Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

Debtors' claims relate to matters stemming from the 2018 foreclosure sale of their home. Mila Homes, represented by its counsel, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's orders denying debtors' motions for sanctions against Mila's counsel; to alter or amend the order denying the request for sanctions and for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law; and seeking to disqualify the bankruptcy judge. The panel concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err by denying debtors' sanctions request based on counsel's statements on behalf of Mila Homes in the Mila Stay Motion. In this case, the bankruptcy court provided debtors with a hearing, listened patiently to their arguments, read methodically through the Bankruptcy Sanctions Motion, and addressed in detail why nothing in the Mila Stay Motion violated Rule 9011. Finally, the panel denied debtors' requests for judicial notice and awarded Mila's counsel $3,000 in sanctions from debtors. The panel concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in denying debtors' fifth motion for disqualification of recusal and that debtors' appeal is frivolous. View "Scott v. Anderson" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a final order entered by the bankruptcy court denying debtor's motion for "Revised and Corrected Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order and/or Reopen the Case, Motion for Evidentiary Hearing/Appointment of Counsel." The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed the appeal as untimely and concluded that debtor's notice of appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a)(a). In this case, debtor recognized that his appeal was beyond the 14-day limit and debtor did not seek an extension of time to file his appeal from the bankruptcy court pursuant to Rule 8002(d). The panel noted that, to the extent debtor is raising an issue involving service of the order, and any related time period for appeal, it is properly addressed in the first instance by the bankruptcy court not in the Notice of Appeal. View "Reichel v. Snyder" on Justia Law

To finance the purchase of a home in 2008, Wood borrowed $39,739.44. About six years later, Wood defaulted, with an unpaid balance of $23,066.66. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which had insured the loan, paid that amount and sent Wood a Notice of Intent to Collect by Treasury Offset, using income tax overpayments. In 2017, Treasury offset Wood's federal tax overpayment of $9,961 toward the debt. In 2018, Wood filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, opting to exempt any 2017 income tax overpayment. Treasury nonetheless offset a $6,086 overpayment.Wood requested that the bankruptcy court void HUD’s lien and order a return of the $6,086. The court concluded that a debtor’s tax overpayment becomes property of the estate, protected by the stay, and the debtor may exempt the overpayments and defeat a governmental creditor’s right to setoff. The district court agreed, stating that because Treasury had knowingly intercepted the overpayments after the Woods filed for bankruptcy, equity did not favor granting permission to seek relief from the automatic stay.The Fourth Circuit remanded. The protections typically accorded properly exempted property under 11 U.S.C. 522(c) do not prevail over the government’s 26 U.S.C. 6402(d) right to offset mutual debts. Although the government exercised that right before requesting relief from the automatic stay, there is no reason to abridge the government’s 11 U.S.C. 362(d) right to seek the stay’s annulment. View "Wood v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

Earl Schwartz Company and the co-personal representatives of the Estate of Earl N. Schwartz (amongst others, together “ESCO”) and SunBehm Gas, Inc. appealed a judgment quieting title to oil and gas interests in Great Plains Royalty Corporation. Great Plains cross appealed, arguing the district court erred when it denied its claims for damages. Great Plains’ creditors filed an involuntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1968. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. The bankruptcy trustee prepared an inventory and published a notice of sale that listed various assets, including oil and gas interests. Earl Schwartz was the highest bidder. Schwartz entered into an agreement with SunBehm to sell certain interests described in the notice, and the district court order approved the transfer of those interests directly from the bankruptcy estate to SunBehm. The bankruptcy case was closed in 1974. Great Plains’ creditors were not initially paid in full; the bankruptcy case was reopened in 2013, Great Plains’ creditors were paid in full with interest, and adversary proceedings were brought to determine ownership of various oil and gas interests, to which ESCO was a party. ESCO argued the bankruptcy sale transferred all of the interests owned by Great Plains, regardless of whether they were listed in the notice of sale. The bankruptcy court rejected ESCO’s argument and determined title to various properties (not the subject of the present appeal). Then in 2016, Great Plains brought this quiet title action against ESCO and SunBehm; ESCO and SunBehm brought quiet title cross claims. The district court held a bench trial and found the bankruptcy trustee intended to sell “100%” of all of the oil and gas interests Great Plains owned at the time of the bankruptcy. But the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, finding the district court erred when it determined the bankruptcy trustee intended to sell all of Great Plains’ interests, including those not listed in the notice of sale. On remand, ESCO and SunBehm claimed they held equitable title to oil and gas interests in various tracts identified in the notice of sale, interest which were confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s ruling on collateral estoppel as a misapplication of the law, and vacated the court’s title determination and its denial of Great Plains’ conversion claim. The case was remanded for the court to determine whether ownership of any interests in the tracts identified in the notice of sale passed to ESCO or SunBehm by virtue of the bankruptcy sale and confirmation order. View "Great Plains Royalty Corp. v. Earl Schwartz Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment in favor of debtors in an action brought by Lund-Ross, seeking to determine the dischargeability of a debt it alleges debtors owe. The court concluded that Lund-Ross's legal theory for the recovery of a debt from debtors personally and the probative evidence Lund-Ross would offer in support of that theory were absent from the summary judgment record before the bankruptcy court. In this case, there is no dispute Lund-Ross did not plead that the corporate veil should be pierced, and it did not argue the corporate veil should be pierced when contesting debtors' motion for summary judgment; Lund-Ross did not allege specific facts that demonstrate debtors used Signature Electric or D & J Electric to commit fraud, violate a legal duty, or perpetrate a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of the rights of another; and Lund-Ross did not identify any state statute or other nonbankruptcy law that would govern debtors' actions as principals of Signature Electric and create a personal debt to Lund-Ross.Because Lund-Ross did not first demonstrate for the bankruptcy court how it could establish a personal debt owed by debtors under nonbankruptcy law, the court, like the bankruptcy court, did not reach the issue of whether such a debt would be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). View "Lund-Ross Constructors, Inc. v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered a certified question of law by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland by holding that the Maryland Contract Lien Act (MCLA), Md. Code Ann. Real Prop. 14-201 - 206, does not permit liens that secure unpaid damages, costs, charges, and fees that accrue after the recordation of the lien.According to Appellant, if a lien complies with the procedural requirements for creation under the MCLA, the lien can secure unpaid damages arising after the recordation of the lien, and therefore, the MCLA permits continuing liens. Appellee, in turn, argued that continuing liens are prohibited by the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and due process requirements. Specifically, Appellee argued that the MCLA prohibits any sum from being secured by a statutory lien before the property owner has the opportunity to contest the sum prior to attachment. The Court of Appeals held that the plain text, legislative history, and case law relevant to the MCLA collectively demonstrate the Legislature's intent to prohibit continuing liens. View "In re Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Morrison in Alabama state court in 2006, alleging common-law fraud and Alabama Securities Act violations, later adding claims under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, alleging that Morrison had given property to his sons to defraud his creditors. Morrison filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the Alabama case to proceed but stayed the execution of any judgment. Plaintiffs initiated a bankruptcy court adversary proceeding, seeking a ruling that their state-court claims were not dischargeable. The bankruptcy court entered Morrison’s discharge order with the adversary proceeding still pending. In 2019, the Alabama trial court entered judgment ($1,185,176) against Morrison on the common-law fraud and Securities Act claims but rejected the fraudulent transfer claims.In the adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court held that the state-court judgment was excepted from discharge, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19), as a debt for the violation of state securities laws, and later ruled that the discharge injunction barred appeals against Morrison on the fraudulent transfer claims. The court found the "Jet Florida" doctrine inapplicable because Morrison would be burdened with the expense of defending the state-court suit. The district court and Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the fraudulent transfer suit is an action to collect a non-dischargeable debt (securities-fraud judgment) or that Plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed against Morrison as a nominal defendant, to seek recovery from the fraudulent transferees. The bankruptcy court has discretion in deciding whether to allow a suit against a discharged debtor under Jet Florida. View "SuVicMon Development, Inc. v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Orexigen produced a weight management drug, Contrave. In June 2016, Orexigen agreed to sell Contrave to McKesson, which provided the drug to pharmacies. The Distribution Agreement permitted “each of [McKesson] and its affiliates … to set-off, recoup and apply any amounts owed by it to [Orexigen’s] affiliates against any [and] all amounts owed by [Orexigen] or its affiliates to any of [McKesson] or its affiliates.” MPRS and Orexigen entered into a “Services Agreement” weeks later; MPRS managed a customer loyalty discount program for Orexigen. MPRS would advance funds to pharmacies selling Contrave and later be reimbursed by Orexigen. The agreements did not reference each other. McKesson and MPRS were distinct legal entities.When Orexigen filed its 2018 Chapter 11 petition, it owed MPRS $9.1 million under the Services Agreement. McKesson owed Orexigen $6.9 million under the Distribution Agreement. With setoff, Orexigen would have owed MPRS $2.2 million; McKesson would have owed Orexigen nothing. McKesson objected to a sale of Orexigen's assets. McKesson agreed to pay the $6.9 million receivable; Orexigen agreed to keep that sum segregated pending resolution of the setoff dispute. Parties may invoke setoff rights when the debts they owe one another are mutual, 11 U.S.C. 553.The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Third Circuit rejected McKesson’s request to set off its debt by the amount Orexigen owed MPRS. McKesson wanted a triangular setoff, not a mutual one, as allowable under section 553. View "In re: Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Debtors’ most valuable asset was an economic interest in Texas’s largest power transmission and distribution company, which NextEra agreed to buy through a Merger Agreement. The sale was not approved by the Public Utility Commission and did not go through. NextEra sought a $275 million Termination Fee. The Bankruptcy Court and Third Circuit rejected that claim. NextEra then sought to recover approximately $60 million in administrative fees under 11 U.S.C. 503(b)(1)(A), arguing that the Merger Agreement required the parties to bear their own expenses. The district court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal, finding that NextEra failed to benefit the estate. The Third Circuit reversed.NextEra plausibly alleged that through a post-petition transaction, the Merger Agreement, it benefitted the estate by providing valuable information, and accepting certain risks, that paved the way for a later deal. The precise monetary value of this benefit and the costs imposed on the estate cannot be distilled from pleadings alone. NextEra plausibly alleged that it is not foreclosed from receiving administrative expenses under Section 503(b)(1)(A). Although NextEra and the Debtors entered into an agreement that generally provided each party would bear its own costs, the agreement exempted from that general rule expenses addressed in the Plan of Reorganization, which unambiguously provides for the recovery of administrative claims under Section 503(b). View "In re: Energy Future Holdings Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of debtor's request to discharge her educational loans pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). On appeal, debtor argues that she was deprived of due process because the bankruptcy court accepted the joint pretrial memorandum as agreed to and approved by all parties on July 31, 2018 and ultimately adopted it as the bankruptcy court's Pretrial Order, while declining to adopt other versions of the pretrial memorandum submitted unilaterally by debtor in the interim.The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in basing its Pretrial Order on the joint pretrial memorandum edited by both parties; it was not an abuse of discretion to disallow debtor from unilaterally modifying that joint pretrial memorandum, as the interests of justice in this case did not so require; and debtor failed to make the factual showing to establish "undue hardship" under Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987), in order to discharge her educational loans. View "Tingling v. Educational Credit Management Corp." on Justia Law