Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

by
In a case involving a city manager's personal social media account, a citizen sued the city manager under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his First Amendment rights were violated when the manager deleted his comments and blocked him from commenting further. The city manager argued that he operated his social media account in his private capacity, thus not constituting state action required for §1983 liability. The District Court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed this view, determining that the city manager's social media conduct did not constitute state action.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that a public official's social media activity constitutes state action under §1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts. The court emphasized that the first prong is grounded in the requirement that the conduct causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State. The second prong requires that the official must purport to use that authority. The court noted that the nature of the technology matters to the state-action analysis and that the state-action doctrine requires a fact-intensive inquiry. View "Lindke v. Freed" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Michael Goguen, an engineer and businessman, who was the subject of two civil suits alleging sexual and criminal misconduct. The New York Post published an article detailing these lawsuits, which Goguen claimed was defamatory. Goguen filed a defamation lawsuit against New York Post's parent company, NYP Holdings, and others. In response, NYP Holdings argued that their article was protected by New York’s fair report privilege, a law that protects media from defamation suits if they are reporting on official proceedings.However, the District Court in Montana, where Goguen resides, applied Montana law and denied NYP Holdings' motion to dismiss, finding that whether the article was privileged was a question of fact for the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana determined that under Montana's choice of law rules, New York law should be applied to determine the fair report privilege. The Court found that all the contested statements in the article fairly and accurately reported the lawsuits against Goguen and were thus protected by New York's fair report privilege. Therefore, the Court held that NYP Holdings was entitled to dismissal of Goguen’s complaint.The Court also upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss Goguen's defamation claim against former police chief Bill Dial, ruling that Dial's statements in the article were protected opinions and not actionable. View "Goguen v. NYP Holdings" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a group of plaintiffs who used the online cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, to purchase crypto-assets known as "tokens". They allege Binance violated the Securities Act of 1933 and the "Blue Sky" securities laws of various states by selling these tokens without registration. They also sought to rescind contracts they entered into with Binance under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, alleging Binance contracted to sell securities without being registered as a securities exchange or broker-dealer.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as impermissible extraterritorial applications of these statutes and also dismissed their federal claims as untimely. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this decision. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that their transactions on Binance were domestic transactions, thereby making the application of federal and state securities laws permissible. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' federal claims did not accrue until after they made the relevant purchases, and therefore their claims arising from purchases made during the year before filing suit were timely.This case is significant as it addresses the application of federal and state securities laws to transactions involving cryptocurrencies, and the extraterritorial reach of these laws in the context of online cryptocurrency exchanges. View "Williams v. Binance" on Justia Law

by
A case was brought before the Supreme Court of Iowa involving Kadin Miller, who was convicted of harassment after he posted a video of himself and his ex-girlfriend engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on a pornography website without her consent. This act was done to "annoy" and "get back at" his ex-girlfriend after their relationship ended on bad terms. As a result of his conviction, Miller was sentenced to two years in prison and was required to register as a sex offender. The main issue in the appeal was whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A.Under Iowa law, individuals convicted of any sex offense are required to register as a sex offender if they reside, are employed, or attend school in the state. The law sets forth a comprehensive list of sex offenses that require an offender to register as a sex offender. However, the crime Miller was convicted of, harassment in the first degree, is not a per se sex offense. For non-per se sex offenses, an offender is required to register only if the state proves “beyond a reasonable doubt” to “a judge or jury” that the offense was “sexually motivated.”In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller's crime was sexually motivated. The court found that the district court's reasoning did not focus on the relevant statutory inquiry—whether the crime was sexually motivated—and instead focused on whether Miller had a sexual interest in the video. The court also noted that there was no evidence to support the district court's finding that Miller's commission of the crime of harassment was done for the purpose of his own sexual gratification. As such, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's finding that Miller's crime was sexually motivated, and therefore, Miller was not required to register as a sex offender. View "State of Iowa v. Miller" on Justia Law

by
The case involved a challenge to Texas House Bill 1181 (H.B. 1181), which imposed new standards on commercial pornographic websites. The law required these sites to verify the age of their visitors and display health warnings about the effects of consuming pornography. The plaintiffs, which included an adult industry trade association, several corporations involved in the production and distribution of pornography, and an individual adult content creator, challenged the constitutionality of the law. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of H.B. 1181, concluding that the law likely violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and was preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, vacated the injunction against the age-verification requirement, holding that the requirement was rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in preventing minors' access to pornography and did not violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, the court ruled that Section 230 did not preempt H.B. 1181. However, the court upheld the injunction concerning the health warnings, concluding that they constituted compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. View "Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington heard a case involving Assurance Wireless USA LP, a telecommunications company that provides wireless services to low-income consumers as part of the federal "Lifeline" program. Assurance contested the Department of Revenue's tax assessments on the reimbursements they received for their services, arguing that the transactions were not retail sales. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upheld the tax assessments, finding that the transactions did constitute retail sales and that the tax burden fell on the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), the nonprofit appointed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to administer the Lifeline program.The Supreme Court agreed that the transactions were retail sales and that USAC, not the Lifeline consumers or the FCC, bore the legal incidence of the tax. However, the Court concluded that USAC operates as an instrumentality of the federal government, meaning that the retail sales tax violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as applied in this case. The Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the BTA for further proceedings in line with this opinion. View "Assurance Wireless USA, LP v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
This case involves a lieutenant with the Hartford Police Department who filed a bill of discovery against a blogger who writes about Hartford municipal governance. The plaintiff is seeking to compel the defendant to release data that would reveal the identities of anonymous commenters on the blog who posted allegedly defamatory statements about him. The plaintiff also wants the defendant's laptop and cellphone to be submitted for forensic analysis.The trial court granted the plaintiff's bill of discovery, stating that the plaintiff had shown probable cause for his defamation claim against the authors of certain anonymous comments. The court ordered that the parties should try to agree on a protective order and search protocols to safeguard the defendant's privacy during the forensic analysis. If they couldn't agree, the court would resolve the dispute. The defendant appealed the decision before any negotiations took place.The Supreme Court of Connecticut dismissed the defendant's appeal, stating that the trial court's decision was not an appealable final judgment. The Court explained that the final judgment rule applies to a pure bill of discovery, and the trial court's decision wouldn't become a final judgment until the scope of discovery was clearly defined either by the parties' agreement or by court order. In this case, the parties hadn't yet complied with the court's order to either agree on the terms of the protective order and search protocols or to return to the court for resolution of those issues. Therefore, the trial court's decision was not a final judgment. View "Benvenuto v. Brookman" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to consider an appeal brought by BuzzFeed, Inc. and one of its journalists, Jason Leopold, against a decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The appellants sought the release of a partially redacted report on HSBC Bank's conduct under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The District Court had ruled that the report was entirely exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 8 which protects reports related to the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.The Court of Appeals held that the case must be remanded to the District Court to determine whether the DOJ can demonstrate that the release of any part of the report could foreseeably harm an interest protected by Exemption 8. The Court stressed the requirement for a sequential inquiry: first, whether an exemption applies to a document; and second, whether releasing the information would foreseeably harm an interest protected by the exemption. The Court found that the District Court had not sufficiently conducted this sequential inquiry, and the DOJ had not adequately demonstrated how the release of the report would cause foreseeable harm to an interest protected by Exemption 8.The Court noted that the FOIA requires agencies to release any reasonably segregable portion of a record, even if an exemption covers an entire agency record. The Court determined that the DOJ had not satisfactorily explained why the release of a redacted version of the report would cause foreseeable harm to an interest protected by Exemption 8. Therefore, the Court vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the DOJ and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Leopold v. DOJ" on Justia Law

by
In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Borough of Longport and the Township of Irvington, two New Jersey municipalities, sued Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC, two popular video streaming companies. The municipalities sought to enforce a provision of the New Jersey Cable Television Act (CTA), which requires cable television entities to pay franchise fees to municipalities. The CTA, however, does not provide an express right of action for municipalities to enforce its provisions. The court had to determine whether the CTA implies such a right. The court concluded that it does not and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The court found that the CTA expressly vests all enforcement authority in the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) and that it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the CTA to infer the existence of a private right of action for municipalities. The court rejected the municipalities' argument that the New Jersey Constitution recognizes that municipalities have powers of "necessary or fair implication", stating that this cannot change the plain meaning of statutes or provide municipalities with statutory enforcement authority that would directly conflict with the statute. View "Borough of Longport v. Netflix Inc" on Justia Law

by
In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant, Randall Crater, was convicted of wire fraud, unlawful monetary transactions, and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business based on his involvement in a cryptocurrency scheme. The trial lasted eight days and was based on Crater's management of My Big Coin (MBC), a cryptocurrency company that allegedly misrepresented itself as a gold-backed digital currency and claimed a partnership with MasterCard. The defendant appealed two of the district court's rulings.Firstly, Crater argued that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by refusing to enforce subpoenas against three federal agency witnesses due to Crater's non-compliance with the agencies' Touhy regulations. Secondly, Crater contended that the district court did not perform its gatekeeping duty by admitting testimony from the government's cryptocurrency expert without holding a Daubert hearing.However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Crater's arguments could not be reconciled with controlling precedent or the record in the case. The court found that Crater's failure to show how the excluded testimony of the federal agents would have been both material and favorable to his defense invalidated his Sixth Amendment claim. Furthermore, the court held that Crater's objections to the expert witness's qualifications and methodology were insufficient to necessitate a Daubert hearing. View "US v. Crater" on Justia Law