Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Gordon Green filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on May 11, 2021, listing his "Sun Life: Life Income Fund," a Canadian Registered Retirement Savings Plan, as an asset. Green sought to exempt the fund under Illinois statute 735 ILCS 5/12-1006, which exempts assets intended in good faith to qualify as a retirement plan under applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The bankruptcy trustee objected, arguing that the fund, organized under Canadian law, did not qualify for the exemption. The bankruptcy court agreed, holding that a retirement plan must be organized under IRC § 401(a), which requires the trust to be created or organized in the United States.Green appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court rejected the bankruptcy court's country-of-origin requirement but still found that the Sun Life Fund was not a tax-qualified retirement plan under the IRC. Consequently, the district court affirmed the denial of the exemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined whether the Sun Life Fund qualified as a retirement plan under applicable provisions of the IRC. The court noted that the IRC does not specifically define "retirement plan" for this purpose and that Illinois law requires the plan to qualify under applicable IRC provisions. The court found that the Sun Life Fund did not meet the criteria for tax-qualified retirement plans under the IRC, as it was not governed by any specific IRC provision that regulates retirement plans. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Sun Life Fund was not exempt under Illinois statute 735 ILCS 5/12-1006. View "Green v. Leibowitz" on Justia Law

Demona Freeman secured a loan to purchase her home, which was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon) and serviced by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. After falling behind on her mortgage payments, BNY Mellon initiated a foreclosure action. Freeman filed for bankruptcy and eventually cured her mortgage default through bankruptcy payments. Despite this, Ocwen inaccurately reported her loan as delinquent and began rejecting her monthly payments, leading BNY Mellon to file a second foreclosure action, which was later dismissed. Freeman sued Ocwen and BNY Mellon, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed Freeman’s FCRA claim and granted summary judgment on her FDCPA claim, citing lack of standing. Freeman appealed both rulings. She argued that Ocwen failed to conduct a reasonable investigation after being notified by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) of her dispute over the delinquent loan reporting. She also claimed that Ocwen’s erroneous reporting and collection practices caused her various injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FCRA claim, finding that Freeman failed to specify which CRA she notified, thus not providing Ocwen fair notice of the claim. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the FDCPA claim, concluding that Freeman lacked standing. The court determined that Freeman did not provide sufficient evidence of concrete injuries, such as monetary harm or intangible injuries closely related to common law analogues like defamation or invasion of privacy. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s rulings. View "Freeman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a former coal miner, Richard McLain, who developed a serious lung condition after working underground for nearly two decades. McLain filed a claim under the Black Lung Benefits Act, alleging that his years of mine work had left him totally disabled from a pulmonary perspective. His former employer, Old Ben Coal Company, had been liquidated through bankruptcy, so Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the surety guaranteeing Old Ben’s debts under the Act, contested liability on the coal company’s behalf.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined that McLain was disabled within the meaning of the Black Lung Benefits Act. The ALJ's decision was based on a thorough review of the medical record and a set of medical findings regarding how to distinguish between lung disorders arising from coal dust and those arising from tobacco smoke. Old Ben appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review Board, arguing that the ALJ erroneously treated the 2001 preamble as if it were binding law and made factual findings unsupported by the medical record. The Review Board affirmed the benefits decision in full.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the decision of the Benefits Review Board, emphasizing the broad discretion ALJs enjoy when evaluating competing medical theories, the weight ALJs may properly attribute to the perspective of the Department of Labor on such issues, and the significant deference owed to ALJs’ medical findings and scientific judgments on appeal. The court found no error in the ALJ's application of a regulatory preamble or in the factual findings that were challenged by Old Ben. View "Safeco Insurance/Liberty Mutual Surety v. OWCP" on Justia Law

Jan Kowalski, an attorney, was accused of using her position to hide her brother's assets during his bankruptcy proceedings. She allegedly concealed around $357,000 in her attorney trust account and made false statements under oath to cover up the concealment. Kowalski was charged with four counts of bankruptcy fraud and one count of concealing assets from the bankruptcy trustee. She pleaded guilty to the charge of concealing assets.Prior to her trial, Kowalski had been involved in her brother's bankruptcy proceedings, where she used her attorney trust account to hide her brother's assets from his creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. She also made false statements under oath and fabricated documents to cover up her actions. The bankruptcy trustee confronted Kowalski with inconsistencies between her personal bank records and her earlier testimony, but she continued to lie under oath.Kowalski was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The court applied two sentencing enhancements: the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) sophisticated-means enhancement, and the § 3B1.3 abuse of position of trust enhancement. Kowalski appealed her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying these enhancements and that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Kowalski had indeed used sophisticated means to commit the offense and had abused her position of trust. The court also found her sentence to be substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lee Hofmann, who controlled multiple businesses, including Games Management and International Supply. Games Management borrowed approximately $2.7 million from Citizens Equity First Credit Union (the Lender), with Hofmann guaranteeing payment. When Games Management defaulted and Hofmann failed to honor his guarantee, the Lender obtained a judgment against Hofmann. In 2013, Hofmann arranged for International Supply to pay the Lender $1.72 million. By 2015, International Supply was in bankruptcy, and a trustee was appointed to distribute its assets to creditors.The bankruptcy court held a trial, during which expert witnesses disagreed on whether International Supply was solvent in 2013. The Trustee's expert testified that it was insolvent under two of three methods of assessing solvency, while the Lender's expert testified that it was solvent under all three methods. The bankruptcy judge concluded that International Supply was insolvent in August 2013 and directed the Lender to pay $1.72 million plus interest to the Trustee. The district court affirmed this decision.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Lender argued that the only legally permissible approach to defining solvency is the balance-sheet test. However, the court disagreed, stating that the Illinois legislation does not support this view. The court also noted that the Lender had not previously argued for the balance-sheet test to be the exclusive approach, which constituted a forfeiture. The court concluded that the bankruptcy judge was entitled to use multiple methods to determine solvency. The court affirmed the district court's decision, requiring the Lender to pay $1.72 million plus interest to the Trustee. View "Stone v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union" on Justia Law

Edward Johnson filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13 and made payments to the bankruptcy trustee, Marilyn O. Marshall, under his proposed repayment plan. However, the bankruptcy court never confirmed his plan due to his inability to address an outstanding loan and his domestic support obligations, and ultimately dismissed his case for unreasonable delay. Before returning Johnson's undisbursed payments, the trustee deducted a percentage fee as compensation. Johnson filed a motion requesting that the trustee disgorge her fee, which the bankruptcy court granted, reasoning that the trustee did not have statutory authority to deduct her fee because Johnson's plan was not confirmed. The trustee appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court analyzed the statutory text and agreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that the United States Bankruptcy Code requires the Chapter 13 trustee to return her fee when the debtor's plan is not confirmed. The court found that neither of the two exceptions in § 1326(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code applied to the trustee's fee. The court also rejected the trustee's argument that § 1326(b) authorized her to keep her fee when making pre-confirmation adequate protection payments to creditors, as this provision only addresses payments made after a plan has been confirmed. The court further found that the trustee had no right to keep her fee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2), which only addresses the source of funds that may be accessed to pay standing trustee fees.The court concluded that the Chapter 13 trustee must return her fee when the debtor's plan is not confirmed, affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court. View "Marshall v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves Appvion, Inc., a Wisconsin-based paper company, which was sold to its employees through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) in 2001. The company declared bankruptcy in 2017. Grant Lyon, acting on behalf of the ESOP, filed a lawsuit against various individuals and corporations, alleging that they fraudulently inflated the price of Appvion in 2001 and that the price remained inflated until Appvion’s bankruptcy. The district court dismissed almost all the claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of some claims and reversed and remanded others. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims related to actions before November 26, 2012, as they were time-barred under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). However, the court reversed the dismissal of claims related to actions after November 26, 2012, finding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to ensure that the company's valuations were sound. The court also reversed the dismissal of claims alleging that the defendants engaged in prohibited transactions and co-fiduciary liability. The court affirmed the dismissal of state-law claims against the defendants, finding them preempted by ERISA. View "Appvion, Inc. Retirement Savings and Employee Stock Ownership Plan v. Buth" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Trustee for the bankrupt company BWGS, LLC and BMO Harris Bank N.A. and Sun Capital Partners VI, L.P. The Trustee sought to avoid a payment made by BWGS to BMO Harris, which was used to finance the acquisition of BWGS by Sun Capital's subsidiary. The Trustee argued that the payment constituted a constructively fraudulent transfer under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and Indiana state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had to address two novel issues: whether Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which protects certain transactions made “in connection with a securities contract,” applies to transactions involving private securities; and, if so, whether it also preempts state law claims seeking similar relief.The Court held that Section 546(e) does apply to transactions involving private securities and does preempt state law claims seeking similar relief. Consequently, the Trustee's attempt to avoid the payment under the Bankruptcy Code and Indiana law was barred by Section 546(e). The Court also rejected the Trustee's argument that he could recover the value of the payment from Sun Capital under a different provision of the Bankruptcy Code, holding that this claim was also preempted by Section 546(e). The Court thus affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the Trustee's complaint with prejudice. View "Petr v. BMO Harris Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The case in question originated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The dispute arose after the dissolution of a business partnership between Gregory Kleynerman and Scott Smith, which resulted in Smith obtaining a state court judgment of $499,000 against Kleynerman. This judgment was secured by Kleynerman's membership interest in Red Flag Cargo Security Systems LLC. Following this, Kleynerman filed for bankruptcy and valued his interest in Red Flag at $0. Smith argued in the bankruptcy court that the state court's judgment was a result of Kleynerman's fraud and thus could not be discharged. However, the bankruptcy court rejected this argument.After the bankruptcy case was closed, Kleynerman asked the state court to deem the $499,000 judgment discharged. Smith contended that under Wisconsin law, only debts secured by real property can be avoided. The state court agreed with Smith, which led Kleynerman to request the bankruptcy court to reopen the case and clearly state that both the $499,000 debt and the lien on Kleynerman’s interest in Red Flag no longer existed.The bankruptcy court reopened the case and the district court affirmed the decision. The appellate court agreed with the lower courts, stating that the bankruptcy judge had authority to reopen the case, and that Kleynerman had cause for reopening.Furthermore, the court held that the value of Kleynerman’s interest in Red Flag was a matter for the bankruptcy judge to decide before the discharge. Smith had an opportunity to object to Kleynerman's valuation of his interest in Red Flag but failed to do so until after the bankruptcy court had entered its discharge order. The court concluded that Smith's post-discharge subpoenas seeking information about the value of Kleynerman’s interest in Red Flag were a fishing expedition and an exercise in harassment, which was properly rejected by the bankruptcy judge. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. View "Smith v. Kleynerman" on Justia Law

Fliss, Wojciak, and Barr took out a $200,000 bank loan for their jointly owned companies. Each man personally guaranteed the loan. When the borrowers defaulted, the bank obtained a state court $208,639.95 consent judgment, holding the guarantors jointly and severally liable. Wojciak then entered into an agreement with the bank, through his company, Capital I, to purchase the promissory note and judgment debt for $240,000, then entered into a settlement agreement with the bank, agreeing to pay $240,000. Wojciak's other company, Capital II wired the bank $240,000. The state court substituted Capital I for the bank as the plaintiff. Wojciak moved to enforce the judgment: Capital I commenced a supplemental proceeding and sought property turnovers. Fliss and Barr unsuccessfully argued that the debt was extinguished when the Wojciaks paid $240,000 in exchange for settlement.Fliss filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Wojciak had Capital I file a secured claim, seeking to enforce the judgment–$359,967.69 including post-judgment interest. The bankruptcy court disallowed that claim, finding that Wojciak used Capital I as his alter ego and became both the creditor and debtor, which extinguished the debt. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim objection—the Rooker-Feldman doctrine posed no obstacle. Capital I failed to demonstrate the existence of a final judgment as required by res judicata and collateral estoppel. View "Generation Capital I, LLC v. Fliss" on Justia Law