Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

In 1999 Debtor borrowed $75,558.93 secured by a recorded mortgage lien, encumbering real property and all improvements and fixtures. The property contains a manufactured home, with a plate indicating compliance with federal manufactured home standards. The lender's notes indicated that in 1997, the mobile home was gutted and rebuilt as a house. Debtor did not acquire a separate title to the manufactured home; it is unclear whether such a certificate ever issued. In 2009, Debtor filed a petition for chapter 13 relief. He sought to avoid the lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 544 because the Bank failed to perfect its lien on the manufactured home pursuant to Kentucky law. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Debtor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first holding that Debtor had derivative standing to seek to avoid the lien. Regardless of the issuance of a certificate of title, Debtor has an interest in the home that is part of the bankruptcy estate. Under Kentucky law, a mobile home is personal property; perfection of a lien requires notation on the certificate of title. The mobile home had not been converted to real property and the lender did not perfect a lien on personal property. View "In re: Barbee" on Justia Law

In 2008 debtor purchased a 2003 auto, financed the purchase, and granted the dealership a security interest that was transferred to a finance company and noted on the title. The security interest was later transferred to WFB, which did not record the assignment or note it on the title. Debtor defaulted in 2010 and WFB repossessed the vehicle on January 4, 2011. Debtor filed her chapter 7 petition on January 28, 2011. WFB filed a motion for relief from stay, claiming that debtor did not have equity in the vehicle and it was entitled to relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 361, 362, 363 and 554. The court concluded that WFB did not have a perfected security interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Ohio law does require that assignment of a security interest in a motor vehicle be noted on the certificate of title for that interest to remain properly perfected. WFB has a properly perfected security interest in the vehicle and is the party entitled to enforce the security interest. View "In re: Rice" on Justia Law

From 2005 to 2008, debtor, the owner of Waffle House Ffranchises, periodically failed to make all federal income tax withholding, social security, and unemployment payments due to the IRS and to timely file returns. The IRS assessed penalties in excess of $1.5 million; debtor made payments of $637,000 toward the penalty. In 2009 a chapter 11 reorganization plan was confirmed; the business continued to operate until its assets were sold. In 2010 debtor sued the IRS under 11 U.S.C. 548, 550 and the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 66-3-301, asserting that the penalty payments provided no value to debtor and were made at a time when the debtor was incurring debt beyond its ability to pay. The bankruptcy court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the payments resulted in a dollar-for-dollar reduction of debtor's undisputed tax debt. Payment of a fine or penalty is not an avoidable transfer, regardless of whether the penalty is a noncompensatory penalty.View "In re: Southeast Waffles, LLC" on Justia Law

Debtor owned one parcel in Wisconsin and three in Michigan. Permanently disabled and unemployed, he obtained and defaulted on mortgages. The bank began foreclosure. Debtor sold one Michigan property and gave all proceeds to the bank, which continued its Wisconsin foreclosure. In the Michigan foreclosure, the bank bid the full amount of the loan (likely more than value) and obtained a deed. Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition before the Wisconsin foreclosure sale. The bank filed a proof of claim and motion for relief from the automatic stay to reverse foreclosure on the Michigan property and proceed with the Wisconsin sale. The bankruptcy court concluded that Debtor owed the bank nothing, so there was no reason to continue the Wisconsin foreclosure. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bank made a unilateral mistake by bidding the entire amount of the debt at the Michigan foreclosure sale. The sale may not be invalidated, absent fraud. The bank is required by Michigan law to pay, or credit, Debtor the full amount of its bid and has been paid in full. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 558, Debtor is entitled to offset the Michigan sale credit bid against the Wisconsin judgment, satisfying the Wisconsin judgment so that Debtor no longer owes the bank any money.

The debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11. Prior to expiration of the 120-day deadline to assume or reject nonresidential real property leases provided for under 11 U.S.C. 365, debtor obtained a 90-day extension of time to assume or reject leases, making August 30, 2010, the deadline. On August 13, 2010, the debtor filed a second motion for an extension. The landlord would not consent and, on August 27, the trustee filed a motion to assume the lease. The bankruptcy court held that the deadline set forth in 11 U.S.C. 365(d)(4) for assuming a nonresidential real property lease is satisfied upon the debtor filing a motion to assume the lease. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and successfully sought to avoid a lien on her manufactured home held by defendant. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The mortgage did not originally cover the manufactured home, which was personal property until 2007,when a state court entered an in rem judgment and order of sale converting it to an improvement to real property. After that, the home was covered by the mortgage. The conversion, unlike the mortgage, was involuntary as to the plaintiff, so she had standing under 11 U.S.C. 522(h) to avoid the lien.

Plaintiff sued the bank after it refused to honor cashier's checks it thought he had obtained by fraud. One check, for $100,000, had previously bounced, another was a starter check for $80,000 and was dated five months earlier. The bank had communication with plaintiff's former employer, indicating fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to the bank. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Michigan, the bank's actions were lawful even absent any finding of fraud. The checks were not supported by consideration, plaintiff was not a person entitled to enforce the instruments, and plaintiff was not harmed.

The debtor's property was subject to first and second mortgages with complex histories of assignment involving the defendants. The district court dismissed the chapter 7 trustee's action for declaratory judgment to determine the validity, extent, and priority of defendants' liens and vacated a default judgment entered against one defendant, Wilmington. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part. Under 11 U.S.C. 544 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.9-102(1)(az)(3), operating together, the trustee's interest as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor is superior to those security interests which are unperfected as of the filing of the petition, so the trustee stated a claim against GMAC. The bankruptcy court must make further factual findings regarding Litton and Bank of New York as to the first mortgage, to determine which was the secured party on the date of the filing of the petition. The record established that Wilmington was not a proper party, having assigned its interest years earlier, and the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion in setting aside the default judgment.

After a chapter 11 case was converted to a chapter 7 case, the bankruptcy court entered orders granting fees for the chapter 7 trustee's counsel, denying fees requested by chapter 11 counsel, and requiring chapter 11 counsel to disgorge its pre-petition retainer so that administrative expenses from the chapter 7 case could be paid. The Sixth Circuit vacated the denial of fees and disgorgement order and remanded for determination of whether a pre-petition retention letter between the firm and the debtor established a valid lien under Ohio law, securing payment of fees for necessary and reasonable services provided while the firm served as counsel to the debtor as debtor in possession. The bankruptcy court erred in basing its denial on 11 U.S.C. 726, which is a priority scheme for distribution on allowed claims; 11 U.S.C. 330 governs analysis of whether to allow compensation.

The debtor was a member of an investment LLC, engaged in construction. In state court proceedings prior to the bankruptcy filing, the debtor entered a settlement agreement that included an agreement to pay the title company $241,500. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was nondischargeable based on a finding that the debtor obtained financial benefit as the result of fraudulent representations concerning the condition of title, satisfying the elements of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.