Rose bought $120,000 of products on credit from Caudill and did not pay. Before a district court ruled for Caudill, Rose gave 440 acres of land to his son Matt, then filed for bankruptcy. Caudill began an adversary proceeding, asking the judge to pull the land into the estate under 11 U.S.C. 548. The bankruptcy trustee's similar request was settled for payment of $100,000. The bankruptcy judge approved that settlement over Caudill’s objection. To get a discharge, Rose reaffirmed his debt to Caudill. He promised to pay $100,000, with an immediate $15,000; failure to pay entitles Caudill to a judgment for $300,000. Rose paid the $15,000 but nothing more. Caudill might have sought to rescind the discharge, but filed a new suit based on the reaffirmation agreement, obtaining a $285,000 default judgment. Rose failed to pay. Caudill commenced supplemental proceedings, contending that, under Indiana law, it can execute on the land that was fraudulently conveyed to Matt. Rose and Matt did not deny that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance but argued that the settlement of the Trustee’s claim precluded further action to collect Rose’s debts from the value of the land. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, observing that issue preclusion depends on an actual decision, by a judge, that is necessary to the earlier litigation. Whether the transfer of the land was a fraudulent conveyance was not actually litigated; the Trustee’s claim was settled. View "Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Rose" on Justia Law

Debtors appealed the district court's order vacating the bankruptcy court's confirmation of their chapter 13 plan. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that, under Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015), the district court's order vacating confirmation was not a final appealable order because the district court did not finally dispose of a discrete dispute. The panel also held that debtors had other opportunities to seek circuit court review pursuant to the certification methodologies in the general interlocutory appeals statute, 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), and the bankruptcy-specific certification procedures, 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(2). View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Watt" on Justia Law

A bankruptcy estate is entitled to the full amount of spendthrift trust distributions due to be paid as of the petition date. But the estate may not access any portion of that money the beneficiary needs for his support or education, as long as the trust instrument specifies that the funds are for that purpose. The estate may also reach 25 percent of expected future payments from the spendthrift trust, reduced by the amount the beneficiary needs to support himself and his dependents. In this case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision after the California Supreme Court's answer to a certified question regarding whether the creditors of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may reach the trust distributions. The panel remanded so that the bankruptcy court could apply the teachings of Carmack v. Reynolds, 391 P.3d 625, 628 (Cal. 2017). View "Frealy v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Sentinel managed investments for futures commission merchants (FCMs) like FCStone, which act as financial intermediaries between investors and futures markets. Sentinel itself was an FCM. Sentinel organized its customers into “SEGs.” FCM customer assets were held in SEG 1. SEG 1 and SEG 3 customers have special protections under the Commodity Exchange Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and SEC regulations, which required Sentinel to hold customer funds separately. Sentinel, however, routinely used securities it had allocated to customers as collateral for Sentinel’s own borrowing and trading. In 2007, Sentinel’s scheme collapsed. Sentinel halted redemptions and sold a large portfolio of SEG 1 securities, depositing the proceeds in a SEG 1 Bank of New York (BNY) cash account. The next day, Sentinel filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court authorized BNY to disburse funds to SEG 1 customers, less a five percent holdback ($25,000,000). The trustee waited a year before challenging that transfer but the district court allowed its avoidance under 11 U.S.C. 549. The Seventh Circuit reversed. rejecting the trustee's argument that an after-the-fact “clarification” by the bankruptcy judge was entitled to preclusive effect. “Whether the property belonged to the estate or not,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned, the disbursal order “ended any discussion ... the disputed property cannot later be clawed back.” The $25 million held in reserve under the confirmed bankruptcy plan was not estate property subject to pro rata distribution. FCStone and similarly situated customers preserved their right to recover their trust property. View "Grede v. FCStone LLC" on Justia Law

A creditor appealed a bankruptcy court’s decision to deny a creditor’s motion to appoint a trustee for the bankruptcy estate to replace the debtor in possession of that estate. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling. The First Circuit also affirmed, holding (1) the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that appointment of a trustee was not justified under 11 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1); and (2) the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the appointment of a trustee would not be in the interests of creditors - the standard for appointment of a trustee under 11 U.S.C. 1104(a)(2). View "United Surety & Indemnity Co. v. Lopez-Munoz" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. The panel held that the bankruptcy court was correct in concluding it had "arising in" jurisdiction; the bankruptcy court had, at minimum, "related to" jurisdiction; and plaintiffs have consented to the authority of the bankruptcy court. The panel also held that the bankruptcy court had continuing jurisdiction notwithstanding the closing of the case; plaintiffs' complaint was barred by res judicata; and the bankruptcy court did not err in finding the shareholders standing rule prevented plaintiffs from asserting the claims. View "Sears v. Sears" on Justia Law

The U.S. Trustee alleged that Husain’s bankruptcy filings regularly failed to include debtors’ genuine signatures. Bankruptcy Judge Cox of the Northern District of Illinois made extensive findings, disbarred Husain, and ordered him to refund fees to 18 clients. When he did not do so, Judge Cox held him in contempt of court. The court’s Executive Committee affirmed the disbarment and dismissed the appeal from the order holding Husain in contempt but did not transfer the contempt appeal to a single judge, although 28 U.S.C. 158(a) entitles Husain to review by at least one district judge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the disbarment and remanded the contempt appeal for decision by a single judge. The court noted extensive evidence that Husain submitted false signatures, documents that could not have been honest, and petitions on behalf of ineligible debtors; he omitted assets and lied on the stand during the hearing. The court noted that Husain’s appeal was handled under seal and stated that: There is no secrecy to maintain, no reason to depart from the strong norm that judicial proceedings are open to public view. View "In re: Husain" on Justia Law

Peregrine was a registered futures commissions merchant, a registered forex dealer member of the National Futures Association, and dealt in retail foreign currency (retailforex) and spot metal transactions. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission notified Wasendorf, Peregrine’s CEO and the Chairman of the Board, that Peregrine’s accounts were going to be electronically monitored. Wasendorf attempted suicide, after penning a statement admitting to 20 years of embezzlement. He pled guilty to misappropriating nearly $200 million from Peregrine’s segregated customer futures accounts. Peregrine filed for bankruptcy. Bodenstein was appointed as trustee. The bankruptcy of a futures commissions merchant is governed by 11 U.S.C. 761-767, which provides for the distribution of “customer property” in priority to all other claims. “Customer property” is defined as including funds received in connection with a commodity contract, which is defined in section 761(4). Bodenstein excluded one group of plaintiffs from that priority distribution, concluding that forex and spot metal transactions did not constitute “commodity contracts.” After the plaintiffs' adversary proceeding was terminated, another group of customers filed a class action adversary proceeding, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conversion, and seeking the imposition of a constructive trust. The bankruptcy court dismissed the action as untimely. In a consolidated appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court and the district court, rejecting the claims. View "Miller v. Bodenstein" on Justia Law

From 1977-1984 Banco reinsured 2% of the Insurer’s business. The Insurer stopped writing policies in 1985, went into receivership in 1986, and began liquidating in 1987. Through 1993 the liquidator complied with contractual provisions requiring balances to be calculated quarterly and statements sent. If the Insurer owed reinsurers net balances for the previous quarter, it paid them; if the reinsurers owed the Insurer, bills were sent. In 1993, the liquidator stopped sending checks or bills without explanation. In 2008, the liquidator notified Banco that Banco was owed $225,000 as the net on 1993-1999 business. For periods before 1993, the Insurer was owed $2.5 million. In 2010, Banco protested the bill as untimely. Pine bought the Insurer’s receivables and, in 2012, sued Banco. Litigation about procedural issues, arising from the fact that Banco is wholly owned by Uruguay, consumed several years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, holding that Pine’s claim is untimely. Each contract required scheduled netting of claims and payment of the balance. Claims against Banco accrued no later than 1993. The contracts specify application of Illinois law, which allowed 10 years (until 2003) to sue on contracts. A statute concerning insurance liquidation, 215 ILCS 5/206, does not permit a liquidator to wait until the end to net the firm’s debits and credits. View "Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado" on Justia Law

When Eclipse, a jet aircraft manufacturer, declared bankruptcy in November 2008, it reached an agreement to sell the company to its largest shareholder, ETIRC, which would have allowed Eclipse to continue its operations. The sale required significant funding from VEB, a state-owned Russian Bank. The funding never materialized. For a month, Eclipse waited for the deal to go through with almost daily assurances that the funding was imminent. Delays were attributed to Prime Minister Putin needing “to think about it.” Eventually, Eclipse was forced to cease operations and notify its workers that a prior furlough had been converted into a layoff. Eclipse’s employees filed a class action complaint as an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court alleging that Eclipse’s failure to give them 60 days’ notice before the layoff violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2101-2109, and asserting that Eclipse could invoke neither the Act’s “faltering company” exception nor its “unforeseeable business circumstances” exception. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the employees’ claims on summary judgment, holding that the “unforeseeable business circumstances” exception barred WARN Act liability. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. Eclipse demonstrated that its closing was not probable until the day that it occurred. View "In re: AE Liquidation, Inc." on Justia Law