Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Illinois attorney Jahrling was contacted and paid by attorney Rywak to prepare documents for the sale of 90-year-old Cora’s home. Rywak’s clients paid $35,000 for Cora’s property, which was worth at least $106,000 and was later resold by the purchasers for $145,000. Cora later alleged he understood that he would keep a life estate to live in the upstairs apartment of the home rent-free. Jahrling’s sale documents did not include that life estate. Jahrling and Cora could not communicate directly and privately because Cora spoke only Polish and Jahrling spoke no Polish. Jahrling relied on counsel for the adverse parties for all communication with Cora. After the buyers tried to evict Cora, Cora sued Jahrling in state court for legal malpractice. After a partial settlement with a third party and offsets, the court awarded Cora’s estate $26,000, plus costs. Jahrling filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Cora’s estate filed an adversary proceeding alleging that the judgment was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) because the debt was the result of defalcation by the debtor acting as a fiduciary. The bankruptcy court found in favor of the estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Jahrling’s egregious breaches of his fiduciary duty were reckless and the resulting malpractice judgment is not dischargeable. View "Jahrling v. Estate of Cora" on Justia Law

PHA filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo falsely represented that it would forbear collection of the principal balance of a line of credit, ultimately causing PHA to default and enter bankruptcy. PHA subsequently filed suit in Virginia state court, which Wells Fargo removed to federal court. Along with repeating the claims made in the bankruptcy adversary complaint, PHA alleged new theories of lender liability. The district court dismissed the suit. The court rejected PHA's contention that the district court erroneously gave res judicata effect to various sale orders issued during PHA’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, concluding that the elements of res judicata are satisfied. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Providence Hall Assoc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Great Lakes, which automotive service stores throughout the Midwest, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The unsecured creditors’ committee filed an adversary action against T.D., which had leased two oil-change stores to Great Lakes. Great Lakes had negotiated the termination of the leases 52 days before it declared bankruptcy, and the creditors’ committee contends that the termination was either a preferential (11U.S.C. 547(b)) or a fraudulent (11 U.S.C. 548(A)(1)) transfer of the leases to T.D. The bankruptcy judge rejected that claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of the value of Great Lakes’ transfer to T.D. and whether T.D. has any defenses to the creditors’ claims. View "In re: Great Lakes Quick Lube, LP" on Justia Law

Judgment Factor filed an adversary proceeding to prevent the entry of a Chapter 7 discharge order for defendant. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to defendant, holding that he did not act in any way that merited the denial of a discharge under 11 U.S.C. 727(a) and dismissing alter ego claims. The district court affirmed. The court concluded that Judgment Factors failed to obtain leave from the bankruptcy court to pursue alter ego and reverse veil piercing claims on behalf of the estate, so it may not pursue these claims. The court also concluded that Judgment Factors failed establish that defendant concealed or transferred any assets, destroyed or failed to keep financial records, or made any false oaths. Therefore, the court agreed with the lower courts that defendant did not act in any way meriting denial of a discharge under section 727(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Judgment Factors, LLC v. Athol Packer" on Justia Law

WEB2B filed for bankruptcy and turned over its balances to the Chapter 7 trustee. RAC filed suit claiming the balances of an express trust, resulting trust, or constructive trust. WEB2B provided automated clearinghouse and electronic-check conversion services to RAC. The bankruptcy court dismissed RAC's claims and granted summary judgment to the trustee. The court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that the parties' processing agreement had no requirement to segregate RAC funds, nor a definite, unequivocal, explicit declaration of trust. Therefore, there was no express trust in this case. The district court did not err in concluding that the undisputed facts here do not show with reasonable certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt that a resulting trust exists. Finally, the district court properly concluded that RAC had identified no clear and convincing evidence of conversion sufficient to justify imposing a constructive trust on the remaining funds. View "Rent-A-Center East, Inc. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Debtor, a construction business, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which was converted to chapter 7. A The Bank holds a valid, first-priority security interest in all of the Debtor’s assets, including accounts receivable. The Trustee discovered that checks payable to the Debtor had been negotiated and deposited into the personal account of Hartford, the father of Debtor’s principal, totalling $36,389.89. Before initiating adversary litigation, the Trustee engaged in settlement talks with Hartford, who agreed to pay $36,389.89 to the estate and release the estate from all claims involving the transfers. While the Trustee was pursuing settlement., the Bank obtained an order modifying the automatic stay to allow it to exercise its state law remedies with respect to collateral, then filed suit to recover from Hartford the value of the checks. A state court entered judgment in favor of the Bank. The next day, the Trustee successfully moved for approval of the Hartford settlement. The Bank objected. The bankruptcy court rejected the Bank’s argument that the order granting relief from the automatic stay allowed it to pursue the fraudulent transfer action in state court. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the bankruptcy court entered no final judgment or appealable order. View "Schaumburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Alsterda" on Justia Law

The Hargers were Jones’ neighbors. Police reports indicate that there were issues between the neighbors for several years. Grad worked for CarMeds, ostensibly owned by Jones’ mother and run by Jones, occasionally visiting Jones’ home. Grad claimed to have been assaulted after such a meeting. At the police station, Grad identified Harger from a photo line-up. Ultimately, charges were dropped. The Hargers sued Grad and Jones, asserting conspiracy to have Harger falsely arrested. Meanwhile, Jones filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Hoover, the Hargers’ attorney, moved to modify the automatic stay and filed an adversary complaint, alleging that Jones's debt was non-dischargeable and seeking denial of discharge based on the assertion that Jones lied about the ownership of CarMeds. The bankruptcy court later dismissed the adversary proceeding on the Hargers’ motion, and set a hearing sua sponte, directing the Hargers and Hoover to show that they had reasonable grounds for filing. The court found that Hoover violated Rule 9011 by filing without specific evidence and made intentional misrepresentations in his filings; directed him to pay $26,000 in attorneys’ fees; revoked Hoover’s electronic bankruptcy filing authority; and referred the matter for possible prosecution. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings ;erred as a matter of law in awarding fees on a sua sponte basis; and abused its discretion in imposing any sanctions. View "In re: Jones" on Justia Law

RayTrans Holdings, Inc., through the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of RayTrans Holdings, cross-claimed against RayTrans Distribution Services, Inc., Echo Global Logistics, Inc., and Echo/RT Holdings, LLC (collectively, Defendants) seeking avoidance of certain transfers among Defendants, an accounting, and injunction prohibiting any further transfers of RayTrans assets by Defendants until all creditors of RayTrans Holdings were paid in full. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the cross-claims, holding (1) the Trustee does not have standing to sue for fraudulent transfer on behalf of RayTrans Distribution; (2) RayTrans Distribution’s transfer of assets was not fraudulent; and (3) the Trustee’s request for leave to amend the cross-claims is denied. View "Spring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Twenty-one months after plaintiff filed an employment discrimination case against US Steel, she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. When U.S. Steel learned of the bankruptcy case - that plaintiff's Chapter 7 petition had not disclosed the employment-discrimination claims she was pursuing and that the Chapter 7 Trustee was treating the bankruptcy as a “no asset” case and had filed a Report of No Distribution with the bankruptcy court - it moved the district court alternatively to dismiss the case or for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel as formulated in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., and Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., controlled its decision. The court concluded that New Hampshire v. Maine did not govern the district court's application of judicial estoppel in this case. Therefore, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court erred in failing to give the New Hampshire factors appropriate weight and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring her claims on the basis of judicial estoppel. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not err in applying Eleventh Circuit precedent, namely Burnes and Robinson, where the bankruptcy court in those cases accepted the debtor's failure to disclose as property of the bankruptcy estate claims the debtor was litigating in federal district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Slater v. US Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Steven Fustolo’s affiliate companies issued four promissory notes to Patton Drive, LLC. Fustolo personally guaranteed two of the notes. When the principal debtors defaulted on all four notes, Patton drive sued Fustolo. The Massachusetts state court found Fustolo liable for breach of contract and entered judgment against Fustolo. Fustolo appealed, challenging the interest due. Meanwhile, Patton Drive joined with two of Fustolo’s other creditors to file a petition seeking to place Fustolo into involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Fustolo, in turn, asserted that Patton Drive was not qualified it to serve as a petitioning creditor because his pending state court appeal subjected Patton Drive’s judgment to “bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.” The bankruptcy court allowed Patton Drive to join in initiating involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against Fustolo. The district court affirmed, finding that Fustolo’s state court appeal could not raise a bona fide dispute as to Patton Drive’s claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because the amount of Fustolo’s liability on the guaranteed notes was not subject to bona fide dispute, and because Patton Drive’s claim on the guaranteed notes could be considered separately from Patton Drive’s claim on the judgment within which its underlying contract claims were submerged, Patton Drive qualified as a petitioning creditor. View "Fustolo v. 50 Thomas Patton Dr., LLC" on Justia Law