Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Mojalaki Holdings, LLC and GSSG New Hampshire, LLC (the plaintiffs) who appealed a decision by the City of Franklin Planning Board (the Board) that denied their site plan application to install a solar panel array on a piece of land owned by Mojalaki. The proposed solar panel array required the installation of new utility poles and the removal of mature trees to ensure sufficient sunlight. The land, which was mostly open space and was once a golf course, did not have any specific ordinance language addressing solar panel arrays. The Board, after multiple hearings and a site visit, denied the application based on concerns raised by neighbors about the project's potential impact on the scenery, property values, and previous negative experiences with other solar projects in the city.The Board's decision was upheld by the Superior Court, which agreed with the Board's first and third reasons for denial, namely that the installation of new utility poles would create an industrial look out of place in the neighborhood, and that cutting down mature trees contradicted the purpose provisions. However, the Superior Court did not uphold the Board's second basis, that the solar panel array endangered or adversely impacted the residents, due to lack of supporting facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Board could not rely solely on the purpose provisions to deny the application. The court found that the purpose provisions lacked sufficient specificity for site plan review and left the proposed project to be judged by the subjective views of the Board through ad hoc decision making. The court granted the plaintiffs a builder's remedy, allowing them to proceed with their development provided they comply with all other applicable regulations. View "Mojalaki Holdings v. City of Franklin" on Justia Law

The case involves Hattie Tanner, who was convicted of murder and served seventeen years in prison before her conviction was set aside due to insufficient evidentiary support. After her release, Tanner filed a lawsuit against David Walters, a retired police detective, alleging that he violated her constitutional rights by falsifying investigation reports and providing false testimony, leading to her wrongful conviction. Walters sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court partially granted and partially denied. The court allowed Tanner's claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution to proceed to trial. Walters appealed this decision.Previously, the district court found that Tanner's claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution should proceed to trial. Walters appealed this decision, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Walters knowingly fabricated evidence against Tanner, and thus he was not entitled to qualified immunity on Tanner's fabrication-of-evidence claim. The court also found that a reasonable jury could find that Walters's false statements influenced the decision to charge Tanner, and that without these false statements, there would not have been probable cause to prosecute Tanner. Therefore, Walters was not entitled to qualified immunity on Tanner's malicious prosecution claim. View "Tanner v. Walters" on Justia Law

In 2018, Maryland State Trooper Kevin Caraballo used force while arresting 15-year-old Cameron Lewis. Lewis sued Caraballo for excessive force and battery. Caraballo sought summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to qualified and statutory immunity. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that there were disputes of material fact that precluded summary judgment. Specifically, a reasonable jury could find that Caraballo struck Lewis when the teenager did not pose a threat, was not actively resistant, and was subdued. The court held that Lewis’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force in the form of head strikes was clearly established at the time of his arrest. Furthermore, the court held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Caraballo’s actions amounted to gross negligence or malice, precluding summary judgment in his favor on his statutory immunity defense. View "Lewis v. Caraballo" on Justia Law

A California-based psychologist, Dr. Rick Q. Wilson, was investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for potential violations of the Controlled Substances Act. The DEA issued an administrative subpoena to obtain Wilson's medical, prescription, and billing records. Wilson challenged the subpoena on statutory, constitutional, and privacy grounds.The district court initially dismissed the United States' petition to enforce the subpoena, finding it violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Fourth Amendment. However, upon reconsideration, the court granted the United States' motion to amend the petition and enforce a narrowed version of the subpoena.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the modified subpoena complied with HIPAA, was not unreasonably burdensome under the Fourth Amendment, and did not violate Wilson's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination due to the required-records exception. The court held that the subpoena was issued within the DEA's authority, was relevant to the DEA's investigation, and was not unreasonably broad or burdensome. The court also found that the records requested fell within the required-records exception to the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Santa Clarita Valley Water Agency (SCVWA), a public water agency, sued Whittaker Corporation for contaminating groundwater that the agency pumps from wells. The jury found Whittaker liable for negligence, trespass, public nuisance, and private nuisance, and awarded damages for past harm and restoration or repair costs. The jury verdict was reduced to $64,870,000 due to SCVWA’s fault for failure to mitigate damages and an offset for a settlement between SCVWA and a third party. After a bench trial on the statutory claims, the district court denied SCVWA relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and apportioned costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to SCVWA and Whittaker.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury award on Whittaker’s appeal. On SCVWA’s cross-appeal, the court affirmed in part, holding that the district court’s denial of injunctive relief under RCRA, denial of prejudgment interest, and denial of attorneys' fees were proper. However, the court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in denying SCVWA a finding of liability against Whittaker for one category of incurred response costs under CERCLA and by denying SCVWA declaratory relief under CERCLA. The court remanded the case for the district court to amend its judgment. View "SANTA CLARITA VALLEY WATER AGENCY V. WHITTAKER CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The case involves the family of Joseph Perez, who died after law enforcement officers, under the direction of a paramedic, used their body weight to restrain him while he was prone to secure him to a backboard for hospital transport. The family sued the City and County of Fresno, individual law enforcement officers, and the paramedic, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the officers and paramedic were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that at the time of Perez's death in 2017, the law did not clearly establish that the officers' actions would be unconstitutional. The court also found that the paramedic was entitled to qualified immunity because the law did not clearly establish that a paramedic acting in a medical capacity to restrain a person for medical transport could be held liable for a constitutional violation. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence that the City and County were deliberately indifferent to their duty to properly train their officers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the law did not clearly establish, nor was it otherwise obvious, that the officers' actions, directed by medical personnel, would violate Perez's constitutional rights. The court also held that the paramedic was acting in a medical capacity during the incident, and the law did not clearly establish that medical personnel are liable for constitutional torts for actions taken to provide medical care or medical transport. The court concluded that the plaintiffs produced insufficient evidence to support their municipal liability claim against the City and the County based on a failure-to-train theory. View "PEREZ V. CITY OF FRESNO" on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.B., in a specific facility, St. Mary’s Home for Children, as ordered by the court. N.B., who has behavioral issues and Type I juvenile diabetes, was initially placed in Hasbro Children’s Hospital after her mother refused to take her home due to safety concerns. The Family Court ordered DCYF to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, but the facility refused to admit her due to her medical needs and behavioral issues. Despite DCYF's efforts to secure a placement for N.B., including contacting multiple potential placements and attempting to hire nurses to monitor N.B.'s diabetic care needs, no suitable placement was available.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt for failing to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, rejecting DCYF's argument that it was impossible to comply with the placement order. The court ordered DCYF to pay a daily sanction until it complied with the order. DCYF appealed the contempt order, arguing that the Family Court abused its discretion by finding that DCYF had not exercised reasonable efforts to place N.B. and that it was impossible to comply with the placement order.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Family Court’s contempt order. The Supreme Court found that DCYF had made substantial efforts to place N.B. at St. Mary’s and other appropriate facilities, but compliance with the placement order was outside the department’s control due to circumstances such as the refusal of facilities to accept N.B. and ongoing nursing shortages related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court had abused its discretion in finding that DCYF had not used reasonable efforts to place N.B. and in holding DCYF in contempt. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.D., in a residential facility appropriate for her level of need. N.D., a teenager with severe mental health issues, was under the temporary custody of DCYF. Despite the court's order, DCYF was unable to find an appropriate in-state or out-of-state placement for N.D. due to her high level of need and the lack of available facilities. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) filed a motion to adjudge DCYF in contempt for this failure.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt, rejecting DCYF's defense that it was unable to comply with the court's order. The court imposed a contempt sanction of $1,000 per day until N.D. was placed in an appropriate facility, with the sanction to be placed in a trust for N.D.'s benefit. DCYF appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Family Court. The Supreme Court found that while DCYF was in technical violation of the Family Court's order, it had demonstrated that it was literally unable to comply because an appropriate placement for N.D. was not presently within its power. The court noted the lack of appropriate facilities for girls with N.D.'s level of need in Rhode Island, staffing issues, and an increase in mental health problems among adolescents. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "In re N.D." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plaintiff who was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arresting officer prepared a report of the incident and mailed it to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), but not within the three business days required by statute. At the plaintiff's license suspension hearing, the plaintiff's attorney objected to the admission of the report on the grounds that it was not prepared and mailed within the statutory timeframe. The hearing officer overruled the objection and admitted the report, which was the only evidence submitted at the hearing.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that strict adherence to the preparation and mailing requirement was not necessary for the report to be admissible. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the preparation and mailing requirement is directory, and therefore, strict compliance with that requirement is not necessary for a report to be admissible at a license suspension hearing.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that the hearing officer abused her discretion in admitting an incident report that did not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing provision of the statute in the absence of testimony from the arresting officer. The court concluded that the preparation and mailing requirement was mandatory because it promoted the accuracy and reliability of the information that would be used at a license suspension hearing. The court clarified that the statute describes substantive requirements that incident reports must meet, and the failure to meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible insofar as it fails to satisfy the exception for the report to be admitted without the need to produce the arresting officer at the suspension hearing. View "Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 1, which requires law enforcement officers to inform individuals suspected of driving under the influence that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime. The respondent, Brian Matthew Nash, was pulled over for suspected impaired driving. After failing field sobriety tests, he was arrested and a state trooper obtained a search warrant for a blood or urine test. The trooper informed Nash that refusal to take a test is a crime, and Nash complied. His blood test revealed the presence of a controlled substance, leading to the revocation of his driving privileges.Nash sought judicial review of his license revocation, arguing that the trooper's advisory did not comply with the statutory requirement. The district court rejected Nash's arguments and sustained the revocation. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, finding that the advisory given to Nash was misleading and an inaccurate statement of law.The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute. The court held that the trooper's statement that "refusal to take a test is a crime" satisfied the advisory required by section 171.177, subdivision 1. The court reasoned that the statute does not require officers to inform drivers of all the elements and permutations of what is required before the state may take adverse action against them. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the other issues raised by Nash in his appeal. View "Nash v. Commissioner of Public Safety" on Justia Law