Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The Debtors own the Atlantic City Trump Taj Mahal casino. The union represents 1,136 employees. The 2011 collective bargaining agreement was to remain in effect through September 14, 2014 and continue in full force and effect from year to year thereafter, unless either party served 60 days written notice of its intention to terminate, modify, or amend. In March 2014, the Debtors gave notice of their “intention to terminate, modify or amend” and sought to begin negotiations. The Union initially declined. On August 20 the parties met. The Debtors emphasized their critical financial situation. No agreement was reached. The Debtors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On September 11, the Debtors asked the Union to extend the term of the CBA. The Union refused. The CBA expired. On September 17, the Debtors sent the Union a proposal with supporting documentation. After meetings, the Debtors successfully moved, under section 1113, to reject the CBA and implement the terms of the Debtors’ last proposal, asserting that rejection of the CBA was necessary to the reorganization.While 11 U.S.C. 1103 allows a debtor to terminate a CBA under certain circumstances, the National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from unilaterally changing CBA terms even after its expiration; key terms of an expired CBA continue to govern until the parties reach a new agreement or bargain to impasse. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding section 1113 does not distinguish between the terms of an unexpired CBA and terms that continue to govern after the CBA expires. View "In re: Trump Entm't Resorts" on Justia Law

Debtor-Appellant Nathan Welch appealed a district court’s order denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings and determining that a default judgment was nondischargeable in bankruptcy. This case arose from the failure of the Talisman project, a high-end real estate development project in Wasatch County, Utah. Appellee Robert Tripodi was one of these investors, eventually putting $1 million into Talisman. To secure Tripodi’s investment, Welch issued three promissory notes to Capital Concepts, which in turn, assigned the notes to Tripodi. Welch ultimately defaulted on the notes. In January 2009, Tripodi filed a complaint against Mr. Welch in federal district court, alleging violations of state and federal securities laws. For seven months, Welch did not respond. In March 2010, Tripodi filed a motion for entry of default. The court granted the motion for entry of default and issued an order to show cause as to why a default judgment should not be entered. Receiving no response, the district court entered an order granting the entry of default judgment against Welch. Welch filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in August 2011. Nearly two years later, Tripodi sought relief from the automatic stay. In his defense, Welch opposed Tripodi's proof of damages and costs, and attempted to have the default judgment set aside. The district court denied Welch's request to set aside the judgment, ruling the judgment was nondischargable. Finding no reversible error on the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Tripodi v. Welch" on Justia Law

Eden Place appealed the BAP's decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s determination that Eden Place violated the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by evicting debtor from a residential property. After considering the court's applicable precedent, SS Farms, LLC v. Sharp, and the clear language of the statute, the court held that the bankruptcy court’s order that Eden Place violated the automatic stay was final and appealable. On the merits, the court concluded that the unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession entered pursuant to California Code Civil Procedure 415.46 bestowed legal title and all rights of possession upon Eden Place. Accordingly, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred when it ruled that Eden Place violated the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and reversed the bankruptcy court order. In this case, debtor had no legal or equitable interest remaining in the property after issuance of the unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession in state court. View "Eden Place v. Perl" on Justia Law

The purchaser of viatical settlements paid approximately $507,000 for life settlements with the debtor and received $9,000,000 in death benefits when he died shortly thereafter. The bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary proceeding to recover the market value of the life settlements. The court held that debtor's interests in the term life insurance policies, including the secondary market value of the policies and resulting life settlements, constitute a recoverable “interest of the debtor in property” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1). In this case, debtor had a legal and equitable interest in the property at issue within the meaning of section 541(a), the property was not excluded from the estate under section 541(b), and the property was not the subject of a proper exemption in this case. The court further concluded that the district court properly held that the trustee's avoidance action was not time-barred because debtor's fraudulent concealment equitably tolled the statute of limitations from commencing. Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the bankruptcy court should have granted the trustee leave to amend her avoidance action. View "Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp" on Justia Law

Sentinel, a cash-management firm, invested customers' cash in liquid low-risk securities. It also traded on its own account, using money borrowed from BNYM, pledging customers’ securities; 7 U.S.C. 6d(a)(2), 6d(b)), and the customers’ contracts required the securities to be held in segregated accounts. Sentinel experienced losses that prevented it from maintaining its collateral with BNYM and meeting customer demands for redemption of their securities. Sentinel used its BNYM line of credit to meet those demands. In 2007 it owed BNYM $573 million; it halted customer redemptions and declared bankruptcy. BNYM notified Sentinel that it planned to liquidate the collateral securing the loan. The bankruptcy trustee refused to classify BNYM as a senior secured creditor, considering the use of customer funds as collateral to be fraudulent transfers, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(A) and claiming that BNYM was aware of suspicious facts that should have led it to investigate. The district judge dismissed the claim, finding that Sentinel had not been shown to have intended to defraud its customers. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Sentinel made fraudulent transfers. On remand, the judge neither conducted an evidentiary hearing nor made additional findings, but issued a “supplemental opinion” that BNYM was entitled to accept the collateral without investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. BNYM remains a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, but is an unsecured creditor because it was on inquiry notice that the pledged assets had been fraudulently conveyed. View "Grede v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment in favor of Ocwen and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging various causes of action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. At issue is whether a debtor who has received a claim on a debt that has been discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding can sue the claimant in a district court under the FDCPA. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Code does not broadly repeal the FDCPA for purposes of FDCPA claims based on conduct that would constitute alleged violations of the discharge injunction; none of plaintiff's individual FDCPA claims conflicts with the discharge injunction under the Bankruptcy Code; and, in regard to the claim of piecemeal litigation, the court concluded that the remote possibility of a need for clarification provides no basis for routing all FDCPA claims exclusively into the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate plaintiff's FDCPA claims against Ocwen. View "Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, Plaintiff, a church located in Portland, filed a complaint seeking a state court judgment based on a bankruptcy court judgment that it obtained in 1985, under a former name, against Defendant. During the pendency of the state court action, Plaintiff also moved for a writ of execution on the original bankruptcy judgment. Defendant counterclaimed against Plaintiff and its pastor. The district court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ and then granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Plaintiff on both its complaint and Defendant’s counterclaim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the execution order and the judgment, holding (1) the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint seeking a judgment on the bankruptcy court judgment; but (2) the district court erred by ordering that an execution issue, granting judgment on the pleadings, and dismissing Defendant’s claims against Plaintiff’s pastor. View "Faith Temple v. DiPietro" on Justia Law

Brown began working as a United flight attendant in 1991. He suffered from depression and bipolar disorder and was disciplined for absenteeism and unprofessionalism. In 2000, he required psychiatric hospitalization. The Flight Attendants Board of Adjustment directed that he be permitted to return to work if his treating physician and a United doctor found him medically fit. Brown never complied. In 2005, the Board affirmed his termination. Meanwhile, United filed for bankruptcy. Brown filed a claim seeking back pay ($80,000). In 2004, Brown sued United in California state court, seeking more than $500,000. United sought transfer to the Illinois bankruptcy court, which did not lift the automatic stay. For 18 months, Brown did not pursue the case. In 2006, a California bankruptcy court granted transfer of Brown’s lawsuit, calling it an adversary proceeding, to Illinois. Brown had never filed a new or amended proof of claim and had not objected to United’s reorganization plan, which was confirmed in 2006, days after Brown’s lawsuit was transferred. The plan discharged claims “filed by Union-represented employees pertaining to rights collectively bargained for.” The clerk’s office mistakenly returned Brown’s file to California. None of the courts took any further action; neither did Brown. The bankruptcy closed in 2009. In 2013, Brown moved to reopen so that his California claims could be litigated. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit rejected Brown’s arguments. Brown’s years of inaction amounted to abandonment of those claims. View "Brown v. UAL Corp." on Justia Law

Debtor owned a candle factory with three outstanding mortgages. Southwest had the largest security interest. After the trustee unsuccessfully attempted to sell the property and realize the equity for the estate, the trustee abandoned the property to Southwest. At issue on appeal is whether the estate or the secured creditor should pay the property’s maintenance expenses incurred while the trustee was trying to sell the property. The bankruptcy court granted a surcharge against the property for those expenses in the form of a priming lien. The court concluded that, to the extent that a trustee holds an asset longer than necessary to determine and realize its value, and the value turns out to be less than the creditor’s secured interest, the creditor can challenge the necessity of the costs incurred by the trustee. In this case, the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Southwest received a direct and quantifiable benefit from the trustee’s stewardship of the property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Southwest Securities, FSB v. Segner, Jr." on Justia Law

Statek appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order, on remand, denying reconsideration. In denying Statekʹs latest motions for reconsideration, the bankruptcy courtʹs decisions relied on a prior alternative holding - that Statekʹs argument was a ʺnew argumentʺ not proper for a motion for reconsideration - which this Court did not explicitly address in Coudert I.  In Coudert I, the court instructed the bankruptcy court ʺto apply Connecticutʹs choice of law rules in deciding Statekʹs motion to reconsider.ʺ The bankruptcy court did not follow that instruction, as the Connecticut choice‐of‐law rules did not bear on the bankruptcy courtʹs ultimate decision. Instead, the bankruptcy court ordered further briefing on whether it could adhere to its prior alternative holding that Statekʹs argument was a new argument not available on reconsideration. Because the bankruptcy court's decisions do not comply with the court's mandate in Coudert I, the court reversed and remanded with further instructions. View "Statek Corp. v. Development Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law