Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff rented commercial property to AGC under a lease to expire February 28, 2007. In 2006, AGC stopped paying rent and plaintiff obtained a warrant of eviction in state court. On February 2, 2007, before plaintiff could execute the warrant, AGC filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; the automatic stay halted eviction efforts. Plaintiff successfully moved to lift the stay and executed the warrant on April 24, 2007. Plaintiff sought, under Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, post-petition rent, attorneys’ fees, and interest for the period between the Chapter 7 filing date and the date the warrant of eviction was executed. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, concluding that the pre-petition issuance of the warrant of eviction terminated the relationship such that there was no “unexpired” lease, the presence of which is necessary to obtain administrative expenses under Section 365(d)(3). The district court affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated. A lease is “unexpired” for purposes of the Code where the tenant has the power to revive the lease under applicable state law. In New York it is the execution, and not the issuance, of the warrant of eviction that extinguishes the tenant’s interest in a lease, so, until the warrant is executed, the lease is “unexpired.” View "In re: Assoc. of Graphic Commc'n, Inc." on Justia Law

This case required the court to address the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over suits against non-debtor third parties, as well as the scope of a stay issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4). Pfizer and Quigley appealed from a judgment in the district court reversing the Clarifying Order of the bankruptcy court and holding that the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (Angelos) could bring suit against Pfizer for claims based on "apparent manufacturer" liability under Pennsylvania law. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue the Clarifying Order; and that the Clarifying Order did not bar Angelos from bringing the suits in question against Pfizer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: Quigley Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Statek appealed from an order of the district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy court, disallowing its claim against the bankruptcy estate of Coudert and affirming the denial of Statek's motion to reconsider the bankruptcy court's order. The court held that the bankruptcy court should have applied the choice of law rules of the State of Connecticut, where Statek's pre-bankruptcy action against Coudert had been commenced, and not the choice of law rules of New York State, where the bankruptcy court was located. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded. View "In Re: Coudert Brothers LLP" on Justia Law

Former investors with Bernard L. Madoff appealed from an order entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court in the liquidation proceedings of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq. At issue was whether the Net Investment Method the trustee selected for carrying out his responsibilities under SIPA was legally sound under the language of the statutes. The court held that the trustee's determination as to how to calculate "net equity" under SIPA was legally sound in light of the circumstances of the case and the relevant statutory language. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court.

Plaintiff, the SEC, appealed from a judgment dismissing its complaint against Marc J. Gabelli, the portfolio manager of the mutual fund Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF or the Fund), and Bruce Alpert, the chief operating officer for the Fund's adviser, Gabelli Funds, LLC (Adviser). The SEC's complaint charged defendants with failing to disclose favorable treatment accorded one GGGF investor in preference to other investors. As a preliminary matter, the court limited its jurisdiction to the SEC's appeal. The court held that the complaint adequately stated claims against Alpert for violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a), and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b). The court also held that the SEC's prayer for civil penalties survived defendants' motions to dismiss and must be reinstated where the court found that at this stage in the litigation, defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered this fraud prior to September 2003. The court further held that the complaint sufficiently plead a reasonable likelihood of future violations and thus reversed the district court's dismissal of the SEC's prayer for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court granted the SEC's appeal in all respects, dismissed the cross-appeals for want of appellate jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss as untimely plaintiff's complaint, which alleged breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to commit those three offenses. At issue was whether the district court properly ruled that tolling of the untimely claims, on the basis of defendant's continuing concealment, was unwarranted. The court affirmed and held that the lawsuit, commenced on April 2004, arose from an injury suffered no later than June 2000 and therefore, was barred by the applicable statute of repose, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-577. The court also held that plaintiff could not seek the safe harbor of equitable estoppel due to its failure to recognize that it was required to pursue its action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district.

Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (Enron) sought to avoid and recover payments it made to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity from appellees, whose notes were redeemed by Enron. On appeal, Enron challenged the district court's conclusion that 11 U.S.C. 546(e)'s safe harbor, which shielded "settlement payments" from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, protected Enron's redemption payments whether or not they were made to retire debt or were unusual. The court affirmed the district court's decision and order, holding that Enron's proposed exclusions from the reach of section 546(e) have no basis in the Bankruptcy Code where the payments at issue were made to redeem commercial paper, which the Bankruptcy Code defined as security. Therefore, the payments at issue constituted the "transfer of cash ... made to complete [a] securities transaction" and were settlement payments within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 741(8). The court declined to address Enron's arguments regarding legislative history because the court reached its conclusion based on the statute's plain language.

A debtor, his wife, and sister ("appellants") sought to reopen debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for the purpose of pursuing an adversary proceeding against the trustee of debtor's estate and one of the trustee's bondholders. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion to reopen and properly dismissed appellants' complaint. The court held that the bankruptcy court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion where the adversary claims against the trustee were entirely without merit. The court also held that, in light of the meritless appeal, appellants and their counsel were ordered to show cause as to why they should not be sanctioned.

K&L Gates LLP ("K&L Gates") filed a motion to lift two protective orders prohibiting disclosure of communications made during mediation. Savage & Associates, P.C. ("Savage") filed a cross-motion to enjoin K&L Gates from raising questions about the validity of certain provisions of a settlement agreement as a defense to malpractice in a related action. At issue was whether the district court properly denied both K&L Gates' motion and Savage's cross-motion. The court held that the district court did not err in the denial of K&L Gates' motion where K&L Gates failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the discovery, failed to show that the information was not otherwise available, and failed to establish that the need for the evidence was outweighed by the public interest in maintaining confidentiality. The court also held that the district court did not err in holding that K&L Gates was not barred from asserting a defense challenging the validity of any provision of the settlement agreement in connection with the related malpractice action currently pending against the law firm.