Articles Posted in U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals

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Hope 7 entered into bankruptcy in 2009 and RIASO was Hope 7's largest creditor. The bankruptcy court subsequently approved the settlement of Hope 7's fraud-based claims against RIASO, approved RIASO's proof of claim against Hope 7, and directed the payment of funds from Hope 7's estate to RIASO. Hope 7 subsequently found additional evidence relevant to RIASO's alleged fraud and moved for relief of judgment under Rule 60(b) and asked the bankruptcy court to reopen its earlier orders. The court concluded that Hope 7 had not demonstrated that it had standing to challenge the bankruptcy court's settlement order or, with regard to the remaining claims, that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion for relief. The district court did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court's decision, and therefore, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "In re: Hope 7 Monroe Street Ltd." on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from the mortgage plaintiff carried on her New York house. In 2001, WaMu acquired the note and mortgage and then assigned it to Fannie Mae. Thereafter, plaintiff's home went into foreclosure, WaMu failed, and the FDIC became its receiver. In 2009, plaintiff brought this action against the FDIC, alleging that WaMu "owned and/or serviced the mortgage," and that it engaged in wrongful conduct in the foreclosure's aftermath. The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing. Plaintiff appealed and the FDIC argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because plaintiff's notice of appeal was untimely. The court held that the district court's order ran afoul of Rule 4(a)(5)(C), which limited any extensions to thirty days, meaning that the last permissible day would have been the day before plaintiff filed her notice. The court agreed with plaintiff that the Rule 4(a)(5)(C) time limit was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar, and that the FDIC forfeited its timeliness objection. The court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.