply with the requirements of a reaffirmation agreement under section 524(c). The post-discharge agreements served no purpose other than reaffirmation agreements in which Howard agreed to repay all of his discharged personal debt and lacked consideration. View "Venture Bank v. Lapides" on Justia Law

Schwartz was hired as an executive of Barclays, which lent him $400,000 and promised to forgive the loan in equal installments on the first through seventh anniversaries of his start date. Before the second anniversary, the company fired him, which made the unforgiven principal immediately due. Schwartz refused to pay. An arbitrator sided with Barclays and ordered Schwartz to pay $568,568, which included attorneys’ fees plus interest. In response, Schwartz petitioned for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Between the announcement of the arbitration award and the filing of the bankruptcy petition the Schwartzes spent thousands of dollars on inessential consumer goods and services, including tickets to Disney World, private school tuition, and a monthly payment for a Range Rover. Learning of these expenditures, Barclays, the Schwartzes’ principal creditor and the only active opponent of granting a discharge, moved to dismiss. The court dismissed the petition under 11 U.S.C. 707(a), “for cause.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that “for cause” embraces conduct that, while not a violation of required procedures, avoids repayment of debt without an adequate reason. The Schwartzes failed to pay as much of their indebtedness as they could without hardship. View "Schwartz v. Barclays Capital, Inc." on Justia Law