Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Debtor appealed the bankruptcy appellate panel's (BAP) denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus. The court overruled In re Salter and held that the BAP is not a court established by Act of Congress under subsection (a) of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), so it does not have jurisdiction to entertain a mandamus petition. Accordingly, the court vacated the decision of the BAP and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Ozenne v. Chase Manhattan Bank" on Justia Law

Appellants, representatives of certain unsecured creditors of the Chapter 11 debtor Tribune Company, appealed the grant of a motion to dismiss their state law, constructive fraudulent conveyance claims brought against Tribune’s former shareholders. The court held that appellants are not barred by the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay because they have been freed from its restrictions by orders of the bankruptcy court and by the debtors’ confirmed reorganization plan. The court also held that appellants’ claims are preempted by Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), where that section shields from avoidance proceedings brought by a bankruptcy trustee transfers by or to financial intermediaries effectuating settlement payments in securities transactions or made in connection with a securities contract, except through an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig." on Justia Law

Appellants, representatives of certain unsecured creditors of the Chapter 11 debtor Tribune Company, appealed the grant of a motion to dismiss their state law, constructive fraudulent conveyance claims brought against Tribune’s former shareholders. The court held that appellants are not barred by the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay because they have been freed from its restrictions by orders of the bankruptcy court and by the debtors’ confirmed reorganization plan. The court also held that appellants’ claims are preempted by Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), where that section shields from avoidance proceedings brought by a bankruptcy trustee transfers by or to financial intermediaries effectuating settlement payments in securities transactions or made in connection with a securities contract, except through an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig." on Justia Law

Jepson executed a note and mortgage on Illinois property, listing America’s Wholesale Lender as the lender and Mortgage Electronics Registration Systems (MERS) as its nominee. Jepson’s note was endorsed in blank by Countrywide, “doing business as America’s Wholesale Lender” and transferred to CWABS, a residential mortgage trust that pools loans and sells certificates backed by the mortgages to investors. CWABS was formed and governed by a Pooling and Service Agreement (PSA). BNYM, trustee for CWABS, now possesses Jepson’s note. MERS assigned Jepson’s mortgage to BNYM. Jepson defaulted. BNYM filed a foreclosure complaint. Jepson filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. BNYM sought to lift the automatic stay. Jepson filed an adversary complaint, seeking a declaration that BNYM had no interest in her mortgage because the note did not include a complete chain of intervening endorsements and was endorsed after the closing date in the PSA and that America’s is a fictitious entity, so that the note was void and not negotiable under Illinois law. The bankruptcy court held that, under governing New York law, Jepson lacked standing to challenge alleged violations of the PSA, dismissed the adversary complaint, and modified the automatic stay to allow BNYM to proceed with its Illinois foreclosure action. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Jepson lacks standing to raise challenges based on the PSA, but remanded for consideration of her other claims. View "Jepson v. Bank of NY Mellon" on Justia Law

Jepson executed a note and mortgage on Illinois property, listing America’s Wholesale Lender as the lender and Mortgage Electronics Registration Systems (MERS) as its nominee. Jepson’s note was endorsed in blank by Countrywide, “doing business as America’s Wholesale Lender” and transferred to CWABS, a residential mortgage trust that pools loans and sells certificates backed by the mortgages to investors. CWABS was formed and governed by a Pooling and Service Agreement (PSA). BNYM, trustee for CWABS, now possesses Jepson’s note. MERS assigned Jepson’s mortgage to BNYM. Jepson defaulted. BNYM filed a foreclosure complaint. Jepson filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. BNYM sought to lift the automatic stay. Jepson filed an adversary complaint, seeking a declaration that BNYM had no interest in her mortgage because the note did not include a complete chain of intervening endorsements and was endorsed after the closing date in the PSA and that America’s is a fictitious entity, so that the note was void and not negotiable under Illinois law. The bankruptcy court held that, under governing New York law, Jepson lacked standing to challenge alleged violations of the PSA, dismissed the adversary complaint, and modified the automatic stay to allow BNYM to proceed with its Illinois foreclosure action. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Jepson lacks standing to raise challenges based on the PSA, but remanded for consideration of her other claims. View "Jepson v. Bank of NY Mellon" on Justia Law

Illinois attorney Jahrling was contacted and paid by attorney Rywak to prepare documents for the sale of 90-year-old Cora’s home. Rywak’s clients paid $35,000 for Cora’s property, which was worth at least $106,000 and was later resold by the purchasers for $145,000. Cora later alleged he understood that he would keep a life estate to live in the upstairs apartment of the home rent-free. Jahrling’s sale documents did not include that life estate. Jahrling and Cora could not communicate directly and privately because Cora spoke only Polish and Jahrling spoke no Polish. Jahrling relied on counsel for the adverse parties for all communication with Cora. After the buyers tried to evict Cora, Cora sued Jahrling in state court for legal malpractice. After a partial settlement with a third party and offsets, the court awarded Cora’s estate $26,000, plus costs. Jahrling filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Cora’s estate filed an adversary proceeding alleging that the judgment was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) because the debt was the result of defalcation by the debtor acting as a fiduciary. The bankruptcy court found in favor of the estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Jahrling’s egregious breaches of his fiduciary duty were reckless and the resulting malpractice judgment is not dischargeable. View "Jahrling v. Estate of Cora" on Justia Law

PHA filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo falsely represented that it would forbear collection of the principal balance of a line of credit, ultimately causing PHA to default and enter bankruptcy. PHA subsequently filed suit in Virginia state court, which Wells Fargo removed to federal court. Along with repeating the claims made in the bankruptcy adversary complaint, PHA alleged new theories of lender liability. The district court dismissed the suit. The court rejected PHA's contention that the district court erroneously gave res judicata effect to various sale orders issued during PHA’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, concluding that the elements of res judicata are satisfied. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Providence Hall Assoc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Great Lakes, which automotive service stores throughout the Midwest, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The unsecured creditors’ committee filed an adversary action against T.D., which had leased two oil-change stores to Great Lakes. Great Lakes had negotiated the termination of the leases 52 days before it declared bankruptcy, and the creditors’ committee contends that the termination was either a preferential (11U.S.C. 547(b)) or a fraudulent (11 U.S.C. 548(A)(1)) transfer of the leases to T.D. The bankruptcy judge rejected that claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of the value of Great Lakes’ transfer to T.D. and whether T.D. has any defenses to the creditors’ claims. View "In re: Great Lakes Quick Lube, LP" on Justia Law

Judgment Factor filed an adversary proceeding to prevent the entry of a Chapter 7 discharge order for defendant. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to defendant, holding that he did not act in any way that merited the denial of a discharge under 11 U.S.C. 727(a) and dismissing alter ego claims. The district court affirmed. The court concluded that Judgment Factors failed to obtain leave from the bankruptcy court to pursue alter ego and reverse veil piercing claims on behalf of the estate, so it may not pursue these claims. The court also concluded that Judgment Factors failed establish that defendant concealed or transferred any assets, destroyed or failed to keep financial records, or made any false oaths. Therefore, the court agreed with the lower courts that defendant did not act in any way meriting denial of a discharge under section 727(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Judgment Factors, LLC v. Athol Packer" on Justia Law

WEB2B filed for bankruptcy and turned over its balances to the Chapter 7 trustee. RAC filed suit claiming the balances of an express trust, resulting trust, or constructive trust. WEB2B provided automated clearinghouse and electronic-check conversion services to RAC. The bankruptcy court dismissed RAC's claims and granted summary judgment to the trustee. The court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that the parties' processing agreement had no requirement to segregate RAC funds, nor a definite, unequivocal, explicit declaration of trust. Therefore, there was no express trust in this case. The district court did not err in concluding that the undisputed facts here do not show with reasonable certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt that a resulting trust exists. Finally, the district court properly concluded that RAC had identified no clear and convincing evidence of conversion sufficient to justify imposing a constructive trust on the remaining funds. View "Rent-A-Center East, Inc. v. Leonard" on Justia Law