Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted for the theft or embezzlement of funds from his employee's IRA accounts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 664. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction should be reversed because, at trial, the district court barred him from presenting evidence to the jury that he eventually repaid all of the embezzled funds. The court held that because the intent to permanently deprive was neither a required element of, nor a defense to, the conversion or stealing that section 664 criminalized, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of defendant's eventual repayment of his employees' funds in a bankruptcy proceeding as irrelevant.

This case concerned the bankruptcy estate of Qualia Clinical Service, Inc. The estate's Chapter 7 Trustee sought to avoid as a preferential transfer a security interest recorded by one of Qualia's creditors shortly before the bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) held the security interest voidable. The court held that the bankruptcy court and the BAP properly applied 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(5)(A) to conclude that the preferential transfer in this case, though it concerned an interest in accounts receivable, improved Inova Capital Funding, LLC's position as against Qualia's other creditors and so was not exempt from avoidance under that subsection. The court found Inova's remaining arguments unpersuasive.

Debtor appealed from the bankruptcy court's order confirming his modified Chapter 13 plan over his objection. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court could confirm the debtor's plan which provided for the avoidance of two junior liens on the debtor's principal residence. The court held that 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2) did not bar a Chapter 13 debtor from stripping off a wholly unsecured lien on his principal residence. The court also held that the strip off of a wholly unsecured lien on a debtor's principal residence was effective upon completion of the debtor's obligations under this plan and it was not contingent on his receipt of a Chapter 13 discharge. Accordingly, the court reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court and remanded for further proceedings where the debtor must amend his plan to provide for proper treatment of the junior lienholders' claims as unsecured nonpriority claims.

Appellant appealed the bankruptcy court's approval of a multi-million dollar, global settlement in one of the largest Ponzi scheme bankruptcies in American history. The settlement had been substantially consummated and the appeal had been rendered largely moot. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement where the record upon which the bankruptcy court based its approval of the settlement was sufficient and where the settlement satisfied the Flight Transportation/Drexel factors. Accordingly, the order of the bankruptcy court approving the settlement was affirmed.

The Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC) appealed from the judgment of the bankruptcy court, later affirmed by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which discharged the student loan debt of debtor under the "undue hardship" provision of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The court held that it was not clear error to consider debtor's financial condition from the date of discharge to the date debtor sought undue hardship relief. The court also held that there was no clear error in not calculating debtor's husband's part time income where debtor and her husband stipulated their adjusted gross income in 2007. Even when the payroll deductions were excluded, the expenses of the debtor and her dependents outstripped her available resources. Therefore, the court held that, in light of the overall circumstances, excepting debtor's student loan debt from discharge would impose an undue hardship on her.

The trustee of Cheryl Reagan's bankruptcy estate, and Latta Bachelor, the personal representative of Ronald Reagan's probate estate, appealed from an order of the district court affirming the judgment of the bankrutpcy court in this interpleader and declaratory judgment action filed by Regions Bank. The court held that although Cheryl, acting as executrix, retained control over the assets in Ronald's estate, and she may have improperly exercised that control in her capacity as executrix, her conduct in that capacity did not invalidate the spendthrift provisions. Because the spendthrift provision was enforceable under Arkansas law, Cheryl's interest in the net income from Trust C was subject to a "restriction on... transfer" under "applicable nonbankruptcy law," the section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code's exception applied, and Cheryl's interest in the distributions of net income from Trust C was not a part of her bankruptcy estate. Appellants have failed to establish the requisite inducement and detrimental reliance to successfully assert that Cheryl should be estopped from claiming the benefit of the spendthrift trust.

Plaintiff, the Chapter 7 trustee, appealed the bankruptcy court's entry of a judgment in favor of defendants on his complaint seeking turnover under 11 U.S.C. 542 of money allegedly owed to the bankruptcy estate. The court held that while there was no clear error in the bankruptcy court's determination that defendants were not unjustly enriched and therefore, defendants were not indebted to the bankruptcy estate, the court affirmed on the more fundamental ground that the relief sought by the trustee was beyond the scope of 11 U.S.C. 542.

This case stemmed from the replevin actions filed by Klein Bank against debtors. Klein Bank appealed from the Orders of the Bankruptcy Court denying its motions to remand its replevin actions which had been removed from the state court to the bankruptcy court. In denying the motions, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that replevin actions were core proceedings. While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court clarified that core proceedings were limited to those "arising under or arising in" a bankruptcy case. Based on that, the court now concluded that the matters involved in the replevin actions were not core proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further findings on the question of whether the court was required to abstain under 28 U.S.C. 1334(c)(2).

Debtor reopened his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings and thereafter, moved the bankruptcy court to hold in contempt his former spouse and her subrogee, West Virginia's Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau of Child Support Enforcement (BCSE), for violating the terms of debtor's confirmed Chapter 13 repayment plan by seeking income-withholding orders against him for child and spousal support arrears. The bankruptcy court refused to hold the former spouse or BCSE in contempt but did reduce the income withholding. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) reversed and reinstated the income withholdings. Debtor timely appealed. The court held that 11 U.S.C. 1327(a) did not apply to this case because the bankruptcy court confirmed debtor's plan and the plan explicitly limited the former spouse's privilege to return to family court for the sole purpose of litigating child support interest. Although the Bankruptcy Code provided that, to be confirmed, a plan must provide for the full payment of accrued interest on child support and spousal support, 11 U.S.C. 101(14A), a confirmed plan was given res judicata effect even when it violated the Code. As for debtor's claim for post-petition child and spousal support, and interests thereon, the BAP correctly ruled that these claims were beyond the purview of the plan and the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the BCSE income-withholding order could exceed the monthly payment schedule provided in debtor's plan. The court further held that the former spouse's recovery of post-petition spousal and child support was permitted because they were post-petition domestic support obligations for which the Bankruptcy Code allowed no proof of claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Following remand for consideration of the effect of 11 U.S.C. 544(a) on the trustee's motion to sell, the bankruptcy court entered judgment denying the trustee's request to sell jointly-owned real estate free and clear of defendant co-owner's interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 363(b) and (h). The Chapter 7 trustee appealed. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sell where, based on the record before it, the bankruptcy court concluded that the trustee had not met his burden of proving that the benefit to the bankruptcy estate of the sale outweighed the detriment to defendant and where the bankruptcy court's findings of fact regarding the benefit of the estate and detriment to defendant were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.