Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of prohibition to defendant Denita D. Berg, preventing the Circuit Court of Grant County from enforcing orders to sell personal property before determining its ownership. The orders were part of a case brought by Denita Berg's stepchildren, who alleged that Berg had not properly inventoried their father's estate after his death and had committed fraud.The Supreme Court's decision was based on the fact that the orders to sell the property were issued despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact about who owned it. The Court explained that the circuit court's order was erroneous as a matter of law because it went beyond the requirements of Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment should only be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law.The Court concluded that the circuit court had exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering the sale of the property when ownership was still in dispute. Therefore, it granted a writ of prohibition, as moulded, to preclude the circuit court from ordering the sale of the disputed property. View "State of West Virginia ex rel. Berg v. Ryan" on Justia Law

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The court case involves Ferrellgas, L.P., which was appealing against an order enforcing a subpoena issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The subpoena was part of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination charge filed by an employee, alleging that Ferrellgas had engaged in discriminatory hiring, pay, and termination practices.Ferrellgas contended that the subpoena was improperly served, was facially invalid due to procedural errors, was overly broad, and would impose an undue burden. Ferrellgas also argued that the subpoena sought information on hiring practices, which was irrelevant to the specific discrimination charge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all of Ferrellgas's arguments.The Court found that the subpoena was served properly, despite Ferrellgas's claims to the contrary. It also ruled that the procedural errors in the subpoena were harmless and did not preclude its enforcement. The Court concluded that the subpoena was not overly broad, as the information sought could shed light on the alleged discriminatory practices. The Court also held that Ferrellgas failed to demonstrate that complying with the subpoena would impose an undue burden.In conclusion, the Court affirmed the district court's order enforcing the EEOC's subpoena, deciding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "EEOC v. Ferrellgas, L.P." on Justia Law

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This case involved the interpretation of an offer of judgment in a lawsuit where a prisoner, Samuel Lee Dartez, II, sued state officers for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The state officers offered a judgment of $60,000 “plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs allowed by law, if any.” The district court interpreted this offer as allowing attorneys’ fees exceeding the statutory cap and waiving the plaintiff's obligation to contribute to these fees.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's interpretation. The court determined that the offer of judgment was ambiguous in its language pertaining to the statutory cap on attorney fees and the requirement for the plaintiff to contribute to those fees. The ambiguity was resolved against the defendants, who had drafted the offer, and found that the defendants had waived the statutory cap and the plaintiff's contribution requirement.In Dartez's cross-appeal, he argued that the district court wrongly applied a statutory cap on hourly rates. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversing the district court's application of the cap and remanding for recalculation of the fee award without this cap. The court did not address Dartez's arguments that the statutory limitations on fees did not apply due to his obtaining non-monetary relief and because he received an agreed settlement amount rather than a monetary judgment. View "Dartez v. Peters" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Dania Mateo, filed a case against Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC and several of its employees, which included 22 counts alleging violations of Rhode Island's Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA) and Civil Rights Act (RICRA) as well as claims of sexual harassment, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, negligence, false imprisonment, defamation, and conspiracy to commit defamation. The case was pending for nearly 14 years.Mateo appealed a Superior Court decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of certain defendants. The defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the hearing justice erred in granting partial final judgment because he failed to make an express determination that there was no just reason for delay, as required by Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found the defendants’ cross-appeal meritorious. The Court ruled that the hearing justice erred in granting partial final judgment because he failed to determine whether the criteria clearly set forth in Rule 54(b) had been satisfied. The Court held that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. As a result, the Court did not reach the issues raised in the plaintiff's appeal. View "Mateo v. Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC" on Justia Law

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Elaine Bart, a former supermarket manager, brought a lawsuit against her former employer, Golub Corporation, alleging gender discrimination under Title VII and state law. She was fired for falsifying food logs, a violation she admitted to but argued was not the sole reason for her termination. Bart claimed that her supervisor made several remarks indicating that women were not fit for managerial roles, suggesting a gender bias.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to Golub, reasoning that Bart's admission of the violation, which was the company's stated reason for her termination, resolved the pretext inquiry, defeating her claims. Bart appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's ruling. The Appeals Court held that a plaintiff need not necessarily show at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test that the employer’s stated justification for its adverse action was a pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff may also satisfy this burden by providing evidence that even if the employer had mixed motives, the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was at least one motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action. Given Bart's testimony about her supervisor's remarks indicating gender bias, the court concluded that Bart met this burden, thus precluding summary judgment.Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bart v. Golub Corp." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed a decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeals concerning the right to a jury trial in a civil case. The case arose from a dispute between the Estate of Tomlinson and Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc., regarding the installation of a swimming pool and a deck. The plaintiff, Tomlinson, filed a lawsuit and demanded a jury trial, paying a $500 jury deposit as required by a local rule. Later, Tomlinson withdrew her request for a jury trial, but Mega Pool still wanted a jury trial.The trial court and the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that Mega Pool had waived its right to a jury trial because it had not paid a $500 jury deposit, as required by the local rule. The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, ruling that the local rule did not require each party seeking a jury trial to pay a separate deposit. The court also held that, under Civ.R. 38(D), a party may not unilaterally withdraw a jury demand without the consent of all the parties.The court noted that Tomlinson's attempt to withdraw her jury demand without Mega Pool's consent violated Civ.R. 38(D). As such, the court reversed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Estate of Tomlinson v. Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc." on Justia Law

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In June 2020, the City of Claremont received a request for the disclosure of governmental records related to former police officer Jonathan Stone. Stone appealed a decision from the Superior Court ordering the City to disclose thirteen internal affairs investigation reports and four sets of correspondence between the New Hampshire Police Standards and Training Council (PSTC) and the City.Stone argued that the City violated a 2007 Stipulated Award when the City Manager sent a letter to a journalist responding to the request for certain government records. He also argued that the City Manager's letter incorrectly indicated the number of sustained reports that the City located pertaining to him, and that the City violated the Stipulated Award when it did not destroy certain internal affairs reports.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the 2007 Stipulated Award did not prohibit the disclosure of the requested records and that Stone waived any argument that the records would otherwise be exempt from disclosure. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to disclose the records. View "Stone v. City of Claremont" on Justia Law

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In this case, Chuck McKay appealed the dismissal of a complaint he filed seeking declaratory relief regarding the Republican Party primary election for a county commissioner position in Saline County, Nebraska in 2022. The district court had dismissed McKay's complaint on the grounds that the exclusive remedy for his claims was an election contest under Nebraska law.McKay alleged that Anita Bartels, the county clerk, had unlawfully altered the boundary of the district in which he was a candidate, which affected the outcome of the election. According to McKay, when votes from the area that Bartels added to the district were disregarded, he would have won the election. Furthermore, McKay contended that Bartels did not meet residency requirements to serve as county clerk, rendering her actions null and void.Despite McKay's assertions that he was not contesting the election, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that his complaint effectively sought to do so. The court noted that the election contest statutes were generally the exclusive means for challenging election results. McKay had failed to provide any reasons why an election contest did not provide him with a full, adequate, and serviceable remedy for his claim. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of McKay's complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim entitling him to declaratory or equitable relief. View "McKay v. Bartels" on Justia Law

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The appellant, Elinton Gramajo, was a pizza delivery driver for Joe's Pizza on Sunset, Inc. and other defendants, and sued them for Labor Code violations regarding unpaid minimum and overtime wages. After several years of litigation, a jury trial awarded Gramajo $7,659.93. Gramajo then requested attorney fees of $296,920 and costs of $26,932.84 under Labor Code section 1194(a), which allows prevailing employees to recover reasonable litigation costs, including attorney fees. The trial court, however, denied these requests, arguing that Gramajo’s counsel had excessively litigated the case, and that the requested fees and costs were disproportionately high compared to Gramajo’s limited trial success.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight disagreed with the trial court. The court held that employees who win actions for unpaid minimum and overtime wages are entitled to reasonable litigation costs under Labor Code section 1194(a), regardless of the amount recovered. The court stressed that Gramajo was entitled to his reasonable fees and costs, and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine a reasonable fee and cost award. The court did not express an opinion on the reasonableness of Gramajo’s requests for litigation costs. View "Gramajo v. Joe's Pizza on Sunset, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Maryland has ruled that the term "rent" under Real Property § 8-401, as applied to residential leases, refers to the fixed, periodic payments a tenant is required to make for use or occupancy of a rented premises. This definition excludes additional charges such as late fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The court also ruled that any provision in a residential lease that allows a landlord to allocate payments of "rent" to other obligations, thereby subjecting a tenant to eviction proceedings based on failure to pay "rent", violates Real Property § 8-208(d)(2). Further, penalties for late payment of rent, capped at 5% of the monthly amount of rent due, are inclusive of any costs of collection other than court-awarded costs. Finally, the court ruled that the Circuit Court erred in declining to review the merits of the tenants’ second renewed motion for class certification. The case has been remanded for further proceedings in line with these holdings. View "Westminster Management v. Smith" on Justia Law