Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between the City of Las Vegas and 180 Land Co., LLC over a 35-acre parcel of land. 180 Land Co. purchased the land, which was part of a larger 250-acre golf course, with the intention of developing it for residential use. The land was zoned for residential development, but was also designated as "Parks/Schools/Recreation/Open Space" in the city's General Plan. The City of Las Vegas denied 180 Land Co.'s applications to develop the property, citing public opposition and concerns about piecemeal development.In response, 180 Land Co. sued the City for inverse condemnation, arguing that the City's actions had deprived it of all economically beneficial use of the property. The district court agreed, finding that the City's handling of 180 Land Co.'s development efforts rendered any future attempts to develop the property futile. The court also ruled that the residential zoning of the property took precedence over the open space designation in the General Plan. The court awarded 180 Land Co. $48 million in compensation, including the value of the property, property taxes, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees.The City appealed the decision, arguing that the lower court erred in determining that a regulatory taking had occurred and in its calculation of the compensation award. 180 Land Co. also appealed, challenging the amount of prejudgment interest awarded by the district court.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision in its entirety. The court agreed that the City's actions constituted a per se regulatory taking and that 180 Land Co. was entitled to just compensation. The court also upheld the district court's calculation of the compensation award, including the amount of prejudgment interest. View "City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Laura Graham against International Property Holdings, LLC (IPH) and its sole member, Ovidiu Ene. Graham sustained injuries when she tripped and fell over a sprinkler box on IPH's property. During the trial, Graham moved to assert that Ene was the alter ego of IPH, meaning he should be held personally liable for the injuries she sustained on the company's property.The district court found that Ene, as the sole member and manager of IPH, was indeed the alter ego of the company. The court based its decision on several factors: Ene had his own personal gate code to the property and used it for personal reasons without paying IPH or the property management company; Ene's father maintained a garden and a chicken coop on the property; the property's insurance was in Ene's name; and Ene remained the guarantor on the mortgage loan for the property.The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed with the district court's findings. The court clarified that the alter ego analysis for a limited liability company is the same as the analysis applied to a corporation. The court found that substantial evidence did not support the district court's determination that Ene was the alter ego of IPH. The court concluded that while Ene did influence and govern IPH, there was not a unity of interest and ownership such that Ene and IPH were inseparable. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that recognizing IPH as a separate entity from Ene would sanction fraud or promote injustice. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ene v. Graham" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a property dispute between two neighboring parties, Bo and Dan Jones (appellants), and Hamed Ghadiri (respondent). A block wall, erected before either party owned their respective properties, did not follow the property line, resulting in Ghadiri being denied use of a portion of his property. When Ghadiri sought to remove the wall and build a new one on the property line, the Joneses filed a complaint in the district court for a prescriptive easement or adverse possession.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. It found that the Joneses could not claim adverse possession as they had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. It also ruled that a prescriptive easement was unavailable as it would result in Ghadiri's complete exclusion from the subject property. The Joneses appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified the distinction between adverse possession and prescriptive easements, noting that the former results in the acquisition of title and the right to exclusively control the subject property, while the latter results in the right to a limited use of the subject property. The court acknowledged that comprehensive prescriptive easements, which result in the owner of the servient estate being completely excluded from the subject property, may be warranted in exceptional circumstances. However, it found that the Joneses had not demonstrated such exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. View "Jones v. Ghadiri" on Justia Law

In this case, David W. Axelrod, as Trustee of the David W. Axelrod Family Trust, and Reid Limited Partnership (RLP), along with Michael Reid, an individual, were neighboring landowners in Teton County, Idaho. Axelrod purchased a parcel of land in 2003 that was not accessible by road. Reid, who owned and operated an organic dairy farm nearby, leased land adjacent to Axelrod's parcel. Axelrod had two options for building an access road: build along two easements provided in his deed or build onto an existing dirt road that came through the RLP property. Reid preferred Axelrod to build onto the existing dirt road, which Axelrod did in 2004. However, in 2011, the relationship between Axelrod and Reid began to sour, leading to a series of disputes and legal actions.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Teton County, initially concluded that Axelrod did not have an express easement for use of the RLP Easement, but he did have an easement by estoppel. The parties then executed a settlement agreement and stipulated to dismiss the suit. However, disagreements over the implementation of the settlement agreement led to further litigation. The district court granted Axelrod's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Reid, as the nonmoving party, had failed to properly support any assertion of fact or address the assertions of fact in Axelrod’s motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Reid individually and affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing RLP’s counterclaims for conversion and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court also affirmed the judgment of the district court on Axelrod’s breach of contract claim and the judgment of the district court refusing to allow amendment of the pleadings to add Reid Family Limited Partnership (RFLP) as a party. However, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing RLP’s trespass claim and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court also vacated the attorney fee award as against RLP and remanded for determination of an appropriate fee award at the conclusion of the proceedings. View "Axelrod v. Reid Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

The case involves the United States government's action to reduce federal tax liens to judgment and foreclose on real property. The government sought to foreclose on tax liens against a property owned by Komron Allahyari. Shaun Allahyari, Komron's father, was named as an additional defendant due to his interest in the property through two deeds of trust. The district court found that the government was entitled to foreclose on the tax liens and sell the property. However, the court did not have sufficient information to enter an order for judicial sale and ordered the parties to submit a Joint Status Report. Shaun Allahyari filed an appeal before the parties submitted the Joint Status Report and stipulated to the value of the property to be sold.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the district court's order was not final because it did not have sufficient information to enter an order for judicial sale. The court also clarified that for a decree of sale in a foreclosure suit to be considered a final decree for purposes of an appeal, it must settle all of the rights of the parties and leave nothing to be done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds. Because that standard was not met in this case, there still was no final judgment. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "USA V. ALLAHYARI" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between two local water management agencies, Mission Springs Water District (Mission Springs) and Desert Water Agency (Desert Water), over who should be the regional groundwater sustainability agency (GSA) responsible for managing groundwater in the Coachella Valley region of Riverside County, California. The dispute arose from the implementation of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which requires the creation of GSAs to manage groundwater basins. Desert Water claimed to be the exclusive GSA within its statutory boundaries, which encompass most of Mission Springs' boundaries. Mission Springs challenged this claim and also sought resolution of competing claims to GSA authority for an additional three-square-mile area outside of Desert Water’s statutory boundaries.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled in favor of Desert Water and the California Department of Water Resources (the Department), denying Mission Springs' petition for a writ of mandamus. Mission Springs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Desert Water did not violate any provisions of the Water Code by becoming a GSA. It also found that Desert Water did not form a new public corporation or public agency within Mission Springs’ jurisdiction by becoming a GSA, and therefore did not violate section 30065 of the Water Code. The court further held that the Department did not err in posting Desert Water’s notice of intent to become a GSA, as Desert Water had complied with all notice requirements. Finally, the court found that the Department was not responsible for resolving the overlapping claims to the three-square-mile area, as the Act requires the agencies to resolve this dispute themselves. View "Mission Springs Water Dist. v. Desert Water Agency" on Justia Law

Richard DeVillier and over 120 other property owners in Texas alleged that the State of Texas had taken their property for stormwater storage without just compensation, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The state had installed a barrier along a highway median to prevent stormwater from covering the road, which resulted in flooding on the petitioners' land during heavy rainfall. DeVillier argued that the Takings Clause itself authorized him to bring suit, even if the legislature had not affirmatively provided a cause of action.The District Court denied Texas' motion to dismiss the federal inverse-condemnation claim, concluding that a property owner may sue a State directly under the Takings Clause. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that Texas law provides a cause of action that allows property owners to vindicate their rights under the Takings Clause. Therefore, DeVillier's claims may proceed under Texas' state-law cause of action. The Court did not resolve the question of whether a property owner may sue for just compensation directly under the Takings Clause, as it was not necessary to do so in this case. View "DeVillier v. Texas" on Justia Law

The case involves Mojalaki Holdings, LLC and GSSG New Hampshire, LLC (the plaintiffs) who appealed a decision by the City of Franklin Planning Board (the Board) that denied their site plan application to install a solar panel array on a piece of land owned by Mojalaki. The proposed solar panel array required the installation of new utility poles and the removal of mature trees to ensure sufficient sunlight. The land, which was mostly open space and was once a golf course, did not have any specific ordinance language addressing solar panel arrays. The Board, after multiple hearings and a site visit, denied the application based on concerns raised by neighbors about the project's potential impact on the scenery, property values, and previous negative experiences with other solar projects in the city.The Board's decision was upheld by the Superior Court, which agreed with the Board's first and third reasons for denial, namely that the installation of new utility poles would create an industrial look out of place in the neighborhood, and that cutting down mature trees contradicted the purpose provisions. However, the Superior Court did not uphold the Board's second basis, that the solar panel array endangered or adversely impacted the residents, due to lack of supporting facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Board could not rely solely on the purpose provisions to deny the application. The court found that the purpose provisions lacked sufficient specificity for site plan review and left the proposed project to be judged by the subjective views of the Board through ad hoc decision making. The court granted the plaintiffs a builder's remedy, allowing them to proceed with their development provided they comply with all other applicable regulations. View "Mojalaki Holdings v. City of Franklin" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Town of Ferrisburgh and 2078 Jersey Street, LLC, the latter of which had purchased a parcel of land in the town and began constructing an access road to an existing rock quarry on the property. The town's Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) issued a notice of violation to the company, stating that the construction required a permit. After the ZBA rejected the company's appeal of the notice of violation, the company filed for a conditional-use permit. The ZBA denied the permit, concluding that the construction of the road would substantially expand a nonconforming use of the property, in violation of local land use regulations.After the ZBA denied the permit, the company mailed a request for reconsideration to the ZBA. However, the company did not file an appeal to the environmental court within the thirty-day appeal period under Rule 5(b)(1) of the Vermont Rules of Environmental Court Proceedings. The ZBA did not take any action on the reconsideration request prior to the expiration of the time to appeal to the environmental court. After the expiration of the appeal period, the ZBA denied the request for reconsideration.The company then filed a notice of appeal with the environmental court. The town moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the company had failed to timely appeal. The court denied the motion, finding that, under Appellate Rule 4(b)(5), a request for reconsideration tolls the appeal deadline. The town then requested an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the environmental court's decision. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 4(b)(5) is inapplicable in this context and that tolling does not otherwise apply under these circumstances. Therefore, the company's appeal to the environmental court was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The case was remanded with orders that the company's appeal be dismissed. View "In re 2078 Jersey Street" on Justia Law

George Sheetz sought to build a small, prefabricated home on his residential parcel of land in El Dorado County, California. However, to obtain a permit, he was required to pay a substantial fee to mitigate local traffic congestion. Sheetz challenged this fee as an unlawful “exaction” of money under the Takings Clause, arguing that the fee amount should be necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to his specific development. The County’s predetermined fee schedule, Sheetz argued, failed to meet that requirement.The trial court rejected Sheetz’s claim and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The Court of Appeal asserted that the Nollan/Dolan test, which requires permit conditions to have an “essential nexus” to the government’s land-use interest and “rough proportionality” to the development’s impact on the land-use interest, applies only to permit conditions imposed “on an individual and discretionary basis.” Fees imposed on “a broad class of property owners through legislative action,” it said, need not satisfy that test. The California Supreme Court denied review.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the California Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative permit conditions. The Court found no basis in constitutional text, history, or precedent for affording property rights less protection in the hands of legislators than administrators. The Court did not address the parties’ other disputes over the validity of the traffic impact fee, including whether a permit condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development. The case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. View "Sheetz v. El Dorado County" on Justia Law