Justia Bankruptcy Opinion Summaries

LUMA Energy, LLC and LUMA Energy ServCo, LLC entered into a long-term contract to operate and maintain Puerto Rico’s electric power transmission and distribution system, previously managed by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), a Title III debtor under PROMESA. The agreement included a liability waiver provision, which was subsequently approved with modifications by the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau (PREB). After LUMA invoked the waiver to deny numerous consumer claims, the Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs (DACO) brought suit in Puerto Rico’s courts against LUMA, PREPA, and PREB, challenging the constitutionality of the waiver. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico accepted the case for review.While the DACO action was pending, LUMA, without participation from PREPA or the Financial Oversight and Management Board (the Board), sought an order from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (acting as the Title III court) to enforce the automatic bankruptcy stay and halt the DACO litigation. The Title III court denied LUMA’s motion, finding the police and regulatory power exception to the automatic stay applicable because DACO’s action was an exercise of governmental authority to protect consumers. LUMA appealed this order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The main holding was that LUMA lacked statutory standing to appeal the Title III court’s denial of its motion to enforce the automatic stay. The First Circuit clarified that LUMA was not a “person aggrieved” for purposes of appellate standing under the Bankruptcy Code as incorporated by PROMESA, because LUMA did not show it suffered a direct and adverse pecuniary injury of the type the automatic stay is meant to prevent. Accordingly, the First Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "LUMA Energy LLC v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs" on Justia Law

The case concerns the founder and sole shareholder of a corporation (VPX), who elected to treat the company as a Subchapter S Corporation for federal tax purposes. After VPX and affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a reconstituted board removed the founder from his executive and board positions, though he remained the sole shareholder. The company’s assets were later sold, and its remaining interests were vested in a trust under the reorganization plan. The founder then sought confirmation that the bankruptcy automatic stay did not prohibit him from revoking the corporation’s Subchapter S status or, alternatively, for relief from the stay to do so.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida denied his motions, holding that the Subchapter S election constituted property of the bankruptcy estate and was therefore protected by the automatic stay. The founder appealed this decision to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which denied the trustee’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, consolidated the appeals, and certified a direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed several issues, including mootness, the law of the case, and whether Subchapter S status is property of the bankruptcy estate. The court held that a corporate debtor’s Subchapter S election is not property of the bankruptcy estate because the election belongs to the shareholder, not the corporation. The court found the appeal neither constitutionally nor equitably moot, determined that procedural hurdles were met, and reversed the bankruptcy court’s denial of the founder’s motions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. View "Owoc v. The Liquidating Trustee on Behalf of the Liquidating Trust" on Justia Law

Jason Wylie, a farmer and business owner, experienced significant financial distress following a serious illness in 2018 that left him unable to manage his farm and businesses. Over the preceding years, Wylie and his mother, Kathleen Sullivan, engaged in several financial transactions, including property transfers and loans. In August 2019, Wylie transferred three pieces of real property back to Sullivan by quitclaim deed, with two properties still subject to mortgages. The parties executed a “Mutual Release in Full” to settle the debt. In August 2020, Wylie filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, seeking to discharge nearly $2 million in debt. The bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Sullivan to avoid one of the property transfers, alleging it was constructively fraudulent and intended to shield assets from creditors.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that Wylie received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the property transferred to Sullivan, determining the transfer was constructively fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i). The court ordered Sullivan to return one of the properties to the estate. Sullivan appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, with no deference to the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Wylie did not personally guarantee the business loan to Sullivan, the Mutual Release did not cover damages from a prior conversion of funds, and the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by ordering recovery of the transferred property rather than its value. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Sullivan v. Miller" on Justia Law

A business entity filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the priority of two loans was disputed: one held by the Small Business Administration (SBA Note), and another by Energy Debt Holdings LLC (EDH Note). During the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court entered a Final Cash Collateral Order, recognizing EDH's secured claim and barring any challenges to the EDH Note’s priority after June 15, 2023. Later, at a confirmation hearing, the SBA’s counsel admitted that the SBA Note was subordinate to the EDH Note, and the parties agreed to a Confirmation Order granting EDH first priority. After the bankruptcy, Joshua Adler acquired the SBA Note and sought a declaratory judgment that it was senior to the EDH Note and requested payment from proceeds received by EDH.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Adler’s suit, finding him judicially estopped from contesting the EDH Note’s priority due to prior admissions by SBA’s counsel. Adler appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which affirmed the dismissal on alternate grounds. The district court concluded Adler’s claim was barred by both the Cash Collateral Order, due to the late filing, and the Confirmation Order, which established EDH’s priority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying clear error review for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The Fifth Circuit held that Adler’s suit was precluded by both the Cash Collateral Order and the Confirmation Order, as his challenge to EDH’s loan priority was filed after the deadline and contrary to the terms of the orders. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of Adler’s claims. Judicial estoppel was not decided as an independent ground. View "Adler v. Energy Debt Holdings" on Justia Law

The case concerns two individuals who owned a car loan business in Virginia. Their business, Total Auto Financing, LLC, borrowed significant sums from American Credit Acceptance, LLC, with the loans personally guaranteed by the owners. After a series of renewals and a final short-term extension with restrictive terms, Total Auto defaulted on its debt. Following the default, American Credit replaced Total Auto as the servicer of its loan portfolio with Peritus Portfolio Services II, LLC. The new servicer’s management coincided with a sharp decline in the value and performance of the loan portfolio. The business was eventually forced into bankruptcy, and its main asset was sold at auction for much less than its previous value, leaving the owners personally liable for a large deficiency due to their guarantees.After the bankruptcy filing, the owners, acting in their personal capacities, filed complaints against American Credit and the new servicer (and related parties), alleging a range of claims including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and others. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed both complaints, finding that the claims belonged to the LLC, not the individual owners. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia affirmed the dismissals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the principle determining who owns a claim—whether the business or its equity holders—means that owners cannot personally sue for injuries suffered by the business, even if they are financially harmed as a result. The court concluded that all claims asserted were either direct claims belonging to the LLC or failed to allege a personal injury distinct from the LLC’s injury. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the individual owners could not bring these claims in their own names. View "Bayramov v. American Credit Acceptance" on Justia Law

The debtor in this case filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed a plan that included distributions to Bank of America, a creditor with a secured claim on the debtor’s residence. The bankruptcy court confirmed the amended plan on January 31, 2023, before the bar date for creditors to file claims had passed. Bank of America did not file a proof of claim and did not object to its inclusion in the plan. Over a year later, the Chapter 13 trustee sought to modify the plan to remove Bank of America from distributions, arguing that only creditors with allowed claims—those who have filed proofs of claim—should receive payments under the plan.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the trustee’s motion to modify the plan, relying on its reasoning in In re Ellis, which supported the district’s “plan forward” procedures. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order, agreeing that the inclusion of Bank of America in the confirmed plan required the trustee to make distributions according to the plan, regardless of whether Bank of America had filed a proof of claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the legal conclusions de novo. The court held that under the Bankruptcy Code, the provisions of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan are binding on all parties, including creditors listed in the plan, regardless of whether they have filed proofs of claim. The court concluded that confirmation of the plan “allows” the claims contained therein, and the trustee must distribute payments as directed by the plan. The court affirmed the district court’s order and did not reach the trustee’s argument regarding modification of the confirmed plan. View "Hooper v Crawford" on Justia Law

Two competing companies in the athleticwear market, both producing bioceramic materials embedded in textiles, became involved in litigation over allegedly false advertising. One company, after settling the initial lawsuit by agreeing to pay $2.5 million and refrain from claiming FDA approval or health benefits for its product, filed for bankruptcy before completing the settlement payments. The plaintiff then brought a new action against the CEO of the defendant company, alleging both tortious interference with the settlement agreement and false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, asserting that the defendant continued to falsely represent the product's health benefits and FDA approval.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the Lanham Act claim and awarded nominal damages. On post-trial motions, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff on the tortious interference claim, awarded $2.5 million in damages, and further awarded the plaintiff disgorgement of the CEO’s salary (trebled) as "profits" under the Lanham Act, in addition to nearly $600,000 in attorneys’ fees.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that, under California law, a corporate officer acting within the scope of agency and not at the expense of the corporation is immune from tortious interference claims, and reversed the district court’s denial of immunity and its tortious interference damages award. The court also reversed the district court’s disgorgement award, concluding that the CEO’s salary was not equivalent to profits under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the case was “exceptional.” The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MULTIPLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC V. CASDEN" on Justia Law

A healthcare holding company with several subsidiaries faced significant financial distress during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in the closure of one of its hospitals and the loss of hundreds of jobs. Former employees of this hospital, known as the Reed Creditors, obtained a judgment against the company for unpaid wages. Shortly after this judgment, the company filed for bankruptcy under Subchapter V of Chapter 11, which is available only to debtors with less than $7.5 million in liquidated, noncontingent debt. The company’s filings listed a disputed debt to LHP Hospital Group, Inc. (LHP) as unliquidated and contingent, based on the terms of a recent settlement agreement that required LHP to make a written demand for payment before any obligation would arise.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware found that, because LHP had not made a demand before the bankruptcy filing, the debt was both contingent and unliquidated. This meant the company qualified for Subchapter V relief. The Bankruptcy Court also approved the company’s reorganization plan, which included a settlement with insiders in exchange for a release of potential avoidance (fraudulent transfer) claims. The court determined, after hearing testimony, that there was little likelihood of success on those claims and that the settlement was reasonable. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware affirmed both the eligibility determination and the approval of the plan, concluding the Reed Creditors had not shown the settlement was unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that the LHP debt was properly classified as contingent and unliquidated, allowing the company to proceed under Subchapter V. The court also held that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement with insiders and overruling the Reed Creditors’ objections. The company’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot was denied. View "In re Alecto Healthcare Services LLC" on Justia Law

A debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York and subsequently brought an adversary complaint against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The debtor sought a determination that her federal income tax debts for certain years were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), meaning they would be eliminated through bankruptcy. She received a general discharge, but her complaint remained pending due to delays in serving the IRS. Before service was completed, the IRS filed its own complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to reduce the tax debts to judgment and contending they were excepted from discharge on the grounds of fraud or willful evasion.The IRS moved to dismiss the debtor’s complaint in the bankruptcy court, arguing there was no justiciable dispute because the debtor had not plausibly alleged a concrete injury, and also argued that the Declaratory Judgment Act barred the requested relief. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, allowing the debtor to file a supplemental complaint to address any jurisdictional deficiencies, reasoning that the IRS’s later assertion of nondischargeability in district court created a live controversy. The IRS appealed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York certified the appeal directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, noting the absence of controlling precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the debtor’s initial complaint failed to allege an injury in fact, as it was based only on hypothetical future harm and not on any concrete action by the IRS. The court further held that, even if a supplemental complaint could cure a jurisdictional defect, the bankruptcy court should have dismissed the case in deference to the district court, which was the first to have jurisdiction over a justiciable dispute. The Second Circuit vacated the bankruptcy court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss both the original and supplemental complaints. View "In Re: Goebel" on Justia Law

A company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which was later converted to Chapter 7. The trustee identified multiple parcels of real property that had been transferred to affiliated entities for no consideration, claiming these transfers were fraudulent. The parties settled, and it was agreed that the properties would be treated as assets of the bankruptcy estate and sold free and clear of liens, claims, and interests. The Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement and sale, ordering that any claims against the sale proceeds must be filed within thirty days. Cloud 9 Properties, LLC filed three claims related to the properties, attaching mortgage documents but initially lacking promissory notes. After an objection was raised due to insufficient evidence of debt owed to Cloud 9, Cloud 9 submitted the notes, but they showed the debts were actually owed to other entities at the relevant time.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment for the objector, INXS VII, LLC, disallowing all of Cloud 9’s claims because Cloud 9 did not own the notes at the time the claims were filed. The District Court for the Middle District of Florida affirmed this decision, holding that only a party with an enforceable right to payment at the time of filing could assert a valid claim in bankruptcy. Bay United Holdings, LLC, which had been assigned Cloud 9’s claims, appealed, arguing that the existence of the mortgages justified the claims and that strict foreclosure standards should not apply in bankruptcy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. The court held that in bankruptcy, a creditor must demonstrate it has the right to enforce its claim at the time of filing. If a claimant cannot establish its entitlement to payment when the claim is filed, the claim is properly disallowed. The court rejected arguments for equitable relief and clarified that the validity of a claim in bankruptcy depends on enforceability under applicable state law. View "Bay United Holdings, LLC. v. INXS VII, LLC" on Justia Law