Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

The Smiths lived in a Joliet home, title to which passed to wife in 2004 as an inheritance. Real estate taxes had gone unpaid in 2000, resulting in a tax lien. At a 2001 auction, SIPI purchased the tax lien and paid the delinquent taxes—$4,046.26—plus costs and was awarded a Certificate of Purchase. Smith did not redeem her tax obligation. SIPI recorded its tax deed in 2005 and sold the property to Midwest for $50,000. In 2007, the Smiths filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief and sought to avoid the tax sale. The bankruptcy judge and the Seventh Circuit found a fraudulent transfer (11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B)) because the property was not transferred for reasonably equivalent value, but found Midwest a subsequent transferee in good faith. The 1994 Supreme Court decision, BFP v. Resolution Trust, that a mortgage foreclosure sale that complies with state law is deemed for “reasonably equivalent value” as a matter of law, does not apply in Illinois. Unlike mortgage foreclosure sales and some other states’ tax sales, Illinois tax sales do not involve competitive bidding where the highest bid wins. Instead, bidders bid how little money they are willing to accept in return for payment of the owner’s delinquent taxes. The lowest bid wins; bid amounts bear no relationship to the value of the real estate. View "Smith v. Sipi, LLC" on Justia Law

Sentinel, a cash-management firm, invested customers' cash in liquid low-risk securities. It also traded on its own account, using money borrowed from BNYM, pledging customers’ securities; 7 U.S.C. 6d(a)(2), 6d(b)), and the customers’ contracts required the securities to be held in segregated accounts. Sentinel experienced losses that prevented it from maintaining its collateral with BNYM and meeting customer demands for redemption of their securities. Sentinel used its BNYM line of credit to meet those demands. In 2007 it owed BNYM $573 million; it halted customer redemptions and declared bankruptcy. BNYM notified Sentinel that it planned to liquidate the collateral securing the loan. The bankruptcy trustee refused to classify BNYM as a senior secured creditor, considering the use of customer funds as collateral to be fraudulent transfers, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(A) and claiming that BNYM was aware of suspicious facts that should have led it to investigate. The district judge dismissed the claim, finding that Sentinel had not been shown to have intended to defraud its customers. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Sentinel made fraudulent transfers. On remand, the judge neither conducted an evidentiary hearing nor made additional findings, but issued a “supplemental opinion” that BNYM was entitled to accept the collateral without investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. BNYM remains a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, but is an unsecured creditor because it was on inquiry notice that the pledged assets had been fraudulently conveyed. View "Grede v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Brown began working as a United flight attendant in 1991. He suffered from depression and bipolar disorder and was disciplined for absenteeism and unprofessionalism. In 2000, he required psychiatric hospitalization. The Flight Attendants Board of Adjustment directed that he be permitted to return to work if his treating physician and a United doctor found him medically fit. Brown never complied. In 2005, the Board affirmed his termination. Meanwhile, United filed for bankruptcy. Brown filed a claim seeking back pay ($80,000). In 2004, Brown sued United in California state court, seeking more than $500,000. United sought transfer to the Illinois bankruptcy court, which did not lift the automatic stay. For 18 months, Brown did not pursue the case. In 2006, a California bankruptcy court granted transfer of Brown’s lawsuit, calling it an adversary proceeding, to Illinois. Brown had never filed a new or amended proof of claim and had not objected to United’s reorganization plan, which was confirmed in 2006, days after Brown’s lawsuit was transferred. The plan discharged claims “filed by Union-represented employees pertaining to rights collectively bargained for.” The clerk’s office mistakenly returned Brown’s file to California. None of the courts took any further action; neither did Brown. The bankruptcy closed in 2009. In 2013, Brown moved to reopen so that his California claims could be litigated. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit rejected Brown’s arguments. Brown’s years of inaction amounted to abandonment of those claims. View "Brown v. UAL Corp." on Justia Law

CEOC, the Chapter 11 debtor, owns and operates casinos. Caesars (CEC) is CEOC's principal owner. CEOC borrowed billions of dollars, issuing notes guaranteed by CEC. As CEOC’s financial position worsened, CEC tried to eliminate its guaranty obligations by selling assets of CEOC to other parties and terminating the guaranties. CEOC's creditors, who had received the guaranties, challenged CEC’s repudiation, seeking approximately $12 billion. CEOC, in its bankruptcy proceeding, asserted claims alleging that CEC caused CEOC to transfer valuable assets to CEC at less than fair value, leaving CEOC saddled with debt (fraudulent transfers) and that the guaranty suits will thwart CEOC’s multi‐billion‐dollar restructuring effort, which depends on a substantial contribution from CEC in settlement of CEOC’s claims, and will let the guaranty plaintiffs take precedence over other creditors. The bankruptcy judge, and a district judge refused CEOC's request to enjoin the guaranty suits until 60 days after a bankruptcy examiner completes his report. The bankruptcy judge’s exercise of jurisdiction over the other suits would have been constitutional, but he thought he lacked statutory authority to enter an injunction under 11 U.S.C. 105(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the judges misinterpreted the statute and that issuance of a temporary injunction could facilitate a prompt wind‐up of the bankruptcy. View "Caesars Entm't Operating Co., Inc. v. BOKF, N.A." on Justia Law

In 1997, Player and his wife established EAR, purportedly to refurbish high-tech machinery . In 2005-2009, EAR defrauded creditors and the couple obtained $17 million in fraudulent transfers from EAR. Before the fraud was detected, they used funds for their personal benefit and spent large amounts at the Horseshoe Casino, Player was known to “walk with chips,” rather than cashing them in, and giving chips to a third party to cash in. Neither is illegal, but are potentially indicative of “structuring” transactions to avoid triggering the $10,000 reporting requirement, a federal crime, 31 U.S.C. 5324. When the fraud was discovered, EAR filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The plan administrator sought to avoid transfers to Horseshoe, alleging that Horseshoe had reasons to believe that Player’s money came from EAR. Horseshoe objected to a motion to compel under 31 C.F.R. 1021.320(e), which governs Suspicious Activity Reports filed by financial institutions, including casinos, to detect money laundering and other violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. The district court ordered an ex parte filing by Horseshoe, which was inaccessible to EAR. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Horseshoe accepted the transfers without knowledge of the fraud at EAR and could not have uncovered the fraud if it had investigated. View "Brandt v. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC" on Justia Law