Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's confirming of their amended Chapter 13 plan. The court held that when a Chapter 13 debtor’s treatment of a creditor under one subsection of 11 U.S.C. 1322(b) falls within the contours of another subsection of that statute, all standards of both subsections must be satisfied. Specifically, the court examined whether the maintenance of regular payments for unsecured non-priority student loan debt by debtors in this case, while they paid substantially less to other unsecured non-priority debt, satisfied the requirements of Bankruptcy Code 1322(b)(1) and (b)(10). The court held that those requirements were not met. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s holding that debtors’ plan was unfairly discriminatory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jordahl, Jr. v. Burrell" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On his claimed exemption schedule, Debtor asserted that, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(bb), his entire interest in two corporations’ stock was exempt from the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court certified a question to the Supreme Court, asking whether section 21.090(1)(bb) allows a debtor to exempt his entire interest in a closely held corporation or whether the exemption is limited to the debtor’s noneconomic interest in the corporation. The Supreme Court answered that section 21.090(1)(bb)’s language exempting stock of a corporation described in subsection 2 of Nev. Rev. Stat. 78.746 “except as set forth in that section” means that a debtor can exempt stock in the corporations described in Nev. Rev. Stat. 78.746(2), but his economic interest in that stock can still be subject to the charging order remedy in section 78.746(1). View "Becker v. Becker" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding filed by debtor. Debtor appealed from the bankruptcy court's order sustaining the bankruptcy trustee’s objection to her claim of an exemption in certain real property and limiting the exemption to $155,675.00. The court concluded that debtor did not acquire the property in which she claims her homestead exemption within the 1215-day period preceding the filing of the petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(p)(1)(A), thus limiting her homestead exemption to $155,675.00. In this case, the trustee presented evidence from three sources to the effect that instead of recording the deed immediately after execution, Donn Bruess, debtor's father, left it with his attorney until he determined whether to go forward with that conveyance. Upon consideration of the trustee’s evidence, the bankruptcy court found that Donn Bruess had not surrendered control of the deed with the intent to irrevocably convey the property. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court's findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the judgment. View "Bruess v. Dietz" on Justia Law

Appellants and the company they own filed suit against David Fisher and other defendants, alleging claims arising from an unfulfilled real estate purchase agreement. Fisher filed an answer and counterclaim. Three years later, Fisher filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Appellants filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case, requesting a determination that their claims against Fisher were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The district court subsequently dismissed Appellants’ claims. Thereafter, the bankruptcy court ruled that Appellants’ claims against Fisher were dischargeable in bankruptcy. Appellants then filed a motion to modify the district court’s order dismissing the action and a renewed motion for summary judgment. The district court denied both post-dismissal motions, noting that the matter had already been dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court treated Appellants’ motions as motions for relief from the dismissal order pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motions. View "Bartel v. West" on Justia Law

Day’s company, Forever Green, sells artificial turf playing fields. It sued its competitor, ProGreen, for $5 million for diversion of corporate assets (Bucks County Action). Dawson, an owner of ProGreen and a former Forever Green sales representative, would be liable if damages are awarded. Dawson sued Forever Green for unpaid commissions and wages (Louisiana Action). Years later, the Louisiana court entered a consent judgment ( about $300,000) in favor of Dawson, which was not paid. Meanwhile, the Bucks County parties agreed to arbitrate. Weeks after the consent judgment entered, ProGreen moved to terminate arbitration, arguing that Forever Green was insolvent and that Day lacked “ability or desire to pay the Arbitrator’s fees and expenses.” Dawson obtained a writ of execution against the arbitrator. Recognizing that he was adverse to Dawson, the arbitrator suspended the arbitration until the fee issue was resolved. Forever Green sued to reinstate the arbitration. Dawson and a law firm that was owed $206,000 from Forever Green, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Forever Green, which satisfied the statutory criteria, 11 U.S.C. 303(b). The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the filing as being in bad faith. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that bad faith provides a basis for dismissal independent of the statutory criteria for filing. View "Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Weinman was the Chapter 7 Trustee for Adam Aircraft Industries (“AAI”). Defendant Joseph Walker was an officer of AAI and served as its president and as a member of its Board of Directors. Throughout his employment, Walker had neither a written employment contract nor a severance agreement with AAI. In February 2007, the Board decided it wanted to replace Walker as both president and as a board member. Since AAI did not want Walker’s termination to disrupt its ongoing negotiations for debt financing, AAI suggested that Walker could voluntarily “resign” in lieu of termination and could also continue to support the company publicly. Subsequently, Walker agreed, and the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) outlining the terms of Walker’s separation, and they also embodied these terms in two Separation Agreements and Releases. About a year after terminating Walker, AAI declared bankruptcy. It then sued in bankruptcy court to avoid further transfers to Walker, to recover some transfers previously made to Walker, and to disallow Walker’s claim on AAI’s bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court denied AAI’s claims. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirmed this ruling in its entirety. AAI appealed part of the ruling, arguing that its obligations and transfers to Walker were avoidable under the Code on two alternative bases. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. View "Weinman v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 1997, Player and his wife established EAR, purportedly to refurbish high-tech machinery . In 2005-2009, EAR defrauded creditors and the couple obtained $17 million in fraudulent transfers from EAR. Before the fraud was detected, they used funds for their personal benefit and spent large amounts at the Horseshoe Casino, Player was known to “walk with chips,” rather than cashing them in, and giving chips to a third party to cash in. Neither is illegal, but are potentially indicative of “structuring” transactions to avoid triggering the $10,000 reporting requirement, a federal crime, 31 U.S.C. 5324. When the fraud was discovered, EAR filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The plan administrator sought to avoid transfers to Horseshoe, alleging that Horseshoe had reasons to believe that Player’s money came from EAR. Horseshoe objected to a motion to compel under 31 C.F.R. 1021.320(e), which governs Suspicious Activity Reports filed by financial institutions, including casinos, to detect money laundering and other violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. The district court ordered an ex parte filing by Horseshoe, which was inaccessible to EAR. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Horseshoe accepted the transfers without knowledge of the fraud at EAR and could not have uncovered the fraud if it had investigated. View "Brandt v. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC" on Justia Law

MERV, an LLC formed to purchase and operate an antique mall, encountered difficulties paying its mortgage loan and entered into a forbearance agreement with the Bank. MERV later defaulted and filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition. Although a plan of reorganization was confirmed, MERV again defaulted. The Bank foreclosed its mortgage on the property. Before the bankruptcy case closed, MERV retained special counsel and filed an adversary proceeding against some of its founders and the Bank. The claims against the Bank alleged breach of contract, “facilitation of fraud and theft”, and equitable subordination of the Bank’s claim. MERV sought punitive damages. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment, agreeing with the Bank that MERV had executed a release of all of the claims as part of the forbearance agreement. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, finding that the Bank offered prima facie evidence of a complete affirmative defense to the complaint by showing that MERV executed a Release of all claims. MERV did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of that Release. MERV did not file a motion or a Rule 56(d) affidavit or declaration with the bankruptcy court requesting more time for discovery. View "In re: MERV Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a motion in the bankruptcy court seeking to recover from AmeriCredit all of the attorney’s fees she incurred in opposing AmeriCredit’s objection to confirmation of her Chapter 13 plan. The court noted that a claim secured by property worth less than the amount of the claim is “bifurcated” into two claims: a secured claim equal to the value of the property and an unsecured claim for the balance. The hanging paragraph creates a special rule for auto lenders by prohibiting bifurcation of claims that are secured by a “purchase money security interest” in a motor vehicle recently acquired for the debtor’s personal use. The bankruptcy court ruled that the purchase money security interest protected by the hanging paragraph does not include amounts attributable to the negative equity from a trade-in vehicle. The bankruptcy court denied debtor’s motion for attorney’s fees on the ground that she did not prevail “on the contract” because her success in the litigation with AmeriCredit turned on a question of federal bankruptcy law. The district court affirmed. California Civil Code 1717 makes reciprocal an otherwise unilateral contractual obligation to pay attorney’s fees. The court held that the hanging-paragraph litigation was an “action on a contract” in which debtor prevailed. The court concluded that, as the “party prevailing on the contract,” debtor is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under section 1717. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Penrod v. AmeriCredit Fin. Serv." on Justia Law

Debtors are "Chapter 20 debtors" who filed for Chapter 7 and then Chapter 13 relief. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court properly voided HSBC’s lien under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, confirmed debtors' Chapter 13 plan offering permanent voidance of HSBC’s lien upon successful plan completion, and found no due process violation or bad faith purpose in filing the Chapter 13 petition. Therefore, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s lien-voidance order, plan confirmation order, and plan implementation order. In regards to debtors' cross-appeal for attorneys' fees, the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether debtors were entitled to attorneys’ fees because this issue was not addressed, in the first instance, by the bankruptcy court. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's denial o fees and instructed the district court to remand to the bankruptcy court for a determination of debtors' entitlement to attorneys’ fees in the first instance. View "HSBC Bank v. Blendheim" on Justia Law