Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Nicholas Beaudreaux, serving a 50-year-to-life sentence for the first-degree murder and attempted robbery of Wayne Drummond, twice petitioned unsuccessfully for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. In the resentencing proceedings on his second petition, the trial court ruled that the order denying relief on his first petition, an order affirmed in 2020, foreclosed relief. Beaudreaux appealed again, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, which clarified the procedural law governing section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings.Previously, Beaudreaux and a co-defendant, Brandon Crowder, were charged with the same two counts: murdering Drummond and attempting to rob Drummond. However, only Beaudreaux was charged with personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death to Drummond. A jury trial followed, and Crowder changed his plea from not guilty to no contest to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The jury found Beaudreaux guilty of first-degree murder and attempted robbery of Drummond, and found the sentencing enhancement allegations against him to be true.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, the court agreed with Beaudreaux that the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by once again failing to appoint counsel, and by relying on substantive facts summarized in this court’s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. However, the court concluded that these errors were harmless. The dispositive question was whether, based on the record of conviction, Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond’s actual killer. The court concluded that the record was sufficient to refute conclusively Beaudreaux’s attempt to allege entitlement to section 1172.6 relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "P. v. Beaudreaux" on Justia Law

The defendant, Heclouis Nieves-Díaz, was on supervised release for a federal drug conviction when he was convicted of possession of ammunition as a convicted felon, illegal possession of a machine gun, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. He received an 84-month prison term for each conviction, to be served concurrently. His supervised release was also revoked, resulting in an additional 18-month prison term to be served consecutively to his 84-month sentences.Nieves had previously pleaded guilty to one count of drug conspiracy and was sentenced to 80 months of imprisonment and 96 months of supervised release. His term of supervised release was twice revoked. While on his third term of supervised release, Nieves was arrested following a search of an apartment where he was residing. The search yielded cocaine, marijuana, approximately 149 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition, and a device that could convert a Glock pistol into a fully automatic weapon.Nieves appealed his 84-month sentences and the revocation sentence. He argued that the District Court improperly calculated his Guidelines Sentencing Range (GSR) for each of the underlying offenses and that the court's application of a four-level enhancement was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the District Court did err in applying the four-level enhancement, as the record did not support the determination that the ammunition in this case had the required potentially facilitative effect. Therefore, the court vacated the District Court's sentences and remanded for resentencing. However, the court affirmed the revocation sentence, finding it both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Nieves-Diaz" on Justia Law

In 2016, Shawn Vincent Gray was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) for one count of stalking and two counts of making criminal threats. He also admitted to a prior strike allegation and six one-year prior prison commitment allegations. As part of his plea agreement, Gray acknowledged that an NGI verdict would mean that he would be committed to the Department of Mental Health for a maximum term of 19 years and four months. In 2023, Gray filed a petition to recall his maximum commitment time and strike the legally invalid enhancement, citing Senate Bill No. 483 (SB 483) and Penal Code section 1172.75. The Kern County Superior Court granted the petition, recalculating Gray's maximum commitment term to 13 years and four months.The People appealed the superior court's decision, arguing that the court erred by recalculating Gray's maximum term of commitment. They claimed that the legislative changes that eliminated most section 667.5(b) sentencing enhancements did not retroactively apply to Gray's 2016 maximum term of commitment and that because Gray continued to be a threat to public safety, any reduced commitment recalculation was erroneous.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District found that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and consider Gray's petition in the first instance and its subsequent orders were void. The court concluded that the People's appeal was statutorily authorized and that it had appellate jurisdiction. However, it also found that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and consider Gray's petition in the first instance and its subsequent orders were void. The court reversed and vacated the superior court's orders recalling the 2016 judgment and recalculating Gray's maximum term of commitment. The court ordered the superior court to instead enter a new and different order denying Gray's petition in its entirety. View "P. v. Gray" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joshua Aldridge, who was found guilty of conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, among other charges. Aldridge and his girlfriend, Kathy, were both addicted to painkillers and sought out higher-dosage pills from Larry Dean Porter. When they could not afford to purchase pills with money, Porter would allow them to have the pills as long as they agreed to pay him later. Eventually, Kathy was informed that she could “work off” the debt by “cleaning and doing sexual favors.” Aldridge would regularly drive Kathy to Porter’s house, take his pill, leave Kathy at the house, and return to pick her up when she was finished.The district court denied Aldridge's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the adult-sex-trafficking-by-force conspiracy charge. The court reasoned that a jury could find that Aldridge had personally coerced Kathy to buy pills in exchange for sex acts. The jury found Aldridge guilty on all three counts. At sentencing, the district judge applied two enhancements over Aldridge’s objections: the enhancement for use of a computer to entice or offer and the vulnerable-victim enhancement.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Aldridge challenged the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion and the district court’s application of two sentencing enhancements. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Aldridge knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy with intent to further its objective. The court also found that the district court properly applied the sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

The case involves Katrina Robinson, founder and director of The Healthcare Institute (THI), a for-profit company in Memphis, Tennessee, that provided certified nursing assistant training. THI received a federal grant from the Geriatrics Workforce Enhancement Program (GWEP), administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), from 2015 to 2019. The grant provided scholarships for eligible THI students. Robinson was convicted of four counts of wire fraud for actions she took in administering the grant. The district court granted Robinson's post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal on two of the counts, and Robinson appealed the denial of acquittal on the remaining two counts.The district court's decision was based on a federal investigation that raised concerns about Robinson's use of HRSA grant funds for personal expenses and discrepancies in Annual Performance Reports (APRs) that Robinson had submitted on THI’s behalf. The APRs contained inaccurate information on the number of students who graduated from the program, the number of students who received grant-funded scholarships, and the unique numerical identifiers assigned to students. The government argued that these "errors" were intentional manipulations by Robinson to ensure THI’s continued receipt of grant funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Robinson's submission of false information in the APRs constituted a course of conduct intended to deprive the government of money. The court also found that Robinson's intent to defraud was demonstrated by her direct involvement in preparing and submitting the APRs, and her direction to charge personal wedding expenses to the grant. The court reversed the district court's grant of acquittal on one of the counts, finding that a rational juror could conclude that Robinson's transmission of materially false information was done to induce HRSA to continue funding the grant. The court affirmed the district court's denial of acquittal on the remaining two counts. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The defendant, Kristen Nicole Wetzel, was convicted of unlawful taking of a vehicle, also known as "joyriding," under West Virginia Code § 17-8-4(a). As part of a plea agreement, she was sentenced to six months of incarceration, with only ten days of actual confinement and the remainder of the sentence suspended in favor of probation. The court later amended the confinement period to 240 hours of actual incarceration. Wetzel filed a motion to correct her sentence, arguing that the language of the sentencing order was denying her "good time" credit, a reduction of sentence for good conduct.The Circuit Court of Barbour County denied Wetzel's motion. The court found that the issue of good time credit was within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the court. The court also noted that its sentencing order did not prohibit Wetzel from receiving good time credit. If Wetzel believed she should be receiving credit for good time, the court suggested she should file a civil action against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Wetzel's sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on any impermissible factor. The court agreed with the lower court that the issue of good time credit fell within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Therefore, the court found no basis to grant Wetzel any relief under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. View "State of West Virginia v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

Jeremy Travis Payne, a California parolee, was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and cocaine. The charges stemmed from evidence obtained from a house in Palm Desert, California, and from Payne's cell phone, which was unlocked by police using Payne's thumbprint during a traffic stop. Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search of his phone and the house violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.The district court denied Payne's motion. It found that the search of Payne's phone was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given Payne's parole status and the conditions of his parole, which allowed for suspicionless searches of his property. The court also determined that the use of Payne's thumbprint to unlock his phone was not testimonial and therefore did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the search of Payne's phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It found that the search was authorized under a general search condition of Payne's parole, which allowed for the suspicionless search of any property under Payne's control. The court also held that the search of Payne's phone was not unreasonable under California law, which prohibits arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches.Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that the use of Payne's thumbprint to unlock his phone was not testimonial because it required no cognitive exertion. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment did not apply.Finally, the court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for the house in Palm Desert, California, without regard to observations made during a challenged protective sweep of the house. View "USA V. PAYNE" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Louis McIntosh, who was indicted on multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses. The indictment demanded that McIntosh forfeit all property derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the offenses. The Government later provided McIntosh with a pretrial bill of particulars that included as property subject to forfeiture $75,000 in cash and a BMW that McIntosh purchased just five days after one of the robberies. After a jury convicted McIntosh, the District Court imposed a forfeiture of $75,000 and the BMW at the sentencing hearing. However, the Government failed to submit an order of forfeiture for the court’s signature within a week from the hearing as ordered by the District Court.On appeal, the Government moved for a limited remand to supplement the record with a written order of forfeiture. The Second Circuit granted the unopposed motion. Back in District Court, McIntosh argued that the failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B) meant that the District Court could not proceed with forfeiture at all. The District Court overruled McIntosh’s objections, finding that the Rule is a time-related directive, and that the failure to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before sentencing did not prevent the court from ordering forfeiture because the missed deadline did not prejudice McIntosh. The Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part.The Supreme Court of the United States held that a district court’s failure to comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s requirement to enter a preliminary order before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review. The Court agreed with the Second Circuit and the Government that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) establishes a time-related directive. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. View "McIntosh v. United States" on Justia Law

Devonte Veasley was charged with possessing a firearm while using a controlled substance, following an incident where he shot at his drug dealer. Veasley pleaded guilty to the charge. However, after the Supreme Court ruled in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen that a New York law requiring "proper cause" to carry a firearm violated the Second Amendment, Veasley sought to withdraw his plea or have the indictment dismissed. He argued that the federal statute under which he was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by someone using or addicted to a controlled substance, was facially unconstitutional. The district court did not allow him to withdraw his plea or dismiss the indictment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected Veasley's facial challenge to the statute. The court reasoned that the prohibition of firearm possession by drug users or addicts does not always violate the Second Amendment. The court drew analogies to historical regulations that restricted the rights of certain groups, such as the mentally ill and those who used firearms to terrorize others, to bear arms. The court concluded that, at least for some drug users, the statute imposes a comparable burden on the right to bear arms and serves a comparable justification. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Veasley" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Israel Marcial Uriostegui, who was convicted of first-degree residential burglary by a jury. Uriostegui appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his objection under section 231.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section aims to prevent the improper removal of jurors based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or membership in another protected group. Uriostegui's objection was based on the prosecutor's peremptory challenge against a prospective juror, T.N., who appeared to be Hispanic.Previously, the trial court had asked T.N. for basic information during voir dire. T.N. disclosed her employment at Taco Bell, her current unemployment due to an injury, and her lack of prior jury service. She also revealed that two of her family members had been convicted of a crime, but she was not close to them. When the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against T.N., Uriostegui's counsel objected, arguing that the basis for excusing T.N. was presumptively invalid under section 231.7. The prosecutor justified the challenge by citing T.N.'s "lack of life experience," her unemployment, and her demeanor. The trial court denied Uriostegui's objection, finding no substantial likelihood that T.N.'s perceived membership in a protected class was a factor in the peremptory challenge.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District, Uriostegui contended that the trial court erred in denying his objection under section 231.7. The court agreed with Uriostegui, stating that the prosecutor's reasons for excusing T.N. were presumptively invalid under section 231.7. The court found that the prosecutor's reasons and the trial court's findings did not overcome the presumption of invalidity. The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Uriostegui's objection under section 231.7. As a result, the judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Uriostegui" on Justia Law