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The First Circuit affirmed the sale of Debtor’s remaining finished goods inventory to Schleicher and Stebbins Hotels LLC (S&S) after Debtor auctioned of its assets pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtor and S&S completed the sale with the bankruptcy court’s approval. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. (Mission), an unsuccessful bidder at the auction, appealed, challenged the inventory sale. The bankruptcy court ultimately approved the sale of the inventory to S&S. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) concluded that the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standards and that S&S was a good faith purchaser. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) S&S was a good faith purchaser entitled to the protection of section 363(m); and (2) Mission’s remaining challenges to the sale order were therefore rendered statutorily moot. View "Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Old Cold, LLC" on Justia Law

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The “senior Veluchamys” earned great wealth in business. They acquired two banks in the 1990s and merged them. When the bank suffered financial problems, the senior Veluchamys personally borrowed and guaranteed loans totaling $40 million from a predecessor of Bank of America (BoA). The loans went into default in 2008. BoA obtained a judgment against the senior Veluchamys in 2010 for over $43 million. The senior Veluchamys filed a bankruptcy petition in 2011. BoA filed an adversary proceeding against them and their children, the “junior Veluchamys”, alleging a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by attempting to hide tens of millions of dollars from BoA and other creditors. The bankruptcy court determined the evidence established all of BoA’s major allegations. The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed, rejecting an argument that turnover to the Estate under 11 U.S.C. 542 was not the appropriate remedy regarding $5,500,000 they claim they transferred to a company in India, particularly when that company was not joined as a necessary party. The Seventh Circuit upheld the language of the district court’s judgment requiring turnover of specific jewelry; its decision in holding the junior Veluchamys jointly and severally liable; and decisions concerning specific stock holdings. View "Veluchamy v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

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In 1995, Peoria signed a lease that allowed RTC to construct and operate a gas conversion project at the city’s landfill, providing that when the lease terminated, the city had an absolute right to retain, at no cost, the “structures” and “below‐grade installations and/or improvements” that RTC installed. Years later, RTC entered bankruptcy proceedings. Banco provided RTC with postpetition financing secured with liens and security interests in effectively all of RTC’s assets. RTC defaulted. Litigation ensued. The city notified RTC that it was terminating the lease and would retain the structures and installations. After RTC stopped operating the gas conversion project, Peoria modified the system to comply with environmental regulations for methane and other landfill gasses and continued to use the property. Banco sued, alleging unjust enrichment and arguing that it had a better claim to the property because its loan was secured by a lien on all of RTC’s assets and the bankruptcy court had given its loan “super-priority” status. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. No matter the priority of its claim to RTC’s assets, Banco has no claim to Peoria’s assets. By the terms of the lease between RTC and the city, the disputed structures and installations are city property. The lease gave RTC no post‐termination property interest in that property. View "Banco Panamericano, Incorporat v. City of Peoria, Illinois" on Justia Law

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In 2006, the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board awarded a slot machine license to PEDP for a $50 million fee. The Board eventually revoked the license when PEDP failed to meet requirements. PEDP unsuccessfully appealed from the revocation in state courts. PEDP then filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and brought an adversary action against the Commonwealth alleging that the revocation was a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. 544 and 548 and under Pennsylvania law. Citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the fraudulent transfer claims because state courts had upheld the revocation. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit reversed. State and federal courts can address the similar question of property interests; the Bankruptcy Court would not need to review the Commonwealth Court’s decision to reach a conclusion; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the court from finding that there was a fraudulent transfer. The Trustee is not “complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” An award of damages for the revocation is not the functional equivalent of reinstating the license. The court did not express an opinion on the merits of the claim or on the possibility of issue preclusion. View "Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, LP v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that DPG's claim against debtor was not nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The panel held that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err by determining that DPG had failed to establish the essential elements of its claims by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, no evidence established that filing of the mechanic's lien at issue was certain or almost certain to cause harm to DPG, and therefore malicious or willful under section 523(a)(6). View "Dering Pierson Group, LLC v. Kantos" on Justia Law

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A debtor claiming federal exemptions under section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code may exempt a 100% interest in an asset in certain cases because the relevant provisions of section 522 cap the value of the asset a debtor may exempt, not the debtor's interest in that asset. The Fifth Circuit answered the certified question and thus returned the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. View "Peake v. Ayobami" on Justia Law

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After Natchez Regional Medical Center (“NRMC”) filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, H. Kenneth Lefoldt, who had been appointed trustee for the NRMC Liquidation Trust, sued NRMC’s former directors and officers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging breach of fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty. The directors and officers sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and argued that they were immune under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). The district court agreed and granted dismissal to the directors and officers. Lefoldt appealed, and the Fifth Circuit certified questions of Mississippi Law to the Mississippi Supreme Court pertaining to the MTCA as the exclusive remedy for a bankruptcy trustee standing in the shoes of a public hospital corporation against the employees or directors of that public corporation. If indeed the MTCA was the exclusive remedy, then did the MTCA permit the trustee to pursue any claims against the officers and directors in their personal capacity? The Mississippi Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative: the MTCA did not furnish the exclusive remedy for the bankruptcy trustee. View "Lefoldt v. Rentfro" on Justia Law

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The Bankruptcy Code did not forestall the automatic operation of Georgia's pawn statute. In this case, debtor entered into a pawn transaction in which he pledged his car in exchange for a loan, defaulted on the loan, and then, shortly before the expiration of the redemption period—during which he could pay off his debt (with interest) and thereby regain title to his car—filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. The Eleventh Circuit held that the car dropped out of the bankruptcy estate and vested in the pawnbroker when the prescribed redemption period lapsed. Accordingly, with respect to the car, 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2) had no field of operation. The court explained that following the expiration of the grace period, the pawnbroker did not have a mere "claim" on debtor's car, but rather had the car itself. View "Title Max v. Northington" on Justia Law

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The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court concluding that Mountain Glacier properly reserved its arbitration claim in its dispute with Nestle Waters after Mountain Glacier filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy automatically stayed the companies’ arbitration. After the bankruptcy proceedings ended, Mountain Glacier attempted to resume arbitration, but Nestle Waters objected, arguing that Mountain Glacier failed properly to reserve the arbitration in its reorganization plan. The lower courts disagreed, as did the Sixth Circuit, holding (1) Mountain Glacier’s reservation enabled creditors to identify its claim and evaluate whether additional assets might be available for distribution; and (2) neither Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 772 (6th Cir. 2002) nor 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3) required Mountain Glacier to provide more information than it did. View "Nestlé Waters North America. Inc. v. Mountain Glacier LLC" on Justia Law

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The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination that debtor failed to meet her burden of proof to establish an undue hardship pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) to discharge her student loans. The panel held that the bankruptcy court did not err in dividing her federal tax refund by each month in the year and including it as monthly income; based upon the evidence of her age, health, skill sets and abilities, debtor failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that her future employment opportunities will not result in higher wages and full time employment; and the bankruptcy court's finding that debtor had sufficient income in excess of her expenses to make modest monthly payments to her lenders was amply supported by the evidence. View "Piccinino v. U.S. Department of Education" on Justia Law