Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Virginia
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Fatima Shaw-McDonald filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia, P.C. after suffering vision loss following cataract surgery. While the lawsuit was pending, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not initially disclose the lawsuit in her bankruptcy filings. Eye Consultants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Shaw-McDonald no longer had standing to pursue it because her interest in the lawsuit had transferred to the bankruptcy trustee. Shaw-McDonald later amended her bankruptcy filings to include the lawsuit and obtained a discharge from the bankruptcy court.The circuit court dismissed the medical malpractice case, concluding that Shaw-McDonald lost standing when she filed for bankruptcy. The court relied on the precedent set by Kocher v. Campbell, which held that a plaintiff loses standing when a cause of action becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Shaw-McDonald appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that Shaw-McDonald had standing to maintain her medical malpractice action. The court reasoned that once the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claim, it reverted to Shaw-McDonald as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Shaw-McDonald did not lose standing permanently when she filed for bankruptcy; rather, her standing was temporarily suspended. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to hold the medical malpractice case in abeyance until the bankruptcy proceedings were resolved, rather than dismissing it. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia P.C. v. Shaw-McDonald" on Justia Law

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A court may raise judicial estoppel on its own motion in an appropriate case, and therefore, the doctrine is not waived if not pled by the parties.After Plaintiff initiated Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, he filed a defamation claim against Defendants. Plaintiff subsequently completed the payments required by the Chapter 13 plan, and the bankruptcy court ordered the discharge of his remaining unsecured debts. Defendants moved for summary judgment and then filed a reply brief to Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the motion, arguing that Plaintiff was judicially estopped from prosecuting his defamation claim because he failed to timely disclose it to the bankruptcy court. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibited Plaintiff from prosecuting his defamation claim after taking the position in the bankruptcy court that it did not exist. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of judicial estoppel was not waived by Defendants for their failure to raise it in their pleadings; and (2) Plaintiff identified no reversible error in the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel. View "Eilber v. Floor Care Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

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In February 2012, Sheryl Ricketts was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Ricketts underwent surgery for her injuries. In January 2014, Ricketts filed a complaint alleging that Charlie Strange’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the accident. Strange moved to summary judgment, alleging that Ricketts lacked standing to pursue her claim because, in September 2012, she had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the bankruptcy court. Strange argued that because Ricketts failed to properly exempt her negligence claim from the bankruptcy estate, the claim was assertable only by the trustee in bankruptcy. The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Strange. The circuit court subsequently denied Ricketts’s motions to correct a misnomer in her complaint or substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the proper plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly granted Strange’s motion for summary judgment because Ricketts did not properly exempt her negligence claim from the bankruptcy estate, and therefore, Ricketts lacked standing to pursue it; and (2) did not err by denying Ricketts’s motions for leave to amend her complaint. View "Ricketts v. Strange" on Justia Law